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Patent Myths Corrected – Part Two

My last column was the first of two columns discussing some of the most common misconceptions or myths about patents.  Here is the second part, starting with number five on my list.

  1. A Patent Does Not Give the Patent Owner the Right to Practice the Invention.

Inventors and patent owners often assume that a patent gives them rights to practice the patented invention, i.e., freedom from infringement.  Not true.

A patent is a grant to its owner of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, and selling the patented invention in the United States, or importing the invention into the United States.  These rights are called exclusionary rights.  A patent does not provide its owner with the rights to do these things.  An invention may be patentable but still infringe another person’s patent.  In such a case, the patent owner may have a patent on the invention but cannot make or use the invention unless they obtain a license from the owner of the patent that is infringed.

  1. Patents Do Not Infringe Other Patents.

A patent cannot infringe another patent.  Only a machine, article of manufacture, composition of matter, or process can infringe a patent.

As stated above, a patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, selling, or importing the patented invention.  The patent is infringed if any of these acts are committed in the United States without the patent owner’s permission.  Thus, there is no infringement unless someone makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells the invention in the United States, or imports the invention into the United States.  An invention described in a patent may infringe another patent, but only if it is made, used, offered for sale, sold, or imported in the United States.  The patent itself is not an act of infringement.

  1. Patentability and Patent Infringement are Not the Same Thing.

Inventors often think that if their invention is patentable, then it cannot infringe other patents.  Not so.  Patentability and patent infringement are two different things.  An invention may be both patentable and infringe an existing patent.  In both cases, the starting point of the analysis is the claims.

To determine if an invention is patentable, the invention, as it is claimed, is compared to what is known in the field (the prior art).  In general, prior art includes written documents (such as other patents, published articles, catalogs, and websites), as well as actions by the inventor and third parties, that exist before the patent application is filed.

The first requirement of patentability is that the claims must be novel (new or different) over the prior art.  The test for novelty is performed by looking at each element of the invention as claimed.  If all of the elements of the claimed invention are present in a single prior art reference, then the invention is not novel and is said to be anticipated by the prior art.  The invention is not patentable.

The second requirement of patentability is that the claims must be nonobvious over the prior art.  The invention is obvious if the differences between the invention and the prior art are such that the invention, as a whole, would have been obvious at the time it was made to a person with ordinary skill in the art.  Unlike the test for novelty, the test for obviousness is not limited to a single prior art reference – any number of references can be combined to render an invention obvious.  For obviousness to be found, every element of the claimed invention must be present or suggested in the prior art, although not necessarily in the same reference.

To determine if an invention infringes an existing, in force (not expired) patent, the claims of the patent in question are compared to the invention (in a patent infringement action, the district court first interprets or construes the claims to determine their meaning and scope).  If each element of a claim is present in the invention (literally, or in some cases, by an equivalent), that claim is infringed.  Only one claim need be infringed for the patent to be infringed.

Thus, although it sounds counter-intuitive, an invention can be patentable over a prior art patent and, at the same time, infringe the same patent.

New Nevada Domestic Violence Leave Law Broader Than FMLA

Beginning January 1, 2018, a Nevada employee who has been employed for at least 90 days and who is a victim of an act of domestic violence or whose family member or household member is a victim of an act of domestic violence (provided the employee is not the perpetrator), is entitled to a maximum of 160 hours of leave in one 12-month period.

Domestic violence is defined under Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 33.018 as follows:

THE SLOW DEMISE OF CALIFORNIA’S SHAM GUARANTY DEFENSE

The California Court of Appeal decision in LSREF2 Clover Property 4, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067, struck another blow to California’s “sham guaranty” defense – highlighting a recent string of decisions seeking to limit the defense. The sham guaranty defense has long provided guarantors of loans with a defense to lenders looking to obtain a deficiency judgment – often giving a guarantor at least a basis to defeat a lender’s attempt to obtain summary judgment and forcing the case to trial.

A guaranty is an unenforceable “sham” when a lender actually looked to the guarantor at the time the loan was made as the primary obligor, structuring the loan to avoid anti-deficiency protections. See River Bank America v. Diller (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1420. While California courts have not established a specific test for determining what constitutes a sham guaranty, there are certain factors considered in the analysis, including: (1) whether the language of the guaranty imports an obligation on the purported guarantor, making him a primary obligor for the loan and not secondarily liable (First Security Co. v. Storey (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 270, 273); (2) whether the named borrower was a “dummy” or shell entity created for the sole purpose of entering into the underlying loan (Paradise Land & Cattle Co. v. McWilliams Enters. Inc., 959 F.2d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir. 1992)); and, (3) whether the lender actually relied on the financial information and condition of the guarantor rather than the named borrower. River Bank, 38 Cal.App.4th at 1423.

Recently, in LSREF, the California Court of Appeal held that “where the lender neither structures the transaction nor knows, at the time of making the loan, of a borrower’s (or an affiliate’s) failure to follow corporate formalities, there generally will be no basis to apply the sham guaranty defense.” Id. at 1082. LSREF makes clear that a lender can likely defeat the sham guaranty defense by not selecting the borrowing entity or its form which, in many real estate transactions, is a single purpose entity created concurrent with the loan for a specific development. Being mindful of the creation of the borrowing entity, and giving-up control over its formation, can significantly bolster a lender’s ability to effectively enforce a personal guaranty given as security for a loan.

California Finally Rolling Out Its Own Cannabis Trademark Laws

California was the first state to legalize marijuana for medical use.  In 1996, California approved Proposition 215, the California Compassionate Use Act.  Two decades later, California voters approved  Proposition 64, the Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA).  Despite the fact that cannabis has been legal in California since 1996, you still can’t get a trademark in California for marijuana, medical or otherwise.  Why is that.

The problem results from a disconnect between California’s trademark statutes and the California laws governing legal cannabis use.  California Business and Professions Code Section 14272 provides as follows:

The intent of this chapter is to provide a system of state trademark registration and protection substantially consistent with the federal system of trademark registration and protection under the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1051 et seq.), as amended. To that end, the construction given the federal act should be examined as nonbinding authority for interpreting and construing this chapter.

The USPTO regularly rejects applications to register trademarks related to cannabis on the grounds that such use would not constitute “lawful use in commerce”.  The legal reasoning underlying such rejection goes as follows:  Under federal trademark law, the registration of a trademark requires use of that mark in connection with the goods or services in commerce.  Federal trademark law defines “commerce” as all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.  If the goods or services covered by a mark are unlawful, actual lawful use in commerce is not possible.  And in those situations, a mark covering such unlawful goods or services cannot be federally registered.

Cannabis and products that are primarily intended or designed for use in connection with cannabis are federally illegal under the Controlled Substances Act.  The federal trademark office has taken the position that if a mark covers a good or services that would be illegal under the CSA, lawful use in commerce is not possible, and as such, the mark cannot be federally registered.

The trademark examiners in Sacramento have gone further than taking USPTO reasoning as nonbinding authority; they have taken the USPTO reasoning as gospel in  rejecting state applications for cannabis.  However, California’s lawmakers are proposing an amendment to California’s trademark laws that will address this inconsistency.

AB 64 proposes to, notwithstanding those provisions, authorize the use of specified classifications for marks related to medical cannabis and nonmedical cannabis, including medicinal cannabis, goods and services that are lawfully in commerce under state law in the State of California

AB 64 intends to provide a statutory mechanism for allowing the registration of a California trademark for cannabis products.  The bill proposes two new classifications of goods and services may be used for trademark marks related to cannabis, including medicinal cannabis that are lawfully in commerce under state law in the State of California.  The proposed classes are:

(1) 500 for goods that are cannabis or cannabis products, including medicinal cannabis or medicinal cannabis products.

(2) 501 for services related to cannabis or cannabis products, including medicinal cannabis or medicinal cannabis products.

While AB 64 would appear to solve conflict at the California Secretary of State’s trademark department, the down side is that California state trademark registrations for cannabis products will not be available until January 1, 2018.

Patent Myths Corrected – Part One

Patent law is a complicated area of law governed by a confusing set of statutes and regulations that are interpreted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and the federal courts.  Patents themselves are sometimes almost unintelligible and, if intelligible, may require many hours of reading to understand.  It is no wonder that there are a lot of misconceptions or myths about patents.

This is the first of two columns in which I will discuss a few of the most common aspects of patent law that are misunderstood.

  1. Ideas Are Not Patentable.

Clients often want to patent an idea.  Ideas are not patentable – inventions are patentable.

To be patentable, an invention must fall within one of four categories, referred to as statutory subject matter.  Those categories are:  processes (also referred to as methods), machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter.

Process patents include patents for methods of doing just about anything, including some computer software and some methods of doing business (although business method patents are now under increasing scrutiny both in the PTO and in the courts).  Machine or apparatus patents include traditional types of machines as well as computer systems.  Articles of manufacture are devices such as tools or just about any non-machine.  Compositions of matter include chemical compositions, genes, and genetically engineered (non-natural) living organisms, including bacteria, plants, and animals.

The above four categories are the categories of inventions for which a utility patent can be obtained.  There are two additional types of patents:  design patents and plant patents.

Design patents protect ornamental designs for articles of manufacture, such as chairs, dishes, and glassware.  A design patent protects only the appearance of the article, not any aspect of its functionality.  An article may be the subject of both a design patent and a utility patent, however, if it has both ornamental design and function.

Plant patents protect distinct, new varieties of asexually reproducible plants (i.e., plants that can be reproduced without seeds, such as by budding or grafting).  They include such plants as certain types of roses, nuts, flowering plants, and fruit trees.

There are several things that are specifically not patentable.  They are:  abstract ideas and mental processes, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and mathematical algorithms.

Even if a client’s idea fits within one of the four categories of statutory subject matter, it still is not patentable if it is in its infancy.  The idea must be an invention.  The inventor need not have actually made the invention (reduced it to practice), but must have a complete and operative understanding of the invention.  The patent application must contain a detailed written description of the invention and must describe how to make and use the invention without undue experimentation.  Thus, an idea that is not fully fleshed out, even if it is patentable subject matter, is not ready to patent.  The inventor must be able to describe what the invention actually is.

  1. The Inventor Cannot Withhold Details of the Invention to Prevent the Public from Copying.

In addition to a detailed description of how to make and use the invention, a patent application must also include the “best mode” of carrying out the invention.  The best mode is the best way of using the invention known to the inventor at the time the application is filed.

This requirement prevents the inventor from keeping the best way of using the invention a secret.  A patent is a trade-off:  in exchange for the Government giving the inventor the rights to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention, the inventor must fully disclose the invention to the public in the patent.  This is so that the public may practice the invention after the patent expires.

If an invention is easy to reverse-engineer, trade secret protection is essentially useless and patent protection is the better choice.  This is because patents, unlike a trade secret, protect against reverse engineering.  On the other hand, if an invention is difficult to reverse-engineer, trade secret protection may be preferable to obtaining a patent because, unlike a patent, a trade secret does not expire.

  1. You Cannot Tell What a Patent Protects by Looking Only at the Text or the Drawings.

A utility patent contains several parts:  a specification or disclosure, a drawing if necessary, and at least one claim.  The specification is a detailed description of the invention that tells a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention and describes the best mode of carrying out the invention.  The drawings (which may include flow charts) must illustrate all essential elements of the invention.  Drawings are typically necessary for inventions that fall within the subject matter categories of machines, articles of manufacture, and processes; drawings are usually not necessary for compositions of matter.

The specification and drawings describe the different versions (embodiments) of the invention or examples of the invention.  They do not define what the patent owner may enforce with the patent.  This is determined by the claims.

The claims must contain the patentable elements of the invention.  It is the claims that are used to determine whether there is infringement.  The claims must be read in light of the specification and the drawings, but the claims define what the patent protects.  Sometimes, the claims are broader than what is described in the specification and the drawings, so one must read and interpret the claims to know what the patent protects.

  1. A Provisional Patent Application is Not a Quicker, Cheaper Way of Getting a Patent.

A provisional patent application cannot become a patent.  Despite its name, a provisional patent application is not really a patent application at all because it cannot mature into a patent.  Rather, a provisional patent application acts as a placeholder for a utility application – it is a mechanism for allowing an inventor to obtain an earlier filing date for a utility application.

A provisional patent application requires a specification and a drawing if necessary, and should contain at least one claim.  It must satisfy the same requirements as a utility application (written description, enablement, and best mode).  A provisional application is not ever examined by the PTO and no patent ever issues directly from it.  An inventor has one year from the filing date of the provisional application in which to file a non-provisional utility patent application for the same invention, claiming the benefit of the filing date of the provisional application.    Because a provisional application requires the same level of detail as a utility application, it is typically not much quicker or less costly than a utility application.

If a client has limited time or funds, however, filing a provisional application may be better than filing no patent application.  For example, a provisional application may be advantageous if the inventor needs to disclose the invention on short notice and does not have enough time to have a utility application prepared.  In that situation, the provisional application may provide the inventor with an earlier filing date than might otherwise be obtained, as long as what is later claimed in the utility application was disclosed in the provisional application.

Ninth Circuit Holds that “Reverse Confusion” Need Not Be Pled with Specificity

A plaintiff seeking to prevail on a trademark infringement claim needs to establish that there is some likelihood of confusion between its mark and that of the defendant.  Generally, a plaintiff establishes that there is “forward” confusion by showing that customers believed they were doing business with plaintiff but because of a confusion in their respective marks, were actually doing business with the defendant.  Sometimes, however, a plaintiff will seek to establish “reverse confusion” in that a customer believing they were doing business with a defendant actually ends up doing business with the plaintiff.  The Ninth Circuit, in the case Marketquest Group v. BIC Corp. (decided July 7, 2017), was faced with the issue as to whether a plaintiff seeking to prevail under a theory of “reverse confusion” is required to plead that theory with specificity.

For nearly 20 years, Marketquest produced and sold promotional products utilizing its registered trademarks “All-in-One” and “The Write Choice.”  In 2009, BIC Corporation acquired a competitor in the promotional products field and began publishing promotional product catalogs featuring the phase “All-in-One” and in other advertising, using the phrase “The WRITE Pen Choice for 30 Years.”  Marketquest sued BIC for trademark infringement.  After the District Court granted summary judgment to BIC, Marketquest appealed to the Ninth Circuit.  (This article does not address the other issues decided by the Ninth Circuity other than the pleading requirement.)

In seeking to have the Ninth Circuit reject the appeal, BIC argued that Marketquest could not proceed under a “reverse confusion” theory because it had not specifically pled such a theory in its complaint. The Ninth Circuit began by recognizing that the Lanham Act allows a trademark owner to pursue a cause of action against someone who uses the trademark in commerce “when such use is likely to cause confusion.”  Given that neither party questioned the validity of Marketquest’s trademarks, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the main issue before the lower court was “whether there is a likelihood of confusion: that is, whether Defendants’ `actual practice[s were] likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods … in question.’”  Since at least 2005, the Ninth Circuit has recognized two theories of consumer confusion: “forward confusion” and “reverse confusion”.  See Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.32 625 (9th Cir. 2005).  Because Marketquest was attempting to establish trademark infringement under a theory of “reverse confusion,” BIC argued that it was required to plead such a theory with specificity in its complaint and that having failed to do so, the lower court properly granted judgment against it.

The Ninth Circuit recognized that it had not addressed this issue before, but that the First Circuit, in Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Melia, Inc. 728 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2013), had.  In that case the First Circuit ruled that “`reverse confusion’ is not a separate legal claim requiring separate pleading.  Rather, it is a descriptive term referring to certain circumstances that can give rise to a likelihood of confusion.”  The Ninth Circuit adopted this approach and ruled in Marketquest’s favor “when reverse confusion is compatible with the theory of infringement alleged in the complaint, a  Plaintiff need not specifically plead it.”

BIC argued that at least two prior Ninth Circuit cases required a different result.  BIC first cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Surfvivor to support its argument that strict pleading is required. However, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and held that the only the thing that the Surfvivor case held was that when reverse confusion is the only plausible theory in a trademark infringement complaint, a plaintiff cannot establish a viable trademark infringement claim based on “forward confusion.”

BIC also cited Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 1996) in support of its proposition that in order to plead a “reverse confusion” theory, “a plaintiff must allege that the defendant `saturated the market with advertising’ or alleged actual reverse confusion from customers.”  The Ninth Circuit likewise rejected this argument recognizing that its Murray decision was decided before it had even recognized a theory of infringement based on “reverse confusion.”  More importantly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff in Murray had not alleged any cognizable trademark infringement claim regardless of whether it was based on “forward confusion” or “reverse confusion.”

The Ninth Circuit concluded that although Marketquest did not use the words “reverse confusion” in its complaint, nor did it allege that the defendants had saturated the market, it had alleged generally that customers “were confused `as to whether some affiliation, connection or association existed’ among defendants and Marketplace and specifically alleged that there were actual instances of forward confusion (i.e., that consumers that that defendant’s goods came from Marketquest).”  Although Marketquest did not raise issues of ”reverse confusion” until its motion for preliminary injunction and later on summary judgment, the lower court’s order did recognize that Marketquest was asserting infringement based on “reverse confusion.”  Although it had not pled such a theory with specificity in its complaint, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court properly allowed Marketquest to proceed under a “reverse confusion” theory and held that Marketquest was not required to plead such a theory with specificity in its complaint.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Marketquest will give plaintiffs some leeway in pleading their theory of trademark infringement. However, plaintiffs will still be required to allege some likelihood of confusion between its mark and that of the defendant in order to avoid a dismissal of their infringement claim.

Attorney’s Fees as Damages for Breach of Contract? A Jury Must Decide

Often times, contracts contain attorney’s fee provisions.  These terms allow the prevailing party in any action to enforce the contract to recover its attorney’s fees.  Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1717, the prevailing party on these contract actions can simply file a motion and have the court award the fees as costs of suit.  But what happens when a party sues for breach of the contract and the only element of damages the party claims are the attorney’s fees it incurred as a result of the defendant’s breach?  Can that party still file a motion under section 1717 to have the Court award its fees?  Not according to a recent California appellate court opinion.  In Monster, LLC v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the court held that a jury must decide a claim for breach of contract alleging attorney’s fees as damages.  Confusing?  Let me explain.

The Case                                                 

Back in 2008, Monster, LLC (“Monster”) and its founder Noel Lee entered into a licensing agreement with music producer Jimmy Iovine and rapper Dr. Dre to manufacture and sell the duo’s “Beats By Dre”-branded headphones.  Dre and Iovine subsequently founded Beats Electronics (“Beats”), which entered into a new agreement with Monster superseding the 2008 agreement.  The new agreement gave Beats the right to terminate its licensing agreement with Monster should a third party acquire more than 50% of Beats.  As part of this subsequent agreement, Lee was given 5% equity in Beats.

In 2011, a third party, HTC, purchased 51% of Beats.  As a result, Beats exercised its termination rights on the licensing agreement with Monster.  Beats and Monster then entered into a termination agreement allowing the latter continued manufacturing rights through 2012 and royalty rights through 2013.  That termination agreement contained (1) a general waiver and release of all claims relating to the prior licensing agreements, expressly including fraud claims, and (2) a provision allowing the prevailing party to recover its attorney’s fees incurred in any action to enforce the contract.  Shortly thereafter, Lee entered into two agreements selling his 5% equity back to Beats.  Both of those agreements contained the same waiver/release and attorney’s fees provisions as set forth in the termination agreement between Monster and Beats.

Seven months after the parties executed the last of the above agreements, Apple acquired Beats for $3 billion.  Yes, billion.  Monster and Lee wanted a slice of that pie, so they sued Beats, alleging that Beats had engaged in fraudulent scheme to divest them of their business interests in the Beats by Dre line.  In defense, Beats argued that all of Monster’s and Lee’s claims were barred by the releases contained in the prior agreements.  Beats also filed a cross-complaint, alleging that Monster and Lee had breached those same agreements by even filing the lawsuit in the first place.  As damages on the cross-complaint, Beats cited only its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending Monster’s complaint.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Beats on Monster’s complaint, agreeing that the fraud claims were released through the various agreements the parties had executed.  Beats then argued that the attorney’s fees it sought as damages on the cross-complaint should be awarded by motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1717.  In contrast, Monster argued that, because Beats was pursuing a cross-complaint for breach of a contract, a jury must decide whether Beats was entitled to attorney’s fees as damages for the breach.  The trial court agreed with Beats and directed it to file a motion for fees under section 1717.  Before Beats could do so, Monster filed a writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to overturn the trial court’s ruling.

The Court of Appeal sided with Monster, directing the trial court to vacate its order and send Beats’ cross-complaint to a jury.  In doing so, the appellate court noted that “Beats did not seek to recover its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on Monster’s fraud claims.  Instead, Beats sought to recover those fees as damages on its cross-claims for breach of contract.”  The court then recognized a long line of cases holding that, where attorney’s fees are sought as damages, the claim for attorney’s fees is part of the damage sought in the principal action.  Such claims, according to the court, are subject to California’s constitutional requirement that litigants be afforded the right to a jury on breach of contract actions.  The Court noted that Beats could have elected to wait until it was the prevailing party to pursue its attorney’s fees by way of a noticed motion.  Instead, Beats chose to seek those fees as damages by way of a cross-complaint.  Once it elected to do so, the fees became “part of the relief sought [and] must be pleaded and proved at trial … as any other item of damages.”

Takeaway

The Monster holding, while applicable in limited circumstances, is important.  Litigants should think carefully about how to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to contract.  Where the fees are sought by a prevailing party as an incident to the lawsuit, they will be recoverable via a post-judgment motion to the Court.  Where, however, the fees are sought as damages for breach of the contract, those damages will become part of the contract claim.  In the latter circumstance, a jury, rather than the court, will have to decide whether to award them.

SUMMER FUN!

Because it’s summertime, I thought we should take a break from “serious” intellectual property articles.  So, instead, here are some patented inventions that you might see this summer.

A baseball with a speedometer seems like a great idea.  Although I don’t know anyone who has one, I’ve seen them in toy catalogs.  What could be more American?  We love baseball (at least many of us do) and we love competition, and this allows you to prove how fast you can throw the ball!  The patent is entitled “Baseball Having Inherent Speed-Measuring Capabilities.”  The patent covers the baseball itself, which contains a computer chip, as well as a method of determining the speed the ball is thrown.

A spray misting system for cooling people is a very useful thing.  These systems are very popular; in the last few weeks, I have seen them at a restaurant and at the State Fair.  They’re really effective.  One patent is entitled “Water Mist Cooling System.”  Apparently, there are several similar systems on the market, but most have a lot of problems, such as low water pressure due to reliance on tap water, and clogging due to small nozzle openings and high levels of dissolved solids in the water.  The invention is basically a hose with a series of nozzles, but it also has a pump and a regulator.  The pump solves the low water pressure problem and the regulator flushes the system to reduce clogging.

Corn on the cob holders – a cute idea, but no one actually seems to use them.  They come in all sorts of designs, from those with plain handles to those with decorative handles (little corn cobs, soccer balls, etc.).  Most of the patents I found were design patents and all were entitled “Corn Cob Holder.”  The designs varied in their handles (flat, cylindrical, or curved inward) and in the number of prongs (one, two, or four).  Even though these seem useful, most people seem to prefer to eat corn with their fingers.

The frisbee is a classic summertime invention.  The oldest patent I found was issued in 1967 and was called “Flying Saucer.”  Since then, there have been many patents covering improvements to what is now called a “flying disc.”  There are two types: regular saucer-shaped discs and ring-shaped ones.  The aerodynamics of the two types are completely different. I found one patent that described a “yo-yo returning disc” that uses a string and axle to create “yo-yo motion,” causing the disc to return to the user, like a boomerang.  The advantage of this invention is that a person can play frisbee all alone.  I’m not sure why anyone would want to do this, but if you did, this invention would make it much easier.

The barbecue fork with thermometer is a common subject for design patents.  These devices allow you to stab your food item as it’s being grilled to determine whether it’s done.  As a vegetarian, I don’t need this device, but I’m told it is very useful.  The patented designs vary in the location of the thermometer (an in-line thermometer in the handle of the fork or a round device sitting on top of the handle), and in the length of the fork portion.  The forks with the longer fork portion would seem to be better – so that you don’t burn your arm.

There are lots of patents for soccer shin guards.  The old shin guards were pretty simplistic, consisting of a single piece of stiff material.  The new ones have a separate foot portion that attaches with velcro at the ankle to the shin portion.  The patented shin guards all try to solve the same problem: they must be flexible enough to fit a variety of shins and yet also be stiff enough to provide protection.  Protection is critical, because the shin bone (the tibia) is a very vulnerable bone – it is long, thin, triangular, and not covered by muscle or fat.  One patent described a moisture-curable resin shin guard that can be molded to the user’s shin without heat, using only water, to form a rigid, tight-fitting guard.  This sounds like an effective way of getting a good fit.

The swim noodle is my favorite summer invention.  I have a bunch of them, and I wish I’d patented it.  The noodle is a long, open-celled, foam tube that is used as a pool floatation toy.  They come in many colors and shapes.  You can do just about anything with the noodle, depending on how many you have and how you arrange them.  You can use them to float sitting up, lying down, or something in between.  You can use them to do water exercises and to reach other pool toys floating in the pool.  Kids (and adults!) use them to whack each other or blow water out.  I couldn’t find a patent for the basic noodle, but I did find one for a noodle chair.  However, I think the noodle is best used in its purest form, by itself.

Now, enjoy the rest of our summer!

New Florida Law Allows Patients To Use More Potent Pot

High times at Florida workplaces may or may not become more prevalent with a new law that allows the medical use of stronger marijuana by a greater number of patients.

The legal use of medical marijuana is not completely new there.  In 2014, Florida legalized the medical use of low-THC cannabis by patients who are terminally ill with less than a year to live.  In November 2016, Floridians went to the ballot box and voted in by a super majority the Medical Marijuana Legalization Initiative, also known as Amendment 2.  The passage of that ballot initiative allowed medical marijuana to be given to patients so long as a physician believes the medical benefits of using marijuana outweigh the potential health risks.

Read the full article at the HRUSA Blog here: http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/new-florida-law-allows-patients-to-use-more-potent-pot/.

First District Court of Appeal strikes small, but meaningful, victory for businesses combatting online libel.

Just last week, California’s First District Court of Appeal handed a small, but meaningful, victory to businesses that resort to litigation to defend their reputations against anonymous, online attacks.  In ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does, the First District held that ZL Technologies (“ZL”) was entitled to discover the identities of persons who posted anonymous reviews of ZL on Glassdoor.com, after ZL made a prima facie showing that its libel c were factually and legally valid.  Following the Sixth District’s decision in Krinsky v. Doe 6, the First District refused to impose additional burdens on plaintiffs who apparently have been defamed by persons emboldened by the relative anonymity the internet provides.

In 2012, ZL sued a group of unknown persons for libel and online impersonation, based on anonymous reviews posted to Glassdoor.com—a website for job seekers, where current and former employees can post reviews.  In order to serve the defendants with the complaint and prosecute its lawsuit, ZL sought disclosure of the defendants’ identities through a subpoena to Glassdoor.  Glassdoor refused the comply with the subpoena and the trial court denied ZL’s motion to compel compliance and later dismissed ZL’s suit with prejudice for failure to serve the defendants.  The First District found that the trial court wrongfully denied ZL the opportunity to discover the identities of the anonymous reviewers and, as a result, also improperly dismissed the lawsuit.

ZL’s appeal raised a conflict that lacks a definitive standard for resolving—the conflict between an anonymous speaker’s First Amendment right to remain anonymous and a libel plaintiff’s right to prosecute its case.  Neither the U.S. nor California Supreme Court has established a standard for resolving this conflict.  In order to compel disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity, most courts agree that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the elements of a libel claim are supported by some amount of evidence.  But courts differ as to what other requirements a plaintiff must meet.

One oft-followed standard was established by a New Jersey appellate court in Dendrite Intern. V. Doe No. 3.  Under Dendrite, a plaintiff is required to: (1) make an effort to notify the anonymous defendant that the plaintiff seeks disclosure of his or her identity, to provide the defendant an opportunity to oppose discovery; (2) identify the specific statements that were libelous; (3) produce sufficient evidence to state a prima facie cause of action; and (4) show that the strength of its prima facie claim outweighs the defendant’s First Amendment right to remain anonymous.

In ZL Techs. v. Does, amici curae Public Citizen Litigation Group and Twitter, Inc. encouraged the First District to wholly adopt the Dendrite test, which the Sixth District declined to do in Krinsky.  The First District followed Krinsky; however, by refusing to follow the fourth prong of the Dendrite test—balancing the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie claim against the defendant’s First Amendment rights.  The First District found that the additional balancing test adds no protection beyond the requirement that the plaintiff make a prima facie showing of a valid claim, unduly complicates the analysis, and gives protection to conduct that, based on the plaintiff’s preliminary evidentiary showing, is not constitutionally protected.

The fourth prong of the Dendrite test is concerning because it creates an uncertain standard.  Once a plaintiff presents evidence that a specific statement was made, is provably false, and caused harm, what more must the plaintiff do to tip the balance?  Dendrite does not say.  Discovery was denied in Dendrite because the plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of a valid claim—the balancing test was never reached, let alone applied.

Often, litigation is not the best approach to combatting criticism, negative reviews, and bad press, because libel claims are difficult to prove.  While false statements of fact may be actionable, statements of pure opinion or statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts, i.e., obvious exaggeration, are not.  As a result, one’s business reputation usually is best protected through purposeful engagement, both with the market and, at times, with detractors.

For those times when litigation appears appropriate, one can hope ZL Techs. and Krinsky will be the foundation upon which California sets a consistent standard for determining whether a libel plaintiff is entitled to discover the identity of an anonymous speaker.