Offensive Trademarks Are Protected Free Speech Under the First Amendment
Published: July 6, 2017
Simon Tam is the lead singer of the rock group call “The Slants’, which is composed of Asian-Americans. Tam applied for federal trademark registration of the band’s name. While the term “slants” is a derogatory term for persons of Asian descent, Tam adopted the name “to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity,” thereby hopefully removing the term’s denigrating effect. Despite the positive intention, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) denied the trademark application for “The Slants” under a law prohibiting registration of trademarks that may “disparage … or bring … into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U.S.C. §1052(a). However, in its recent decision in Matal v. Tam, the United States Supreme Court found that this law violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. As the Supreme Court opines, it is a bedrock principle of the First Amendment that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”
The Lanham Act, enacted in 1946, serves as the foundation of our current federal trademark law. A goal of this Act is to provide federal “protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” The Lanham Act, however, excludes registration of certain trademarks. For example, under 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1), “a trademark cannot be registered if it is ‘merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive’ of goods.” Further, under 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), a trademark cannot be registered “if it is so similar to an already registered trademark or trade name that it is ‘likely … to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or to deceive.’” In the case of the trademark “The Slants”, the USPTO invoked another exclusion, the disparagement clause of 15 U.S.C. §1052(a), to deny registration of the trademark. The disparagement clause prohibits registration of a trademark that “may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute …”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined that the disparagement clause of 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) is unconstitutional “viewpoint” discrimination. The Court noted that the law “applies equally to marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue.” But even though “the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement of all groups,” it is still viewpoint discrimination because it “denies registration to any mark that is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group.” As the Supreme Court has previously stated, “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”
The Court next had to determine whether the Government’s action and this statute could survive constitutional scrutiny given that it amounted to viewpoint discrimination. The Court considered whether trademarks are commercial speech because at least some of the justices held the opinion that the Government’s regulation of trademarks would be subject to the more relaxed scrutiny described in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y. rather than strict scrutiny. In concurring opinions, other justices asserted that whenever the government creates regulations of speech because of the ideas it conveys, the regulations are subject to strict scrutiny regardless of whether the speech can be characterized as commercial in nature. Despite this disagreement between the justices, they all concurred in the finding that “the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment” because it was determined that the law could not even survive the relaxed standard of scrutiny. Therefore, Tam has the right to register his trademark “The Slants”.
As a result of this Supreme Court decision, another longstanding dispute was resolved almost immediately. The Justice Department and five Native Americans fighting the NFL’s Washington Redskins’ trademark dropped their opposition. While the opponents find the Redskins’ trademark to be an offensive slur, in light of the ruling in Tam, the basis for their challenge to the Redskins’ trademark evaporated, bringing an end to legal fights that date back almost 25 years.
In early 2016, pending resolution of the Tam matter and related cases, the USPTO informally suspended processing of applications for trademarks that potentially violate any aspect of 15 U.S.C. §1052(a), including not just potentially disparaging marks but also those that could fall under another clause of §1052(a) prohibiting a trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.” What happens now? While the Supreme Court did not specifically address the “immoral, deceptive, or scandalous” language in Tam, does the reasoning apply equally to immoral and scandalous trademarks? For example, will the USPTO now allow Erik Brunetti’s trademark for his brand “Fuct”? It seems likely.
Will this ruling impact patents as well? As others have pointed out, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) currently instructs patent examiners to reject or object to offensive subject matter and drawings. For example, MPEP Section 1504.01(e) entitled “Offensive Subject Matter” instructs that “[d]esign applications which disclose subject matter which could be deemed offensive to any race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality, such as those which include caricatures or depictions, should be rejected as nonstatutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 171.” Further, MPEP Section 608 states entitled “Disclosure” states that[i]f during the course of examination of a patent application, an examiner notes the use of language that could be deemed offensive to any race, religion, sex, ethnic group, or nationality, he or she should object to the use of the language as failing to comply with 37 CFR 1.3 which proscribes the presentation of papers which are lacking in decorum and courtesy. The inclusion of such proscribed language in a federal government publication would not be in the public interest. Also, the inclusion in application drawings of any depictions or caricatures that might reasonably be considered offensive to any group should be similarly objected to.
An application should not be classified for publication under 35 U.S.C. 122(b) and an examiner should not pass the application to issue until such language or drawings have been deleted, or questions relating to the propriety thereof fully resolved.
While it is not clear how often these MPEP procedures are applied in practice and even though they are procedural rather than statutory in nature, they represent Government “regulation” of expression of an invention. Wouldn’t one expect rejection of patent applications under these sections of the MPEP to be unconstitutional under the reasoning in Tam? Only time will tell just how far the Tam ruling opens the door for intellectual property protection for what many may find offensive. But the First Amendment protects our right free speech whether or not others find it offensive.