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Texas Federal Court Permanently Blocks Persuader Rule

As previously reported here, earlier this year a federal district court in Texas issued a preliminary injunction preventing the Department of Labor (“DOL”) from enforcing the new Persuader Rule, which was to go into effect as of July 1, 2016. Last week, the court issued a ruling converting its preliminary injunction into a permanent one, which now imposes a nationwide ban on implementation of the new rule.

By way of a refresher, the new Persuader Rule, proposed in March earlier this year, sought to require employers to report highly detailed information regarding their “indirect persuader activities.” Such indirect activities potentially included attorneys advising employers on how to respond to employees attempting to unionize or what actions might discourage unionization. Several experts in the district court proceedings provided evidence that the new reporting requirements effectively restricted employers’ ability to obtain any advice concerning unionization-related issues. Prior to the new rule, employers were simply required to report “direct persuader activities,” which only included activity where there was direct contact with employees to persuade them regarding their rights to unionize.

To read the rest of this article, please visit the HRUSA blog at http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/texas-federal-court-permanently-blocks-persuader-rule/

Holiday Horror Series: Part 1- Could You Patent Christmas?!

The holidays are upon us.  Given that everything seems to be protected by intellectual property rights, could someone protect Christmas?

The most likely candidate to try to patent Christmas would be Santa Claus.  But (assuming all other issues are addressed), could Santa Claus really patent Christmas? Assuming that Santa Claus invented Christmas, then perhaps he could! U.S. patent law provides patent protection for pretty much everything. Under the patent laws of the U.S. and most foreign countries, the first person to invent something may file a patent application seeking a patent for that invention. Unlike most foreign countries, however, U.S. law provides a one-year grace period in which a patent application can be filed after certain types of public disclosures by the inventor.

So, maybe Santa Claus could file a patent application in the U.S. if he was the first to invent something that has not been publicly disclosed in the last year.  Of course, there may be no one else claiming to have invented Christmas, so it might not be much of a problem. And, because Santa has been operating in secret for hundreds of years, there cannot have been any public disclosures.

Santa might even be able to patent the method he uses to deliver gifts to every child all around the world on Christmas Eve.  His method might be treated as a business method, which could make it more difficult to patent, even though it is not really a “business.”

What other kinds of Christmas inventions could someone patent?  The United States Patent and Trademark Office lists over 980 U.S. patents with the word “Christmas” in the title.  These patents cover items like Christmas lights, decorations, Christmas tree stands and turntables, antler apparatus, Christmas tree watering devices, fire extinguishers, and many other things.  My personal favorite is the “Apparatus to Prevent Pets Climbing a Christmas Tree.”  The need for this invention is obvious if you have ever had kittens or cats around your Christmas tree.  The patent states: “as is generally well known in the prior art, pets, such as cats, like to climb up the branches of a Christmas tree. Oftentimes this will result in knocking some of the ornaments off such tree.  These ornaments may be broken…”  The invention is basically a giant circular screen that clips under the lowest branches of the tree. Based on my experience, however, this device will have precisely the opposite of its intended effect. Any cat who sees the screen will climb up or jump onto it.  And, anyway, who really wants to stop cats from climbing Christmas trees?!  It’s too much fun to watch them perched on the branches and swatting ornaments (and to see their embarrassed looks when they land clumsily on the floor)!

What about a new type of Christmas tree?  Trees (and all plants) are patentable, as long as they are new and developed by humans, not discovered in nature.  In fact, a flying reindeer would be patentable (if it was created by humans), as living organisms can be patented.

How about a new nose for Rudolph — one that allows Santa to turn it on remotely from the sleigh?  The nose could be patentable, as could the software that runs it.

New designs for Christmas stockings and ornaments?  The designs for these objects (separate from the objects themselves) are patentable as design patents.  A design patent offers less protection than a utility patent and has a shorter lifespan, but it does protect against designs that are substantially the same as the patented design.

Maybe Santa could protect signature laugh (“Ho, Ho, Ho!”) or his red suit.  The phrase could be trademarked, just as business names and logos, as long as Santa uses it in commerce and was the first to use it.  The red suit might be protectable as a trademark or possibly as trade dress, or more likely as a design patent.  Unlike a patent that expires, however, a trademark has the advantage of lasting indefinitely.

What about your favorite Christmas carol?  The traditional carols are now in the public domain and belong to everyone, but any new song (lyrics and music) is protected by copyright as soon as it is created.  Unlike a trademark, copyright protection only lasts for the life of the author plus a specific number of years.

How about Christmas cookies?  Or that special eggnog recipe? Recipes can be protected and are usually best protected as trade secrets, provided that they are not easily reverse-engineered.  (Think how long Coca-Cola has been around, and it’s still a secret.)

Of course, the most important thing about Christmas is not what can be protected under the law, but the spirit of giving and sharing the holidays bring.  So, have a wonderful holiday season and may the New Year be filled with peace and joy!

Stay tuned for Part 2 of our Holiday Horror Series on December 2nd. 

Employers, Give Thanks! Texas Court Blocks New Overtime Rule

By Jessica Schoendienst

Thanksgiving comes two days early for employers across the country who anticipated the new Department of Labor (“DOL”) overtime Final Rule creating significant pre-holiday expenses.  For those employers, who have been living in denial or under a rock for the last six months, the DOL Final Rule increased the minimum salary level for exempt employees from $455 per week ($23,660 annually) to $921 per week ($47,892 annually).  Although California exempt employees expected a slightly smaller increase, given that California exempt employees’ minimum salary level is currently $800 per week ($41,600 annually), California and national employers alike viewed the DOL Final Rule as an attack on their businesses.

In late September, a lawsuit was filed in the Eastern District of Texas by the Nevada attorney general and joined by 20 other states, including Arizona, Texas, Georgia, Nevada, Utah, and others.  Shortly afterwards, over 50 business organizations also filed a lawsuit challenging the Final Rule.  Both lawsuits ask for preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the Final Rule from taking effect.  The Court consolidated the actions and heard oral arguments on the preliminary injunction on November 16, 2016.

Today, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  The injunction applies nationwide and prevents the DOL from implementing the Final Rule pending further order of the Court.  The Court granted the preliminary injunction on the basis that (1) the Final Rule exceeded the DOL’s rule making authority; (2) the Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm, including increased costs and detrimental effect on government programs and services; (3) the DOL failed to articulate any harm in delaying the implementation of the Final Rule; and (4) the injunction serves the public interest because it will maintain the status quo for the Court to render a meaningful decision on the merits without forcing employers and states nationwide to incur the expense and burden of complying with a potentially invalid rule.

The Court supported its decision on the basis that the Final Rule created an improper salary-based test rather than focusing on the duties employees perform to determine exempt status.  The Court found that Congress unambiguously expressed its intent for employees doing “bona fide executive, administrative, and professional capacity” duties to be exempt from overtime, but that Congress did not intend the exemption to depend on the employees’ salary.  The court held that although the DOL has the authority to define the types of duties that may qualify an employee for the exemption, nothing indicates that the DOL had the authority to raise the minimum salary level such that it supersedes the duties test. In essence, the Court held that because the new rule increased the salary so significantly, it constituted a fundamental change to the statutes operations – effectively creating a de facto salary-only test.

What Employers Should Do

Employers across the country may be wondering “What should I do now”?  If you are an employer that planned to reclassify your employees based only on the salary increase, you can now postpone (and possibly cancel) that reclassification at least until the Court issues a permanent injunction or until the preliminary injunction is appealed (and overturned).  If you are an employer that used the impending salary increase to reevaluate your exempt employees’ job duties and reclassify those employees who were unlikely to be truly exempt, we encourage you to reconsider postponing or cancelling the reclassification and to consult with legal counsel to determine the best approach for your business.  Misclassifying employees can expose your business to significant risk of unpaid wage and penalty liability.  The time may still be right for you to reclassify those employees!  After all, it may be only a matter of time until the injunction is lifted and the Final Rule is enforceable against all employers.

Supreme Court May Cut Back Laches in Patent Infringement Cases

The United States Supreme Court is considering whether the doctrine of laches will bar a patent infringement claim filed within the Patent Act’s six-year damage limitations period set forth in 35 U.S.C. §286.  The case before the Court is SCA Hygiene Products AB v. First Quality Baby Products LLC, 767 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

SCA owned a patent for adult incontinence products.  In 2003, SCA sent First Quality, a competitor, a cease and desist letter, accusing First Quality of infringement.  First Quality responded that it did not infringe SCA’s patent because the patent was invalid.  In 2004, SCA filed an ex parte reexamination of its patent.  The patent was confirmed in 2007.  SCA did not inform First Quality of the reexamination.  During this time, First Quality invested heavily in expanding its business.  In 2010, almost seven years after first notifying First Quality of its infringement, SCA filed an infringement suit against First Quality.  First Quality moved for summary judgment of non-infringement on the grounds that laches barred the claim.  The district court granted First Quality’s motion.

The defense of laches requires the defendant to prove an unreasonable and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff in filing suit and prejudice to the defendant.  In determining whether laches is a defense, a court must balance the equitable factors, including the length of the delay, the severity of the prejudice, the plaintiff’s excuses for the delay, and the defendant’s culpability.  A delay of more than six years establishes a presumption that the delay is unreasonable and inexcusable and caused prejudice to the defendant.  The burden the shifts to the plaintiff patent owner to produce evidence that the delay was excusable or not unreasonable, or that the defendant was not prejudiced.  If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, then the defendant must prove the elements of laches.

On appeal to the Federal Circuit, SCA argued that laches should not apply to a claim brought within the six-year limitations period for damages, and that the time that its patent was under reexamination (three years) should not count, meaning that its suit was filed only four years after SCA learned of First Quality’s infringement.

The Federal Circuit rejected SCA’s argument and affirmed the district court’s decision granting summary judgment for First Quality.  The court held that the presumption of laches was established because SCA’s delay exceeded six years.  The court further held that SCA had not met its burden to produce evidence of excusable or reasonable delay, or lack of prejudice to First Quality.  The court explained that it was not reasonable for SCA to delay almost three years after the reexamination concluded to file suit against First Quality – SCA should have sued First Quality earlier.  With respect to prejudice to First Quality, the court held that First Quality had suffered prejudice as a result of SCA’s delay because it had invested in expanding its product line during that period of time.

SCA’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was granted on May 2, 2016.  SCA relied on a 2014 Supreme Court case (Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)) that held that laches does not apply to copyright infringement cases brought within the three-year damage limitations period of the Copyright Act.  SCA argued that the rationale of Petrella should apply to patent infringement cases – laches should not apply during the six-year damage limitations period set forth in §286 of the Patent Act.  First Quality argued that the reasoning of Petrella should not apply.  First Quality contended that §286 is not a statute of limitations (which requires a plaintiff to file suit within a specific period of time after learning of its claim), but a merely a backwards limit on the recovery of damages.

On November 1, 2016, the Supreme Court held oral argument.  The justices were sympathetic to SCA’s position, asking First Quality why laches should remain a defense when the patent statutes do not specifically provide for the defense.  Based on the oral argument, those following the case predict that the Court will reverse the Federal Circuit’s decision and hold that laches does not apply to patent infringement suits brought within the six-year damage limitations period.

New Marijuana Laws And The Workplace

By: Melissa M. Whitehead

Last week, voters in seven states passed new laws relating to marijuana use, both recreational and medical, which has left many employers wondering what this means to them. Can employers still enforce “zero tolerance” drug use policies? Do they have to allow employees to use marijuana in the workplace or during work hours, if they have a medical prescription? Some, but not all, state marijuana laws include specific provisions guiding employers in their handling of these issues. Take, for example, two of the laws passed last week, in Florida and Nevada.

Federal Circuit Takes A Common Law Approach to “Abstract Idea” Determinations in Alice Cases

In Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom Inc. et al., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently upheld four software patents against a patent-eligibility challenge, finding that the patents do not claim an “abstract idea.”  The patent challenge was under the frame work set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 2014 decision Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank.  In Alice, the Supreme Court looked at the patentability of software patent claims under Section 101 by applying the two-step test it had set forth in Mayo v. Prometheus.  In applying the two-step test, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to first determine whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea.  If they are, the second step is to determine whether the claims include elements showing an inventive concept that transforms the idea into a patent-eligible invention.  While the Court in Alice stated it was treading carefully in invalidating the claims at issue and warned that applying the decision too broadly could “swallow all of patent law,” numerous patents have been invalidated by lower courts in light of the decision in Alice.

The Federal Circuit’s recent holding in Amdocs is a notable departure from this trend.  It held there is no single rule on what constitutes an abstract idea, and instead applied a common law approach in analyzing the claims by comparing the claims to claims in prior cases.  In so doing, the Federal Circuit also blurred the lines between the two distinct steps in the Alice two-step framework.  Also of importance, the Federal Circuit used claim constructions and limitations found in the specification in finding the claims patent-eligible, paving the way for district courts to follow suit in making their patent-eligibility determinations under Section 101 for software patent claims.

The Amdocs v. Openet dispute traces back to 2010 when Amdocs sued Openet for patent infringement of four patents in the Eastern District of Virginia.  The four patents at issue in Amdocs are all part of the same family, and the invention disclosed therein generally comprises parts of a system designed to solve an accounting and billing problem faced by network service providers by allowing network service providers to account for and bill for internet protocol (“IP”) network communications.  After a lengthy procedural history, the District Court Judge found on a motion for judgement on the pleadings that the patents were directed to abstract ideas under the Alice framework because they were essentially directed to using a database to compile network usage information.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed.  The Federal Circuit held that the patents use unconventional new technological solutions like “distributed architecture,” to minimize the impact on network resources, rather than storing all the data in a central database.

In its analysis, the Federal Circuit first noted that in the application of the Supreme Court’s Alice standard, “there is considerable overlap between step one and step two, and in some situations th[e] analysis could be accomplished without going beyond step one.”  The Federal Circuit reasoned this is the case because whether the “analysis is undertaken at step one or at step two, the analysis presumably would be based on a generally-accepted and understood definition of, or test for, what an ‘abstract idea’ encompasses.”  However, the Federal Circuit then went on to note there is presently no “single, succinct, usable definition or test” for determining what constitutes an abstract idea, although “that is not for want of trying” by courts.  “Instead of a definition, then, the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen — what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided.”  Therefore the Federal Circuit explained “that is the classic common law methodology for creating law when a single governing definitional context is not available. We shall follow that approach here.”

Turning to the claims at issue, the Federal Circuit instructed that the claims should be analyzed “in light of the written description…in addition to taking into consideration the approved claim constructions.”   The Federal Circuit reasoned that while the claim limitations “may be generic at first blush, an examination of the claim in light of the written description reveals that many of these components and functionalities are in fact neither generic nor conventional individually or in ordered combination.”

In particular, the court relied on the unconventional technological solution of enhancing data in a distributed fashion to solve the technological problem of massive record flows which previously required massive databases.  Although, the solution requires arguably generic components, including network devices and “gatherers” which “gather” information, the Federal Circuit reasoned “the claim’s enhancing limitation necessarily requires that these generic components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.”   The Federal Circuit continued that “the enhancing limitation depends not only upon the invention’s distributed architecture, but also depends upon the network devices and gatherers—even though these may be generic—working together in a distributed manner.”  Thus, the claim “limitation necessarily involves the arguably generic gatherers, network devices, and other components working in an unconventional distributed fashion to solve a particular technological problem.”  In sum, the claims are “narrowly drawn to not preempt any and all generic enhancement of data in a similar system and do[] not merely combine the components in a generic manner, but instead purposefully arrange[] the components in a distributed architecture to achieve a technological solution to a technological problem specific to computer networks.”

In dissent, Circuit Judge Jimmie Reyna strongly disagreed with the Federal Circuit majority.  He criticized the majority’s approach involving “the mechanical comparison of the asserted claims in this case to the claims at issue in some, but not all, of the cases where we have addressed patent eligibility after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice.”  The majorities’ approach “avoids determining whether the asserted claims are directed to an abstract idea, or even identifying what the underlying abstract idea is,… [and] is contrary to the Supreme Court’s direction in Alice.”  Moreover, “the majority also relies on the specification to import innovative limitations into the claims at issue…[which] contravenes the fundamental principal that the section 101 inquiry is about whether the claims are directed to a patent-eligible invention, not whether the specification is so directed.”

After numerous rulings in district courts and at the Federal Circuit in the last few years invalidating software patents under Alice, Amdocs and other recent Federal Circuit rulings provide examples of how software claims can pass Section 101 eligibility challenges through proper framing.  These cases also show the weight of authority may be signaling software patents are better challenged under other means such as anticipation, obviousness, and Section 112 challenges, and not Section 101.

Homeland Security Issues New I-9 Form

On November 14, 2016, The Department of Homeland Security (through USICS) released a revised version of Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification. Employers may continue using Form I-9 (with a revision date of 03/08/2013) through January 21, 2017.  By January 22, 2017, employers must use the revised form. Employers should continue to follow existing storage and retentions rules for all of their previously completed Forms I-9. Read the USCIS News Release, and visit I-9 Central for more information.

7th Circuit To Revisit Title VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination Ruling

By Vida L. Thomas

On October 11, 2016, the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted en banc (by the full court) review in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College. This rare move means that the entire Seventh Circuit court will reconsider its previous decision, which was originally issued on July 28, 2016.

Kimberly Hively began teaching as a part-time adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000.  In 2013, representing herself, she filed a complaint in district court alleging that she had been blocked from full-time employment at Ivy Tech because of her sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII.  Hively alleged that although she had the necessary qualifications for full-time employment and had never received a negative evaluation, Ivy Tech refused to even interview her for any of the six full-time positions for which she applied between 2009 and 2014.

Branding Buds – Still Illegal Under Federal Law

If voters in California  approve Proposition 64 which would legalize the possession and use of marijuana for recreational purposes, it is without question that the sunshine state will see a huge increase in the number of businesses within the cannabis industry. According to a November 7, 2016 Forbes article, the passage of Proposition 64 could add $8.38 billion in annual sales to an already robust medical market worth an estimated $2.83 billion.  Despite what happens at the voting polls on November 8, marijuana is still illegal under federal law and this makes branding marijuana strains,  paraphernalia or services related primarily to marijuana tricky.

One example of this is the recent problems a cannabis entrepreneur faced in seeking to register two trademarks.  JJ206, LLC sought to register the marks POWERED BY JUJU and JUJU JOINTS with the USPTO, for “smokeless cannabis vaporizing apparatus, namely, oral vaporizers for smoking purposes; vaporizing cannabis delivery device, namely, oral vaporizers for smoking purposes.” The Examining Attorney refused registration of the marks based upon lack of lawful use of the mark in commerce.

Under Section 1 of the Lanham Act (15 USC 1051),  the registration of a trademark requires use in commerce.  Section 45 of the Lanham Act (15 USC 1127) defines “commerce” as all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.  If the goods or services covered by a mark are unlawful, actual lawful use in commerce is not possible, and a refusal under Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45 will be made. But what about the situation where the goods or services are lawful under state law and illegal under federal law.

While vaporizing devices for cannabis may be legal in certain states, they are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).  The CSA makes it unlawful to sell, offer for sale, or use any facility of interstate commerce to transport drug paraphernalia, defined as “any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is primarily intended or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, concealing, producing, processing, preparing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance, possession of which is unlawful under [the CSA].”  Where goods or services in a trademark application are identified as primarily intended or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis or marijuana into the human body, it constitutes unlawful drug paraphernalia under the CSA.

JJ206’s argument that it only intends to do business in states which allow for the sale and distribution of marijuana was not persuasive.  The TTAB noted that whether a product or service is lawful within a state is irrelevant to the question of federal registration when it is unlawful under federal law.  Because “commerce” is defined in the Trademark Act as commerce lawfully regulated by Congress, that which is illegal under federal law cannot be lawful “commerce” under the Trademark Act.  As such, any application to federally register any goods or services that are illegal under federal law will be refused, regardless if it is legal under state law.

So what’s a California cannabis entrepreneur to do?  One could rely on common law trademark rights.  Common law rights arise from actual use of a mark in commerce and no registration is required to establish common law rights.  However, enforcement can present the challenge of establishing proof of the date of first use.  Additionally, common law trademark rights are limited to the actual geographic scope of use established through evidence.

State trademark registration would be an improvement over common law rights.  In California registration is prima facie evidence of ownership of a valid mark and the exclusive right to use the mark for the covered goods or services within California.  Granted seeking registration in California and the other states in which marijuana is legal may not be as convenient or cost effective as a single federal registration and you can’t file based on intent to use, but it is still preferred over relying on common law rights.

Another strategy would be to seek registration for an ancillary product or service that does not violate the CSA.  The application could be filed based on either use in commerce or intent to use. If the mark is registered, the owner would be entitled to argue that the subsequent use by a third party would cause likelihood of confusion and infringe its trademark rights.

California’s New Law Restricts Choice of Law and Forum Selection Provisions in Employment Agreements

On September 25, 2016, Governor Brown approved a very short but powerful piece of legislation for California employees who work for employers who are based outside of California and wish to have another state’s laws govern the employment relationship. Senate Bill 1241 adds Section 925 to the California Labor Code and states expressly that after January 1, 2017, an employer is limited in the use of forum selection and choice of law provisions in employment contracts with California employees.

Specifically, Section 925 states that:

“(a)        An employer shall not require an employee who primarily resides and works in California, as a condition of employment, to agree to a provision that would do either of the following:

                (1)          Require the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California.

                (2)         Deprive the employee of the substantive protection of California law with respect to a controversy arising in California.

(b)          Any provision of a contract that violates subdivision (a) is voidable by the employee, and if a provision is rendered void at the request of the employee, the matter shall be adjudicated in California and California law shall govern the dispute.

(c)           In addition to injunctive relief and any other remedies available, a court may award an employee who is enforcing his or her rights under this section reasonable attorney’s fees.

(d)          For purposes of this section, adjudication includes litigation and arbitration.”

The one exception to the new rule is when an employee is represented by counsel when the employment contract is being negotiated.  Specifically, Section 925(e) states that:

“(e)        This section shall not apply to a contract with an employee who is in fact individually represented by legal counsel in negotiating the terms of an agreement to designate either the venue or forum in which a controversy arising from the employment contract may be adjudicated or the choice of law to be applied.”

In addition to the statutory right an employee has to challenge any choice of law or forum selection clause that violates section 925, if an employee suffers some adverse action (e.g. failure to hire or termination) because of either: 1) his/her refusal to sign an employment agreement that he/she believes violates section 925; or 2) his/her legal action to challenge the employment agreement under section 925, it is likely that the employee will also be able to bring a common law claim for violation of public policy based on the public policy contained in section 925.

Take Away:  Employers should review and update the various forms of employment agreements they require their California employees to sign as a condition of employment (e.g. employment agreements, arbitration agreements, confidential & proprietary information agreements) to ensure they comply with the new law after January 1, 2017.