Welcome to the Weintraub Tobin Resources Page

Browse below for news, legal insights, information on presentations and events, and other resources from the Weintraub Tobin legal team.


THE EEOC JUST KEEPS ON GIVING! New “Guidance” Document Re: Employer-Provided Leaves And The ADA

On May 9, 2016 the EEOC issued yet another “guide” – this time to outline its position on when and how leave must be granted for reasons related to an employee’s disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  The publication, entitled “Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act,” contains information on the EEOC’s position in connection with six subject areas relating to leaves as a form of reasonable accommodation under the ADA, and contains various examples to illustrate those positions.   For a summary of the EEOC’s position on each of the six subject areas, please click here.

Pull up a Chair: California Supreme Court Weighs in on Suitable Seating

To sit or not to sit, that is the question.  And now the California Supreme Court has given us an answer.  Well, sort of.  They have told us how to find the answer.  Even that’s a stretch.  Pull up a seat and I will explain.
To help it resolve two class actions involving California Wage Order requirements that employers provide employees with suitable seats, the Ninth Circuit recently certified some questions for the California Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court responded in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.  As stated verbatim in the Supreme Court’s responsive opinion, these were the questions posed by the Ninth Circuit:
  1. Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to individual tasks performed throughout the workday, or to the entire range of an employee’s duties performed during a given day or shift?
  2. When determining whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits” use of a seat, what factors should courts consider? Specifically, are an employer’s business judgment, the physical layout of the workplace, and the characteristics of a specific employee relevant factors?
  3. If an employer has not provided any seat, must a plaintiff prove a suitable seat is available in order to show the employer has violated the seating provision?”
If you just want the short answers, the opinion was kind enough to give us those right up front as well.  Again, verbatim:
  1. The “nature of the work” refers to an employee’s tasks performed at a given location for which a right to a suitable seat is claimed, rather than a “holistic” consideration of the entire range of an employee’s duties anywhere on the jobsite during a complete shift. If the tasks being performed at a given location reasonably permit sitting, and provision of a seat would not interfere with performance of any other tasks that may require standing, a seat is called for.
  2. Whether the nature of the work reasonably permits sitting is a question to be determined objectively based on the totality of the circumstances. An employer’s business judgment and the physical layout of the workplace are relevant but not dispositive factors. The inquiry focuses on the nature of the work, not an individual employee’s characteristics.
  3. The nature of the work aside, if an employer argues there is no suitable seat available, the burden is on the employer to prove unavailability.
So, there you go.  If you just wanted the answers, you can stop reading now.  But if you want a little elaboration and more background on how the Court arrived at those answers, and my thoughts on what employers should take away from the opinion, remain seated and continue ahead.
The Cases
The two class actions before the Ninth Circuit involved identical provisions of two separate Wage Orders.  InKilby v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., a former CVS customer service representative filed a class action alleging that CVS violated Wage Order No. 7-2001 (mercantile industry) by failing to provide employees seats during shifts.  In large part, the employees’ duties consisted of operating cash registers, straightening and stocking shelves, cleaning the register, gathering shopping baskets, and removing trash.
Similarly, in Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, a group of bank tellers sued Chase alleging it violated Wage Order No. 4-2001(professional/technical/mechanical occupations) by also failing to provide seats to its tellers.  The tellers’ duties consisted of a mix between those around their teller stations such as handling deposits and withdrawals, and those away from their stations such as escorting customers, servicing ATM machines and working the drive-up window.
Both cases turned on identical phrases in the two Wage Orders stating that “[a]ll working employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.”  In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit after procedural losses in the respective district courts.  The Ninth Circuit punted (for now), instead asking the California Supreme Court to answer the above questions to aid in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  The Supreme Court did just that, as set forth above.   Here’s how they arrived at their answers.
The “Nature of the Work”
The defendants in the two cases argued that, when determining whether “the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats,” courts should examine “an employee’s job as a whole, i.e., a ‘holistic’ consideration of all of an employee’s tasks and duties throughout a shift.”  The plaintiffs, in turn, argued that the inquiry should involve a “task-by-task evaluation of whether a single task may feasibly be performed seated.”
After analyzing a long and tortured history of California wage law, which I will spare you here, the court rejected both arguments as inconsistent with the IWC’s intent in placing that language in the Wage Orders.  The court held that the defendants’ “all or nothing approach” ignored factors such as the duration, location, and frequency of tasks, and would unfairly deny a seat to an employee who spends a substantial portion of his workday performing tasks that can be done while seated merely because other aspects of the job required standing.  On the other hand, the plaintiff’s approach would have the opposite effect.  Employer’s would have to provide employees a seat if any single task could be performed while seated, even if the employee only briefly performs the task for negligible periods during each shift.
The court instead split the baby.  It held that “courts must examine subsets of an employee’s total tasks and duties by location,” and then determine whether it’s feasible to perform those tasks while seated.  If so, an employee is entitled to a seat at that location.  But the employee is not entitled to a seat during other parts of a shift while at locations where seating is not feasible.
“Reasonably Permits”
The California Supreme Court next set out to answer the Ninth Circuit’s questions whether the analysis involves consideration of the employer’s business judgment, the workplace layout, and/or the employee’s physical characteristics.
Chase and CVS argued that the court should consider, and even give deference to, the employer’s business judgment as to whether work should be performed standing or sitting.  The plaintiffs argued that the employer’s opinion should be irrelevant, with the focus instead being on the objective nature of the work.  The court again found middle ground. It held that providing a certain level of customer service is an objective job function that employers should be able to assess in determining whether use of a seat is permitted in a certain location.  The court did clarify, however, that “business judgment” does not encompass an employer’s “mere preference.”  So, while business judgment may be considered, so too may objective evidence that sheds light on the reasonableness of that judgment.
Like business judgment, the court held that the physical layout of the work location can be considered as a relevant factor in assessing whether the nature of the work reasonably permits use of a seat.  Again, though, the court cautioned that an employer cannot “unreasonably design a workspace to further a preference for standing.”  In other words, no cheating.
Finally, the court found that consideration of employee’s physical characteristics, rather than the nature of the work, was inconsistent with the IWC’s intent.  That is, if the job permits seating for one, it permits seating for all.
Burden to Show Seating is Available
Finally, the court cleared up any ambiguity about who bears the burden of proof in a suitable seating inquiry.  The defendants argued that, even if the nature of the work permitted suitable seating, the plaintiff must still show that a suitable seat was available but not provided.  The court rejected that argument, holding that an employer who seeks to be excused from the suitable seating requirement bears the burden of showing compliance is infeasible because no suitable seat exists.
Takeaway
If you’re still with me, here is the moral of the story: be careful.  The case leaves a lot of room for factual interpretation.  We are still waiting to see how the Ninth Circuit will treat these two specific cases in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion, let alone how various courts will interpret suitable seating cases under this analysis down the road.
But for now, the court found enough middle ground in its opinion for both plaintiff’s lawyers and employers to claim victories.  Employers can take comfort knowing that their business judgment and the layout of the workplace are relevant factors in assessing whether a given task permits suitable seating.  The court’s focus on all of the circumstances surrounding work performed at a given location, rather than a task-by-task approach, is also good news for employers.
On the flip side, employers now clearly bear the burden of showing that no suitable seat exists.  Employers must also examine all of the separate locations in which an employee performs tasks during a shift, and determine independently whether the nature of the work performed at each location reasonably permits the use of a seat.  If all of that leaves your head spinning, you may want to find a place to sit down.  That is, if doing so is reasonably permissible.

Two Things You Can Do To Reduce the Likelihood That Your Company Will Be Found Liable For Conspiring Or Aiding And Abetting In An Employee’s Breach of Duty To A Former Employer

When companies sue their former employees for theft they often claim that the former employee’s new employer has conspired with the former employee to misappropriate trade secrets, or that that new employer has aided and abetted the former employee’s breach of duty he/she owed to his/her former employer.

Like Woodward and Bernstein, liability “follows the money.”  Current employers are often added to trade secret and breach of duty lawsuits because they have deeper pockets than former employees.  Conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims are more vague and less precise than are other business claims.  Often plaintiffs need only allege that the new employer benefitted from wrongful acts.  Employers should not believe that there is nothing they can do to reduce the chances of a successful conspiracy or aiding and abetting claim against them.  By adopting best practice policies and procedures, an employer can do a lot to reduce the likelihood that it will be found liable on these theories.  These policies and practices should be adopted well in advance of the hiring of a competitor’s employees.  Although there are many policies and practices that an employer can adopt, two of the most common (and most powerful) are: (1) a policy in the employment handbook that prohibits the use or importation of third party or prior employer information.  Such policies often read:

As a condition of employment, employees of the company agree and represent that during the course of their employment with the company, they will not use or disclose any confidential or proprietary information of any third party, including any prior employer, unless such third party has consented to the use or disclosure of that information in writing.

Moreover, as a condition of employment, employees of the company are required to comply with the terms of any agreements where any prior employer pertaining to confidential information, non-solicitation or non-competition to the extent that such agreements are enforceable under applicable law.

Second, employers can, in their offer letters, expressly condition employment upon the non-importation or use of any information from the former employer.  Such language often provides that:

This offer of employment is conditioned upon your agreement that you will not bring any proprietary, confidential or any other business information from any place or former employment to the company.  The company will provide everything you need to perform your work.

While nothing can guarantee that your company will not be named as a conspirator of abettor in a trade secret or breach of duty case, adoption of policies like this will help.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPLIES BROADENED TEST FOR DIVIDED INFRINGEMENT

On April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir., August 2015) (“Akamai IV”), cert. denied, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2768.  The Court declined Limelight’s petition for review of a $46 million jury verdict against Limelight for patent infringement.  The jury had found Limelight liable for direct infringement of Akamai’s method patent, but the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed that judgment, ruling for Limelight.  In Akamai IV, however, the Federal Circuit had reinstated the jury’s verdict, establishing a new rule for direct infringement by “divided” (or “joint”) infringement.

The new rule of Akamai IV is that a defendant can be liable for direct infringement of a method claim when another party performs some of the steps of the method as long as the steps performed by others are attributable to the defendant.  According to the court, a defendant can be liable for direct infringement if the acts of the other party or parties can be attributed to the defendant through a joint enterprise or “when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner for timing of that performance.”  Akamai IV, supra, at 1023.  The court emphasized that its new rule is flexible and should be applied on a case-by-case basis, stating “other factual scenarios may arise” that would support a finding of attribution.  Id.  With its new rule, the Federal Circuit expressly overruled its prior cases and turned Limelight’s victory into a loss.

Limelight’s petition for certiorari argued that the Federal Circuit’s Akamai IV rule was too broad.  Many agreed with Limelight, but obviously the Supreme Court did not.

On April 22, 2016, within days after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Akamai IV, the Federal Circuit used Akamai IV to vacate a district court’s decision in favor of the defendants in another case involving divided infringement, Mankes v. Vivid Seats Ltd., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7924.  In Mankes, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court based on the “broadened divided-infringement standard articulated by the en banc court in Akamai IV.”  Id. at *16.

In Mankes, the plaintiff owned a method patent for a reservation system in which the inventory was split between a local server and a remote Internet server.  Mankes sued Vivid Seats Ltd. and Fandango, LLC in the Eastern District of North Carolina for patent infringement.  The defendants’ business offered movie ticket reservations and used both an Internet system and local movie theaters’ systems.  Fandango and Vivid Seats did not perform all of the steps of Mankes’ claimed method, but together with the local movie theaters, all of the steps of the method claim were performed.

The Federal Circuit explained that Mankes had gotten caught in the changing law of divided patent infringement, as both the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court issued multiple decisions in Akamai v. Limelight.  In early 2015, the Mankes district court had granted judgment on the pleadings for Fandango and Vivid Seats on the grounds that Mankes had not sufficiently alleged direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(a).

On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s judgment on the pleadings against Mankes was based on the prior, narrower rule of divided infringement that had been superseded by the new rule of Akamai IVMankes, supra, at *18.  The appellate court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case.  The court noted that Mankes had alleged that some of the method steps (the Internet server) were performed by Fandango and Vivid Seats, while other steps (the local server) were performed by local movie theaters.  The defendants had not disputed that all of the method steps were performed; rather, they contended that the local theaters’ actions could not be attributed to them.  Id. at *16.

The Federal Circuit held that Mankes should have a chance to prove his case under the new rule of divided infringement, stating that Mankes may be able to allege facts that fall within Akamai IV’s new rule “or might otherwise justify finding direct-infringement liability for divided infringement.”  Id. at *20.  The court emphasized that it is not “appropriate to rule out at this stage any particular theory of direct infringement, including the joint-enterprise theory and the possibility of other bases of attribution recognized in Akamai IV.”  Id.  Thus, the court left the door wide open for Mankes to argue that his case falls within a flexible application of the Akamai IV rule.  After all, if Akamai could win after three tries, Mankes might win on his second time around.

Warning! Know Your Payroll Service Contract!

Many – maybe even most – contracts issued by major payroll processing services contain traps for the unwary. Many employers I speak with turn over all payroll processing responsibilities, including issuance of accurate checks and wage statements and record storage, to their payroll processing service.

This may be a big mistake.

When faced with an individual or a class-action wage and hour claim, many employers turn to their payroll processing service to produce records that evidence the Company’s compliance with California law. Yet many of these payroll processing services expressly disclaim any responsibility to maintain records or to ensure wage statements comply with the law.  Indeed, some of these contracts actually require employers to indemnify the payroll services company against any claims that wage statements or wages were not in paid compliance with applicable law.

Maybe it’s just me, but I think that this is outrageous. Most employers I talk to believe their payroll processing company is their partner in ensuring that the business complies with California law. Read your payroll processing contract carefully. You may not have a partner in your payroll processing company. In fact, your company may be completely on its own. Employers have statutory duties to ensure that they both pay their employees properly and keep records of those payments.  Additionally, the law requires that employers issue detailed wage statements explaining how the wages were calculated and paid.  Failure to comply with these wage statement, payment and record keeping requirements can result in breathtakingly large liability.

To my mind these common contract provisions in payroll processing contracts require employers to do two things:

  1. Shop aggressively for a payroll service that will indemnify your business against the payroll service’s errors and that will agree to keep and maintain all records required under California law without additional charge.
  2. Audit the performance of your payroll service company (to ensure compliance) and regularly download all records the employer is obligated to maintain.

PAGA and class action liability for failure to comply with these laws can be breathtaking. If you have any doubt about your Company’s obligations please contact your employment law advisor immediately.

Court Orders Plaintiff to Pay Defendants’ $8 Million in Attorney’s Fees in Patent Row

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s twin 2014 decisions in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. attorney’s fees awards are becoming more common in patent cases.  35 U.S.C. § 285 allows attorney fees “in exceptional cases.”  Before 2014, this meant a court awarded attorney’s fees only if a party’s litigation position was objectively baseless.  This standard proved to be a high bar, and courts rarely awarded fees.  However, the aforementioned Supreme Court cases liberalized the standards for finding a patent case to be “exceptional” and instituted an abuse-of-discretion review standard.  Specifically, the Supreme Court: (1) defined an exceptional case in which reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party to be “one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated;” (2) reduced the evidence required from clear and convincing to a preponderance of evidence; and (3) increased the deference given the trial court during appellate review of such awards from de novo to abuse of discretion.

A recent attorney’s fees award in Alzheimer’s Institute of America v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al., case number 3:10-cv-00482, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California included pre-suit attorney’s fees, which illustrates the impact of the recent Supreme Court holdings.  In Alzheimer’s Institute of America, the Court awarded almost $8,000,000 in attorneys’ fees, including $235,780 in pre-suit fees, to the defendants after findings that plaintiff Alzheimer’s Institute of America’s (“AI”) patent infringement lawsuit misrepresented the true owner of patents covering Alzheimer’s detection.  Specifically, the court awarded defendant Eli Lilly & Co. (“Eli Lilly”) $4,445,492 and defendant Elan Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“Elan”) $3,435,130.  This recent ruling concerned only the amount of attorneys’ fees the Court would award the defendants because the Court had already ruled last summer that AI’s patent infringement suit was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and the recent Supreme Court precedent.

The lawsuit traces back to February 2010 when AI filed its patent infringement complaint against Eli Lilly and Elan.  The complaint alleges that Eli Lilly and Elan infringe U.S. Patent Numbers 5,455,169 (the “’ 169 Patent”) and 7,538,258 (the “’258 Patent”), which involve technology related to “the Swedish mutation,” one of the known genetic causes of Alzheimer’s disease.  AI filed a second patent infringement lawsuit in November 2010 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”) and Eli Lilly subsidiary Avid Radiopharmaceuticals Inc. (“Avid”) also infringe the ’169 and ’258 Patents.  AI contended that Penn and Avid had infringed the two asserted patents by relying on a protected type of transgenic mice to develop breakthrough Alzheimer’s imaging technology.

In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania action, an issue arose as to whether AI was in fact the proper owner by assignment of the two patents in suit.  AI asserted it was assigned the rights to the patents by Michael Mullan, the sole listed inventor on both patents, who was employed by the University of South Florida (“USF”) at the time.  Thus, there was an issue as to whether the patents were owned by USF because of Mr. Mullan’s employment status.  In addition, there was an issue as to whether Mr. Mullan was actually the sole inventor, or whether his collaborator, John Hardy, had also made a substantial contribution to the innovation.

In August 2011, the Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that under Florida law the patents were owned by USF, but the issue was further complicated because there was a factual dispute as to whether USF had waived its ownership rights.  The Court thus ordered a jury trial on the waiver issue.  In May 2012, the jury found that USF had not in fact waived its right to the asserted patents and that Mr. Mullan was not the sole inventor of the technology covered by the two patents.  The Federal Circuit later affirmed the jury verdict on appeal, and when remanded back to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District Court found the case to be “exceptional” on a motion for attorney’s fees.  The Court found the evidence at trial showed that AI’s principal conspired with two other individuals to misrepresent the true owner of the Swedish mutation inventions and to defraud two universities, and that this “conduct was rare and beyond common decency . . . . [and] motivated by ego and greed . . . . [and] [b]ringing this action was nothing more than a perpetuation of the conspiracy.”

In the meantime, the suit against Eli Lilly and Elan in the Northern District of California had been stayed in December 2011 pending the outcome of the jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In August 2012, after the jury finding that AI was not the true owner of the asserted patents, the Court dismissed the suit against Lilly and Elan, applying collateral estoppel that AI lacked standing to pursue its patent claims.  Then, in June 2015, after the Federal Circuit appeal and the exceptional finding in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania action, the Court in the Northern District granted the defendants’ motions for attorneys’ fees, finding that, as in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania case, the suit was exceptional and attorneys’ fees were justified.

Therefore, the only issue outstanding was the amount of attorney’s fees to award defendants in the Northern District action.  Although the Court considered many issues, including reasonableness of hourly rates, adequacy of documentation, overlapping counsel, standard fees for patent litigation, the effect of multiple litigations, and recovery for paralegal time, one issue of particular note is the Court’s awarding of pre-suit fees to defendants.  In reaching its ruling, the Court noted that defendants’ billing entries reflected that it engaged counsel during its pre-suit investigation “to perform an analysis of Plaintiff’s patents and of potential damages.”  Specifically, the Court noted, “Elan states that it ‘foresaw litigation’ based on a letter from [AI] indicating that ‘[AI] believes that it is now appropriate for licensing discussion with Elan to re-commence’ and that ‘it appears that a substantial portion of Elan’s drug discovery efforts for Alzheimer’s Disease are entirely reliant on the unauthorized use of [AI’s] patented technology.’”  Therefore, the Court reasoned, “as Elan reasonably anticipated that this litigation would occur, its reasonable fees incurred prior to the initiation of this case are recoverable.”

This case illustrates that the courts will take strong action when faced with baseless claims, hidden or altered evidence, and misleading statements made to the court or opponents.  It also serves as a strong reminder to consider your counsel carefully, and the advice that they provide, or a plaintiff may have to pay its own fees and those of the defendant, which in this case amounted to another $8 million.

Governor Brown Signs Bill to Expand the Amount of Wage Replacement Available under California’s Paid Family Leave Law

On April 11, 2016, Governor Brown signed Assembly Bill (AB) 908 which amends certain provisions of California’s Unemployment Insurance Code as it relates to the State’s Paid Family Leave (PFL) program. Before explaining the amendments provided for under AB 908, I think it is important to clarify something that is too often misstated in the press. Despite its name, California’s PFL program is not a statutory leave of absence program that guarantees paid family leave to employees in California. Instead, it is a partial wage replacement benefit for eligible employees who are on some other authorized statutory or discretionary leave of absence from work. As such, employees do not have the right to “take leave” under the PFL program.Beth-West-15_web

The PFL program provides up to six (6) weeks of wage replacement benefits to employees who are on an authorized statutory or discretionary leave of absence to care for a seriously ill child, parent, parent-in-law, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, spouse, or registered domestic partner, or to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth or placement of a child in connection with foster care or adoption. Currently, the “weekly benefit amount” for purposes of the PFL program means the amount of benefits available to qualified disabled individuals under California’s unemployment compensation disability insurance law. In summary, the law currently provides that for an individual who has quarterly base wages of greater than $1,749.20, the weekly benefit is calculated by multiplying base wages by 55% and dividing the result by 13.

AB 908 revises the formula for determining benefits for periods commencing after January 1, 2018 but before January 1, 2022, to provide weekly benefit amounts as follows:

When the amount of wages paid to the employee for his/her highest income quarter is less than $929 – the weekly benefit is $50.00
When the amount of wages paid to the employee for his/her highest income quarter is $929 or more, but less than one-third of the amount of the state average quarterly wage – the weekly benefit is 70% of the amount of wages paid during such quarter divided by 13.
When the amount of wages paid to the employee for his/her highest quarter is one-third of the amount of the state average quarterly wage or more – the weekly benefit is the greater of:
23.3% of the state average weekly wage; or
60% of the amount of wages paid to the individual for employment by employers during the employee’s highest quarter divided by 13.
Also, the requirement that an eligible employee must meet a 7-day waiting period before collecting PFL benefits will become inoperative as of January 1, 2018.

Finally, after January 1, 2022, if an employee meets the eligibility requirements (e.g. has quarterly base wages of greater than $1,749.20) and is on an authorized leave to care for a seriously ill family member or bond with a baby or placed foster or adopted child, the weekly benefit amount shall again be equal to 55% of the employee’s wages during the highest income quarter divided by 13, but not exceeding the maximum workers’ compensation temporary disability indemnity weekly benefit amount established by California’s Department of Industrial Relations (“DIR”) pursuant to Labor Code section 4453.

Supreme Court Battle Set Over Prohibition of Disparaging Trademarks

Section 2(a) of the Lanham act bars the registration of “scandalous, immoral or disparaging trademarks.” The USPTO has used this applied this provision to refuse the registration of marks such as F**K PROJECT, PORNO JESUS, ASSJACKED and NO $#!+.  The USPTO also invoked this provision when it upheld an examiner’s refusal to register the mark THE SLANTS for a musical band on the grounds that it was offensive to Asian-Americans.  The band appealed the refusal to register to the Federal Circuit.

The question on appeal was whether Section 2(a)’s prohibition on scandalous, immoral or disparaging trademarks is constitutional. The government defended the prohibition on the grounds that it disapproves of the messages conveyed by disparaging marks.   The Federal Circuit noted that this prohibition does not further the Lanham Act’s purpose and preventing consumers from being deceived. This reason for denial of registration is for “reasons quite separate from any ability of the mark to serve the consumer and investment interest underlying trademark protection.”

The Federal Circuit found that Section 2(a)’s prohibition on registering disparaging marks is a content-based regulation which is presumptively invalid. Content-based laws – those laws that target speech based on its communicative content – are presumptively unconstitutional and maybe justified only if the government proves that the laws are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.  The refusal to register a trademark because it is disparaging results from the government making a moral judgment based solely on the mark’s expressive content.   The Federal Circuit found that the government’s desire to prohibit disparaging marks and the messages they convey is not a legitimate and compelling state interest.  Based on this analysis, the Federal Circuit found this provision of Section 2(a) to be unconstitutional.

Subsequent to the Federal Circuit’s opinion, the band pushed the USPTO to immediately register its mark.  In response, the USPTO said that it would suspend the registrations of all disparaging trademarks while it considered appealing the Federal Circuit’s ruling to the United States Supreme Court. Commentators believe that the US PTO will likely appeal the Federal Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court.

The Federal Circuit’s opinion may open the door for the registration of marks that may be potentially disparaging and new applications for marks previously refused registration based on Section 2(a).  Further, the Federal Circuit’s opinion may have an impact on the case of Washington Redskins football team which is appealing the 2014 revocation of its REDSKINS trademark on the grounds that it was offensive to Native Americans.

California Increases Minimum Wage – Prepare Now to Avoid Future Liability!

By Jessica Schoendienst

California lawmakers, union supporters, and Governor Brown have come together to increase California minimum wage to $15.00 over the next several years.  Governor Brown signed the law only one week after he announced that legislators and labor leaders negotiated a deal behind the scenes.

The new law requires California employers with more than 25 employees to pay at least $15.00 per hour by 2022.  Employers will 25 or less employees have an additional year to increase their wages to at least $15.00 per hour.  The increase will be phased-in beginning next year when the minimum wage increases to $10.50 per hour.  Click here for a chart of the new minimum wage rates.

After January 1, 2023, the minimum wage will be increased annually from the adjusted U.S. Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W), but no more than 3.5% in a year, with the resulting rate rounded to the nearest $0.10.  CPI-W is generally seen as a cost-of-living index for working individuals and families.

The Governor has the authority to suspend the increases based on economic conditions, such as declining state revenues from sales tax, declines here in labor markets, or budget deficits.  However, the Governor can only suspend the increase twice and the Governor does not have the authority to suspend the minimum wage increase once the minimum wage reaches $15.00 per hour.

The state minimum wage increases affects more than just those paid minimum wage.  Employers should consider these new minimum wage obligations for employees paid commissions and piece-rate compensation, are exempt employees, or those employees that are required to provide and maintain their own tools and equipment.

For example, exempt employees must satisfy both the duties and salary test to be properly classified as an exempt employee.  Generally this means that the employee must earn at least two times the state minimum wage.   Click here for a chart of the new minimum wage rates (minimum exempt salary).

Employers need to ensure they increase the minimum salaries for those whose status is dependent on minimum wage.  Employers who do not increase employee’s wages may risk liability for improperly classifying employees or risk liability for back wages or reimbursements.

Employers will also need to update their written notices provided to minimum wage employees, pursuant to Labor Code § 2810.5, because otherwise the rate of pay and overtime rates listed on the notice will not reflect the new increases.  Employers should also ensure that they display workplace posters that include the new minimum wage rates.