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Grand Theft Auto: Trademark Infringement and the First Amendment

The Grand Theft Auto (“GTA”) video game series is one of the most successful video games of all time. In April 2005, the maker of GTA was sued for trademark infringement as a result of its inclusion of a fictional strip club in its game that bore a resemblance to a real strip club in East Los Angeles. On November 5, 2008, the Ninth Circuit in the case E.S.S. Entertainment 20002, Inc. v. Rockstar Videos, Inc., et al. issued its opinion in this case involving video games and virtual strip clubs and reaffirmed the protections of the First Amendment as a defense to trademark infringement claims.

Rockstar Games, Inc. (“Rockstar”) manufactures the GTA video game series, which includes Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas. The games take place in fictional cities resembling actual American urban areas. Each game is accompanied by a disclaimer stating that the locations depicted are fictional. GTA: San Andreas was created to emulate the West Coast “gangster” culture and depicts the virtual city of Los Santos, which is intended to imitate actual Los Angeles neighborhoods.

In creating the Los Santos portion of the game, some of the computer artists visited Los Angeles to take reference photographs. They then returned to their studios in Scotland where they changed the images from the photographs as necessary to fit into the fictional Los Santos city. One of the computer artists testified that they did not seek to “re-creat[e] a realistic depiction of Los Angeles; rather, [they] were creating `Los Santos’ a fictional city that lampooned the seedy underbelly of Los Angeles and the people, business and places [that] comprise it. “ One of the businesses depicted in Los Santos was a cartoon-style strip club called the “Pig Pen.”

E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. (“ESS”) operates a strip club featuring nude females in East Los Angeles called the Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club (“Play Pen”). ESS claims that Rockstar’s depiction of a fictional strip club called the “Pig Pen” infringed its trademark and trade dress associated with its “Play Pen” club.

Although the video game artists took some inspiration from their photographs of the Play Pen, they also used photographs of other East Los Angeles locations to design other aspects of the fictional “Pig Pen.” These aspects included different characteristics of the “Pig Pen” building and different signage.

In April 2005, ESS sued Rockstar for various claims, including trademark infringement and unfair competition. ESS claimed that Rockstar used the Play Pen’s distinctive logo and trade dress without its authorization and created a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to whether ESS endorsed or was otherwise associated with the GTA video game. The U.S. District Court granted Rockstar’s summary judgment against all of ESS claims and held that the First Amendment protected Rockstar against liability. [The court also addressed and rejected Rockstar’s defense of the nominative fair use doctrine which is not discussed in this article.]

In considering Rockstar’s First Amendment defense, the Ninth Circuit began by recognizing that it had adopted the Second Circuit’s approach from Rogers v. Grimaldi (2d Cir. 1989) 875 F.2d 994, which “requires courts to construe the Lanham Act `to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.’” Furthermore, an artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would constitute trademark infringement under the Lanham Act is not actionable “unless the [use of the mark] has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever or if it has some artistic relevance unless [it] explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Ninth Circuit recognized that although the test was traditionally applied to the use of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, it found no reason why it should not also apply to the use of a trademark in the body of an artistic work.

The Ninth Circuit continued by recognizing that it had adopted the Rogers approach in the case, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 296 F.3d 894. There, Mattel, the maker of “Barbie” dolls, sued MCA for trademark infringement with regard to the title of a song the company released called “Barbie Girl.” The court recognized that the song was a commentary “about Barbie and the values … she [supposedly] represents.” In considering the two prongs of the Rogers test, the court recognized that the first prong was straightforward because the song was about Barbie and the use of Barbie in the title was clearly relevant to the underlying work. As to the second prong, the Ninth Circuit made an important point in observing “the only indication that Mattel might be associated with the song is the use of Barbie in the title. If this were enough to satisfy this prong of the Rogers test, it would render Rogers a nullity.”

In turning to the GTA matter, the Ninth Circuit noted that ESS conceded that the GTA game was artistic and, therefore, the Rogers test would apply. ESS argued, however, that the incorporation of the “Pig Pen” into the game had no artistic relevance and that it was explicitly misleading. ESS argued that its claim was distinguishable from that in Mattel in that (1) the game was not “about” the Play Pen in the way the “Barbie Girl” song was “about” the Barbie doll and (2) unlike Barbie, the Play Pen was not a cultural icon.

The Ninth Circuit reasoned that ESS missed the point. Under past cases, courts have held that the use of a trademark with “no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever” does not merit First Amendment protection. The court reasoned “in other words, the level of relevance merely must be above zero. It is true that the game is not `about’ the Play Pen the way that Barbie Girl was about Barbie, but given the low threshold the game must surmount, that fact is hardly dispositive.” The Ninth Circuit also recognized that while the Play Pen has little cultural significance, the same could be said about many East Los Angeles individual establishments. However, its distinctiveness lay in the “look and feel” of the neighborhood and that characterization is relevant to Rockstar’s artistic goal, which was to develop a cartoon-style parody of East Los Angeles. The Ninth Circuit concluded that to include a strip club that is similar in look and feel to the Play Pen did indeed have at least “some artistic relevance.”

Turning to the second prong, the Ninth Circuit recognized that this prong is directly aimed at the purpose of trademark law, namely, to “avoid confusion in the marketplace by allowing a trademark owner to prevent others from duping consumers into buying a product they mistakenly believe is sponsored by the trademark owner.” The Ninth Circuit held that the only relevant issue was whether GTA would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen was somehow behind the Pig Pen or that it sponsors the GTA game. The Ninth Circuit recognized that the mere use of the trademark alone cannot suffice to make it explicitly misleading and that the GTA game was not complimentary to the Play Pen strip club in that video games and strip clubs do not go together “like a horse and carriage.” The Ninth Circuit did not find any evidence that the buying public would “reasonably have believed that ESS produced the video game or, for that matter, that Rockstar operated a strip club.” Furthermore, there was no evidence that a player would be misled into believing that ESS had provided whatever expertise, support or unique strip club knowledge it possesses to the production of GTA.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that Rockstar’s modification of ESS’ trademark was not explicitly misleading and was thus protected by the First Amendment against ESS’ trademark infringement claim. Since the First Amendment defense applied equally to all of ESS’s state claims, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had properly dismissed the entire case against Rockstar.

Given the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the ESS case, defendants in trademark infringement cases should keep in mind whether First Amendment protections can provide an affirmative defense to the plaintiff’s claims.

LAW ALERT: Governor Approves Ground-Breaking Legislation Regarding Disability Access Lawsuits

Download: LEGAL ALERT. Disability Access Lawsuits (1072778).PDF

Lizbeth V. West, Esq. and Anthony B. Daye, Esq.

After years of defeated legislation involving disability access laws in California, Governor Schwarzenegger signed a very important piece of legislation on October 8, 2008 that will become effective January 1, 2009. Senate Bill 1608 is a lengthy and comprehensive piece of legislation that adds several provisions to existing laws regarding construction-related disability access issues. It is a balanced piece of legislation protecting the disabled public and businesses alike. While it encourages property owners and operators to take proactive steps to ensure their properties comply with applicable access requirements, it also clarifies and amends disability access laws to reduce the unwarranted “drive-by” lawsuits that have plagued California for years.

Below is a summary of some of the many key provisions of the new law:

  • A new state Disability Commission shall be formed that will be responsible for evaluating and providing recommendations on disability access issues impacting the disabled public and California businesses;
  • A system of state-certified access specialists will be implemented and businesses will be able to have their property inspected and certified for compliance.
  • Qualified defendants (those who have had their properties certified or have a certification pending) will have the opportunity to take advantage of a new court procedure if they are sued for construction-based (or access barrier) disability access violations. Such procedure includes the right to request a 90-day stay of the action so that the court can evaluate the report and certification issued to the defendant by a certified access specialist, and to request an early evaluation conference with the court to resolve the lawsuit before protracted and expensive litigation ensues.
  • Whenever a plaintiff’s attorney sends a demand for money or serves a complaint on a property owner or operator regarding construction-based access violations, he/she must include a notice detailing the legal rights and obligations of the property owner or operator. The notice must be in the form of a state approved Judicial Council form, which will be available by mid-2009.
  • Plaintiffs in construction-related disability access lawsuits will only be allowed to recover damages for the violations of disability access requirements that they personally encountered or that deterred them from access on a particular occasion. With respect to deterrence, a plaintiff must, among other requirements, have had actual knowledge of the violation or violations in order to be deterred, based on the circumstances of the individual’s experience.
  • Statutory damages available under the Unruh Act or the Disabled Persons Act can only be assessed on a “per occasion” basis, rather than on the number of violations of construction-related accessibility standards identified at the place of public accommodation. In other words, not every violation of a construction-related disability access standard constitutes a separate offense entitling a plaintiff to a separate award of statutory damages, even if the plaintiff personally encountered more than one violation.
  • Finally, the law clarifies that a court may consider reasonable written settlement offers made and rejected in determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be awarded at the end of a case. This provision is no doubt intended to reduce protracted litigation by the parties of construction-related disability access cases.

If you have any questions about SB 1608 or other California or federal disability laws, please feel free to contact Lizbeth West, Charles Post, or Anthony Daye at Weintraub Genshlea Chediak.

Jack Bauer to Hunt Down DVD Pirates?

Sometimes a law is passed which tackles incredibly complex issues and causes seismic shifts in entire industries. Unfortunately, nothing like that happened in time for this article. However, early this month President Bush signed into law Senate Bill 3325 – the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act of 2008. This new law amends existing federal intellectual property laws to enhance remedies for violations of intellectual property rights and creates a Cabinet level position to coordinate protection of intellectual property, both domestically and abroad, to promote education and to facilitate criminal prosecution of infringers. This bill was backed heavily by the RIAA, MPAA and other organizations who represent content owners. A summary of the changes implanted by the act are as follows.

Enhancements to Civil Intellectual Property Laws

The first section of Title I of the Act makes some modifications to the requirement that prior to instituting copyright infringement action a plaintiff must have registered the work being infringed. First, the Act limits the registration requirements for civil actions, meaning that the government can pursue criminal copyright infringement actions without the copyright owner having ever filed and obtained a copyright registration for the work being infringed. Second, the Act introduces a harmless error provision to the registration requirement. An infringer can no longer avoid liability if the registration covering the work allegedly infringed contains inaccurate information.

The second section of Title I of the Act introduces a new tool for copyright owners combating infringement. Under the newly revised Section 503(a) of the Copyright Act, a court may now impound all of allegedly infringing copies or phonorecords, all plates, molds, masters, and other means or methods of which the allegedly infringing copies or phonorecords were made, and all records documenting the manufacture and sale of the allegedly infringing copies or phonorecords. These new tools were previously only enjoyed by trademark owners who sought to impound counterfeit goods under the Lanham Act.

The third and fourth sections of the Act address the civil penalties that may be imposed in counterfeiting cases under the Lanham Act. Section 35(b) of the Lanham Act has been amended to impose treble damages not only against individuals who engage in the sale or distribution of counterfeit goods, but also against those who provide the goods or services necessary for the sale or distribution of counterfeit goods. The Act also doubles statutory damages available under the Lanham act in counterfeiting cases. Now, in cases involving use of a counterfeit mark, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of statutory damages of not less than $1,000 (up from $500) but no more than $200,000 (up from $100,000) per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold or distributed. If the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful, the court may now award up to $2,000,000 (up from $1,000,000) per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold or distributed.

The Act also amends Section 602 of the Copyright Act which previously addressed the importation of infringing copies or phonorecords. The Act now provides that the importation into the United States, and now the exportation from the United States, of copies or phonorecords which, if sold within the United States would be infringing goods, shall constitute copyright infringement.

New Forfeiture Laws

Title II of the Act adds a new forfeiture provision for civil and criminal infringement. Under the new forfeiture provisions not only are infringing copies or counterfeit items subject to forfeiture and destruction, but also any property used or intended to be used in any manner to commit or facilitate the infringement. Also subject to forfeiture are the proceeds from the infringing activities. The new forfeiture provision also provides for the forfeiture and destruction of property involved in the unauthorized recording of live musical performances or motion pictures.

Creation Of An Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator and Budget Appropriations

Title III contains the most controversial provision of the Act; the creation of a Cabinet level position to oversee and coordinate the enforcement of intellectual property. The “IP Czar” has quite a job description. This person shall be responsible for coordinating the development of a strategic plan to combat and reduce counterfeit and infringing goods in the domestic and international markets, disrupting and eliminating domestic and international counterfeiting and infringing networks, working with foreign nations to establish international standards and policies for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, and taking active steps to protect United States Intellectual Property rights in foreign nations.

Also included in the Act are appropriations totaling $275,000,000 ($55,000,000 per fiscal year beginning in 2009 and continuing through 2013) for the Department of Justice and FBI to combat intellectual property infringement. The Department of Justice shall have access to $25,000,000 per year to make grants available to the states and local law enforcement entities for training, prevention, enforcement, and prosecution of intellectual property theft and infringement crimes. The FBI and the Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the DOJ get a total of $30,000,000 per year in appropriations for the investigation and prosecution of intellectual property crimes, including adding 10 additional operational agents of the BBI designated to support the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the Criminal Division of the DOJ in the investigation and coordination of intellectual property crimes; ensuring that at least one FBI agent provides support to the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Crime Unit in the DOJ for investigating and prosecuting computer hacking or intellectual property crimes; for FBI training in investigating and prosecuting intellectual property crime; and for the assignment of at least two assistant United States attorneys to each United States Attorneys Office who shall be responsible for investigating and prosecuting computer hacking and intellectual property crimes.

Senator Lahey who sponsored the bill stated that “intellectual property makes up some of the most valuable, and most vulnerable, property we have” and that we “need to do more to protect it from theft and abuse if we hope to continue being a world leader in innovation.” According to Lahey, the protection of intellectual property has an impact on the U.S. economy. “If we make better and stronger efforts to combat counterfeiting and piracy”, Lahey stated “we will also enjoy more jobs, greater returns, productivity, and more taxes being paid rather than having infringers and thieves enjoy the financial gains of wrong doing.” According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) “global piracy of copyrighted material costs the U.S. economy $58 billion per year and more than 370,000 jobs and $16 billion in earnings for U.S. workers.”

As a lawyer who represents business engaged in the creation and exploitation of copyrighted content and branded products, I concur that intellectual property are incredibly valuable assets and that companies in the content creation and exploitation business contribute significantly to the economy. But given the current economic situation, should the government spend $275,000,000 to help the RIAA and MPAA members combat global privacy? Do we really want Jack Bauer hunting down DVD pirates in China?

Scott Hervey to Speak at UC Davis Entrepreneurship Academy

On September 15, 2008, intellectual property and new media shareholder Scott Hervey will speak at the annual UC Davis Entrepreneurship Academy. Scott will provide an informative review of intellectual property rights from a legal prospective.

Joe Genshlea to Perform One-Night/One-Man Show as Benefit for Sacramento Theatre Company

Sacramento Theatre Company presents A Sense of Place: Reflections, Recollections and Ruminations on a Sacramento Life. This one-man/ one-night only performance on October 25th will feature Joe Genshlea, a multiple award-winning litigator and Sacramento native, who will share his personal recollections of growing up in the state capital.

Sponsorship and VIP reservations are available by calling Kim Kaplan at 916-446-7501 EXT. 109. For more information and ticket prices, log onto The Sacramento Theatre Company’s website, www.sactheatre.org, or call the STC box office at 916-443-6722 or 1-888-4-STC-TIX.

LAW ALERT: California Supreme Court Rejects Customer Non-Solicitation Contracts

In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, Case No. BC294853 (August 7, 2008) the California Supreme Court holds that non-solicitation of customer agreements are per se unenforceable unless they fall within the statutory or other exception permitted under the law. California law has long protected the rights of employees to lawfully pursue any trade or profession. For more than 100 years California law has invalidated any agreement between an employer and an employee which purports to limit or restrict an employee’s ability to work in their trade or profession following the employment. Many other states permit such “non-compete” agreements between employers and employees as long as the restraints on competition are reasonable. In the Arthur Andersen case, the California high court rejected arguments that more narrow agreements – those that limit a former employee’s ability to solicit the former employer’s customers for some specified period of time – did not run afoul of Business and Professions Code §16600 and thus, were valid.

California’s Business and Professions Code §16600 provides that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void, except as provided in this Chapter [§§16600-16602.5].”

Arthur Andersen argued that such a restraint should not be invalid because it did not limit the former employee’s ability to practice their profession but instead only limited their ability to practice that profession in regard to specific Arthur Andersen customers. The high court rejected that notion and rejected the “narrow restraint” rule adopted by some federal courts considering the enforceability of such non-solicitation agreements under California law, including the Ninth Circuit, the federal district that covers California.

Arthur Andersen argued that a non-solicitation agreement does not violate §16600 if it imposes a limited restriction and “leaves a substantial portion of the market available to the employee.” The California Supreme Court resolved the dispute between federal and state courts and rejected this “narrow restraint” doctrine. In doing so, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed California’s fundamental public policy that is expressed in Business and Professions Code §16600. The Court declared “Section 16600 is unambiguous, and if the legislature intended the statute to apply only to restraints that were unreasonable or overbroad, it could have included language to that effect.” Because the decision was from the California Supreme Court, federal courts considering the question under California law are now obligated to follow the California Supreme Court interpretation.

The California Supreme Court decided another issue in the Arthur Andersen case as well. It examined the scope of a release of claims that a former employee had been required to execute and it concluded that such releases, regardless of the broad scope of their language, do not include a release of rights and claims that are statutorily unwaivable. Specifically, the California Supreme Court concluded that a release of claims which purported to release “any and all” claims arising from or related to employment did not purport to release claims for indemnity under California Labor Code §2802. The same rationale would apply to any other claim which, as a matter of statute, cannot be waived by the employee.

For more information regarding the contents of this article, please feel free to contact any of the employment lawyers at Weintraub Genshlea Chediak: Lizbeth West, Charles Post, or Anthony Daye.

Six Weintraub Genshlea Chediak Attorneys Honored As 2008 Northern California Super Lawyers

SACRAMENTO, Calif., July 31, 2008 –Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, a Sacramento-based business law and business litigation law firm congratulates its six shareholders who were named as 2008 Northern California Super Lawyers:

Dale C. Campbell, Intellectual Property Litigation

Ed Corey, Jr., Estate Planning and Probate

Joseph S. Genshlea, Business Litigation

Michael A. Kvarme, Real Estate

Audrey A. Millemann, Intellectual Property Litigation

Charles L. Post, Employment and Labor

Recognition is based on surveys of approximately 52,000 active lawyers in Northern California, independent research by Law & Politics and review and recommendation by practice-area panel of top lawyers. Published annually in the August issues of San Francisco Magazine and Northern California Super Lawyers, the select list is a comprehensive and diverse guide of the top five percent of lawyers in Northern California by practice areas.

We’re the Government, and We’re Here to Copy – Blueport Co. v. United States

The United States Government, which created the courts and a legal system to provide an avenue to seek redress for injury, is immune from suit in that system unless the Government agrees to be sued by waiving its immunity. This is commonly known as “sovereign immunity,” and allows many lawsuits to be dismissed at the pleading stage. On July 25, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an opinion regarding the scope of sovereign immunity as applied in a copyright infringement case.

The Federal Government has waived its immunity for suits based on its infringing the rights of copyright owners. It is a rather limited waiver, however, and allows the Government to infringe much more freely than a private party. Last week’s Federal Circuit decision, Blueport Co., LLC v. United States, shows how easy it can be for a government employee to lose his rights to work he has created.

In Blueport, Air Force Technical Sergeant Mark Davenport was employed as a manager of the Air Force Manpower Data System, a database containing manpower profiles for the Air Force. He was also a member of the Air Force Manpower User Group, a group of manpower personnel that provided guidance on the use of the MDS. Davenport believed that the software used to run the MDS was not adequate, and set out to write his own software. The Air Force refused to train him on computer programming, so Davenport learned programming on his own, on his own time, and at his own expense.

Davenport wrote a software program – the AUMD program – to use with the MDS. He wrote it on his own time at his home computer. He brought the finished program to work and installed it on his work computer, shared it with his co-workers, and posted it on the Air Force’s website so that Air Force manpower personnel could download and use it. He modified the program based on feedback he received, and added an automatic expiration to require users to download the newest version of the AUMD program. He even gave a presentation on the AUMD program to senior Air Force manpower officers at an annual conference.

The Air Force decided it needed the AUMD program, and asked Davenport for the source code. Davenport refused to simply turn it over; it was his program, after all. The Air Force threatened him with demotion and a pay cut. Davenport responded by assigning all his rights to Blueport, who contacted the Air Force to negotiate a license agreement for the use of the AUMD program. The Air Force had other ideas, and went to SAIC to recreate the program. SAIC modified the AUMD program’s source code to extend the expiration date, which allowed Air Force personnel to continue to use the program. Davenport sued.

Common sense screams “This is not right!” Davenport wrote the program on his own, at his own expense, not using any government computers, so he should own the rights to it. The Air Force can’t just take it! That may be, but remember, it’s the Government, and since the Government makes the rules, it gets to decide which ones to play by. And in this case, it brought out the sovereign immunity rule.

Section 1498(b) of title 28, United States Code, contains the waiver of immunity for copyright infringement. As the Federal Circuit pointed out, it “grants copyright owners a right of action for copyright infringement against the United States, subject to three provisos.” First, there is no right of action where the employee “was in a position to order, influence, or induce use of the copyrighted work by the Government.” Next, there is no right of action where the employee prepared the work as part of his or her “official functions.” Finally, there is no right of action when “Government time, material, or facilities were used” in the creation.

After first deciding that these three provisos are jurisdictional limitations and not affirmative defenses, the Court of Appeals agreed that Blueport’s claim was subject to the first proviso, in that Davenport “influenced or induced” the AUMD program’s use by the Air Force. “Davenport’s position as a member of the Air Force manpower community gave him access and authority to distribute the AUMD program freely to his colleagues.” Therefore, his claim was precluded by the first proviso, and the court did not reach the other provisos. The lower court had held that all three provisos each barred Blueport’s suit. The Government’s waiver of immunity is rather limited.

Blueport also sued for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which provides that “no person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under” the Copyright Act. Blueport claimed that the modification of the expiration date violated this statute. The Federal Circuit didn’t reach the merits of this claim, however. Instead, it held that the Government has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims under the DMCA, and therefore is immune from suit. The court based its opinion on finding that the term “person” in the DMCA does not include the term “sovereign.” Likewise, section 1498(b) does not include a waiver for claims under the DMCA, and a waiver of sovereign immunity must be express, not implied.

An interesting, although for Davenport unsatisfying, distinction can be drawn between this case and a case involving a “work for hire” under the Copyright Act. The copyright of a work for hire is owned by the employer, not the employee. The Government never claimed that it owned the copyright here. It just couldn’t be sued for infringing Davenport’s rights. The lesson to be learned is simple. If you are a government employee, and write a program (or book, manual, etc.) that will make your work place better or more efficient, think before you simply bring it to work and share it. You may be giving your employer a gift you didn’t intend to give.

LEGAL ALERT: New Laws for California Affecting Temporary Service Employers and Video Providers

Download: Legal Alert. SB 940 and AB 2232 (1056069).PDF

Legal Alert: Governor Approves SB 940 and AB 2232

Anthony B. Daye, Esq.

Weintraub Genshlea Chediak

Senate Bill 940.

Effective January 1, 2009, Senate Bill 940 creates new wage and hour requirements for temporary service employers. Along with adding section 210.3 to the Labor Code, SB 940 also amends sections 203, 203.1, 204, 210, 215, 220, and 2699.5 of the Labor Code. Existing law requires that employers pay their employees twice during each calendar month. SB 940 creates a special set of requirements for temporary service employers with employees’ working week-to-week or day-to-day. Employees on week-to-week assignments are now required to be paid weekly, while employees working day-to-day must be paid daily. Further, employees assigned to clients engaged in a trade dispute must be paid daily. These new requirements do not apply to employees who are assigned to a client for more than 90 consecutive calendar days.

Because existing law imposes civil and criminal penalties for wage violations, SB 940 also creates state-mandated local programs to enforce these existing civil and criminal penalties for violations of the new temporary employee wage requirements.

Assembly Bill 2232.

The Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act of 2006 governs telephone corporations and video providers, such as cable companies, in the State of California. Under existing law, telephone corporations are required to perform background checks for all applicants for employment who would have access to the corporation’s network, central office, or subscriber premises.

Effective January 1, 2009, AB 2232 expands the current law to require video providers to perform the same background checks for all applicants for employment who would have access to the video provider’s network, central office, or subscriber premises. This requirement is also applicable to vendors and independent contractors working on behalf of telephone corporations and video providers.

If you have any questions about employee background checks, California wage and hour laws, or any other Labor and Employment Law issues, please feel free to contact any of the employment lawyers at Weintraub Genshlea Chediak: Lizbeth West, Charles Post, or Anthony Daye.

LAW ALERT: Brinker Decision Provides Clarity to Law Governing Meals and Rest Periods

Download: Legal Alert. Brinker Decision Provides Guidance (1055970).PDF

NOTE: Since this article was posted, the California Supreme Court has accepted review of this case.

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The recent California Court of Appeal decision Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court (4th Dist. July 22, 2008) not only takes the wind out of the sails of class-action plaintiff attorneys, it also provides some long awaited guidance for employers.

Summary of the Case and the Court’s Decision.

In Brinker, a group of hourly non-exempt employees brought a class action against the restaurant employer claiming that the employer failed to comply with meal and rest period obligations and also required employees to work off the clock. The employees specifically claimed that: 1) the employer’s practice of having employees take “early lunches” shortly after starting their shift and then requiring them to work another five to ten hours without receiving another meal period violated Labor Code section 512(a) and the wage orders; 2) they were not provided their rest periods between their second and fourth hour of work, and were not provided the rest period before the first meal period; and 3) they were required to work off the clock when they were clocked out for their meal periods.

The employees argued that the wage and hour violations were amenable for class treatment because the employer’s non-compliance with wage and hour requirements could be determined by time card records and the employer’s policies and practices. The trial court agreed and granted class certification. The employer petitioned for a writ of mandate to the court of appeal. The court of appeal issued an unpublished decision which went up to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeal’s original decision and transferred the matter back to the court of appeal for reconsideration. It was on reconsideration that the court of appeal concluded that the class certification order from the trial court was erroneous and must be vacated because the trial court failed to properly consider the elements of the employees’ claims in determining whether they are susceptible to class treatment. In discussing the elements of the employees’ claims, the court of appeal handed down the following encouraging pronouncements:

1. While employers cannot impede, discourage, or dissuade employees from taking rest periods, they need only provide, not ensure, rest periods are taken;

2. Employers need only authorize and permit rest periods every four hours or major faction thereof and they need not, where impracticable, be in the middle of each work period;

3. Employers are not required to provide a meal period for every five consecutive hours worked;

4. While employers cannot impede, discourage, or dissuade employees from taking meal periods, they need only provide them and not ensure they are taken;

5. While employers cannot coerce, require or compel employees to work off the clock, they can only be held liable for employees working off the clock if they knew or should have known they were doing so;

6. Because the rest and meal breaks need only be “made available” and not “ensured,” individual issues predominate and, [based upon the evidence presented to the trial court], they are not amenable to class treatment; and

7. Off-the-clock claims are also not amenable to class treatment as individual issues predominate on the issue of whether [Brinker] forced employees to work off the clock, whether [Brinker] changed time records, and whether [Brinker] knew or should have known employees were working off the clock.

Reaction from the Governor’s Office and the Labor Commissioner.

Immediately following the Brinker decision, Governor Schwarzenegger issued a statement applauding the decision. The Governor said expressly:

“We are pleased that the California Court of Appeal issued today a decision squarely addressing many of the central issues in dispute concerning meal and rest periods. The confusing and conflicting interpretations of the meal and rest period requirements have harmed both employees and employers. Today’s decision promotes the public interest by providing employers, employees, the courts and the labor commissioner the clarity and precedent needed to apply meal and rest period requirements consistently.” (Governor’s Statement)

Also, on July 25, 2008, the Labor Commissioner, Angela Bradstreet, along with the Deputy Chief and Chief Counsel of the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), issued a memo to all DLSE staff advising them of the Brinker ruling and directing them to apply the holdings in the Brinker decision to all meal and rest period cases brought before the DLSE.

Conclusion.

While the Brinker case and the Governor’s and Labor Commissioner’s reaction to the case are all good news for employers, a final word of caution is warranted. It is anticipated that the plaintiffs will petition the California Supreme Court for review of the decision. If the Supreme Court grants review, employers will have to wait and see how it rules. Nevertheless, the current state of affairs is that the rules outlined in the Brinker case will govern meal and rest period claims brought before the Labor Commissioner (DLSE) and most likely will be followed by other state courts.

For more information regarding the contents of this article or for assistance in complying with meal and rest period obligations, please feel free to contact any of the employment lawyers at Weintraub Genshlea Chediak: Lizbeth West, Charles Post, or Anthony Daye.