Labor and Employment

On May 26, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Lewis v. Epic Systems Corporation, held that when an employer conditions continued employment upon the signing of a class or collective action waiver in an arbitration agreement, the agreement violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and is unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The decision creates a split with other circuit courts, including the Second, Fifth and Eighth circuits.

Employers in the Seventh Circuit will have to re-evaluate how to minimize the risk of class and collective action liability.  The ruling arose out of an arbitration agreement seeking to prevent class and collective actions on wage and hour claims.  Increasingly, employers are being hit with class and collective action wage and hour lawsuits trying to force settlements, despite having named plaintiffs who worked at one location and are often unfamiliar with the employer’s actual policies and practices on a class-wide basis. The Seventh Circuit’s decision makes it more difficult for employers to curb these abuses.

The employer in Lewis provided employees with an arbitration agreement via email that stated any wage and hour claims could only be brought through individual arbitration and that the employees waived the right to participate in, or receive money from, any class, collective or representative proceeding.  The agreement further provided that employees were deemed to have accepted the terms of the arbitration agreement through their continued employment with the company, but also requested that employees acknowledge their receipt of the agreement.

Although the plaintiff in Lewis had acknowledged his receipt of the arbitration agreement, he later filed an action in federal court on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees contending that the employer had misclassified employees and failed to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The district court denied the employer’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause violated the NLRA because it interfered with employee’s rights to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection.

In affirming the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, the Seventh Circuit first determined that the employer’s arbitration provision violated Section 7 of the NLRA, providing that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or  other mutual aid and protection.”  Although not specifically including class and collective actions, the Seventh Circuit interpreted “concerted activities” to include such proceedings, reasoning that “[g]iven Section 7’s intentionally broad sweep, there is no reason to think that Congress meant to exclude collective remedies from its compass.”  In support of its ruling, the Court relied on the much-criticized National Labor Relations Board’s decision in D.R. Horton, holding that arbitration agreements prohibiting class or collective actions violate Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.

In finding that the employer’s arbitration violated the NLRA, the Seventh Circuit made a significant distinction worth considering for employers.  The Seventh Circuit specifically distinguished rulings from other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, finding that provisions mandating individual arbitration may be enforceable, where the employees had the right to opt out of the agreement without penalty.  However, because the agreement specifically provided that the employees were “deemed” to have consented to the agreement by continuing with their employment, the court avoided addressing whether an agreement with an opt out provision would be enforceable.

The Seventh Circuit also independently held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the FAA.  In doing so, the Seventh Circuit noted that it was creating a split among circuit courts, on whether the FAA mandates enforcement of individual arbitration provisions over any conflict with the NLRA.

The Seventh Circuit found no conflict with the FAA as the NLRA generally favors arbitration and a violation of Section 7 would not have occurred if the arbitration agreement had permitted class or collective arbitration.  The Court also relied on the FAA’s savings clause in finding no conflict. While the FAA generally favors arbitration, its saving clause provides that arbitration agreements are “enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the arbitration provision violated the NLRA, that illegality rendered it unenforceable under the savings clause.

Notably, the Fifth Circuit, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, has previously rejected the claim that the FAA savings clause could be used to invalidate a class action waiver, as it results in disfavoring arbitration, by eliminating its streamlined convenience and cost savings.  The Fifth Circuit also rejected the argument that that NLRA was exempted from application of the FAA.

Takeaway for Employers:

It remains to be seen when the United States Supreme Court will address the split among circuits on whether class action waivers in arbitration agreement are enforceable under the FAA or violate the NLRA.  However, employers in the Seventh Circuit should now review their arbitration agreements to see if they comply with Lewis.  A class action waiver entered into as a condition of employment will be found invalid by district courts in that circuit.

However, it does not necessarily follow that all class arbitration waivers will be deemed to be per se invalid.  The Seventh Circuit left open the question of whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement would comply with the NLRA if the employee were given the choice of opting out in connection with their continued employment.

The EEOC Special Task Force (“Task Force”) has spent the last 18 months examining the myriad and complex issues associated with harassment in the workplace. Thirty years after the U.S. Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that workplace harassment was an actionable form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Task Force concludes that “we have come a far way since that day, but sadly and too often still have far to go.”

The Task Force was comprised of 16 members from around the country, including representatives of academia from various social science disciplines; legal practitioners on both the plaintiff and defense side; employers and employee advocacy groups; and organized labor. The Task Force reflected a broad diversity of experience, expertise, and opinion. From April 2015 through June 2016, the Task Force held a series of meetings – some were open to the public, some were closed working sessions, and others were a combination of both. In the course of a year, the Task Force received testimony from more than 30 witnesses, and received numerous public comments.  The Task Force focused on learning everything about workplace harassment – from sociologists, industrial-organizational psychologists, investigators, trainers, lawyers, employers, advocates, and anyone else who had some useful information.

Below is a summary of the Task Force’s key findings.

• Workplace Harassment Remains a Persistent Problem. Almost fully one third of the approximately 90,000 charges received by EEOC in fiscal year 2015 included an allegation of workplace harassment on the basis of sex (including sexual orientation, gender identity, and pregnancy), race, disability, age, ethnicity/national origin, color, and religion.
• Workplace Harassment Too Often Goes Unreported. Common workplace-based responses by those who experience sex-based harassment are to avoid the harasser, deny or downplay the gravity of the situation, or attempt to ignore, forget, or endure the behavior. The Task Force found that roughly three out of four individuals who experienced harassment never even talked to a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassing conduct.
• There Is a Compelling Business Case for Stopping and Preventing Harassment. When employers consider the costs of workplace harassment, they often focus on legal costs. In 2015 alone, the EEOC recovered $164.5 million for workers alleging harassment. However, beyond the cost to the company, workplace harassment affects all workers, and its true cost includes decreased productivity, increased turnover, and reputational harm.
• It Starts at the Top – Leadership and Accountability Are Critical.Workplace culture has the greatest impact on whether harassment occurs or not. An organization must have systems in place (at all levels and across all positions) that holds employees accountable. Accountability systems must ensure that those who engage in harassment are held responsible in a meaningful, appropriate, and proportional manner, and that those whose job it is to prevent or respond to harassment should be rewarded for doing that job well.
• Training Must Change. Much of the training done over the last 30 years has not worked as a prevention tool – it’s been too focused on simply avoiding legal liability. Training must be part of a holistic culture of non-harassment that starts at the top. Similarly, one size does not fit all: Training is most effective when tailored to the specific workforce and workplace, and to different cohorts of employees. Finally, when trained correctly, middle-managers and first-line supervisors in particular can be an employer’s most valuable resource in preventing and stopping harassment.
• New and Different Approaches to Training Should Be Explored. The Task Force reviewed several new models of training that may show promise for harassment training. “Bystander intervention training” – increasingly used to combat sexual violence on school campuses – empowers co-workers and gives them the tools to intervene when they witness harassing behavior, and may show promise for harassment prevention. Workplace “civility training” that does not focus on eliminating unwelcome or offensive behavior based on characteristics protected under employment non-discrimination laws, but rather on promoting respect and civility in the workplace generally, likewise may offer solutions.
• It’s On Us. The Task Force made clear that harassment in the workplace will not stop on its own – it’s on all of us to be part of the fight to stop workplace harassment. For this reason, the Task Force suggests exploring the launch of an “It’s On Us Campaign” for the workplace. Originally developed to reduce sexual violence in educational settings, the “It’s On Us Campaign” is premised on the idea that students, faculty, and campus staff should be empowered to be part of the solution to sexual assault, and should be provided the tools and resources to prevent sexual assault as engaged bystanders. According to the Task Force, while launching a similar campaign in workplaces across the nation – large and small, urban and rural – is an audacious goal, doing so could transform the problem of workplace harassment from being about targets, harassers, and legal compliance, into one in which co-workers, supervisors, clients, and customers all have roles to play in stopping such harassment.

The EEOC Task Force’s final report includes detailed recommendations and a number of helpful tools to aid in designing effective anti-harassment policies; developing training curricula; implementing complaint, reporting, and investigation procedures; creating an organizational culture in which harassment is not tolerated; ensuring employees are held accountable; and assessing and responding to workplace “risk factors” for harassment.

A full copy of the Report can be found at:
Select Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace

On June 14, 2016, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) announced publication of a Final Rule in the Federal Register that sets forth the requirements that covered contractors must meet under the provisions of Executive Order 11246 prohibiting sex discrimination in employment. This Final Rule updates sex discrimination guidelines from 1970 with new regulations that align with current law and address the realities of today’s workplaces. The Final Rule deals with a variety of sex–based barriers to equal employment and fair pay, including compensation discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environments, failure to provide workplace accommodations for pregnant workers, and gender identity and family caregiving discrimination.

The Final Rule addresses the following subjects:

• Brings the sex discrimination guidelines up to date. The Final Rule aligns OFCCP’s regulations with current law and addresses the realities of today’s workplaces. It, therefore, provides more accurate and relevant guidance to contractors than the outdated guidelines.
• Provides protections related to pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. The Final Rule protects employees against discriminatory treatment because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, including loss of jobs, wages, or health care coverage. The Final Rule requires that contractors provide workplace accommodations, such as extra bathroom breaks and light-duty assignments, to an employee who needs such accommodations because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, in certain circumstances where those contractors provide comparable accommodations to other workers, such as those with disabilities or occupational injuries.
• Promotes fair pay practices. Contractors may not pay workers differently because of their sex. For instance, contractors may not deny opportunities for overtime work, training, better pay, or higher-paying positions because of a worker’s sex. The rule also includes a provision that enables employees to recover lost wages any time a contractor pays compensation that is the result of discrimination, not only when the decision to discriminate is made.
• Provides equal benefits to male and female employees participating in fringe-benefit plans. The rule prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex with regard to fringe benefits such as medical, hospital, accident, life insurance, and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
• Prohibits sexual harassment. The rule prohibits unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, offensive remarks about a person’s sex, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when such conduct unreasonably interferes with an individual’s work performance, becomes the basis for employment decisions, or creates a hostile working environment.
• Gives men and women equal access to jobs and workforce development opportunities. A contractor may not set requirements for jobs or training that are based on an applicant’s or employee’s sex unless the contractor can meet the high bar of demonstrating that such requirements are a bona fide occupational qualification. Additionally, a contractor may not set requirements, such as height or weight qualifications, that adversely affect applicants because of their sex unless it demonstrates that the qualifications are job-related and consistent with business necessity.
• Safeguards workers who provide caregiving to their loved ones. Contractors may not treat female or male employees or applicants differently based on the stereotypical assumption that women are more likely to have caregiving responsibilities. For instance, contractors may not deny mothers employment opportunities that are available to fathers based on the faulty assumption that mothers’ childcare responsibilities will conflict with their job performance. Similarly, contractors may not deny fathers flexible workplace arrangements that are available to mothers based on the faulty assumption that men do not have and do not assume childcare responsibilities.
• Protects transgender workers. The rule makes clear that sex discrimination includes discrimination because of an employee’s gender identity. Also, the rule requires contractors to allow workers to use bathrooms, changing rooms, showers, and similar facilities consistent with the gender with which the workers identify. In addition, the preamble to the rule notes that an explicit, categorical exclusion of coverage for all care related to gender dysphoria or gender transition is facially discriminatory because such exclusion singles out services and treatments for individuals on the basis of their gender identity or transgender status.
• Prohibits discrimination based on sex stereotypes. Contractors may not treat employees or applicants adversely because they fail to comply with expectations about how women and men should look or act or what kinds of jobs they should do.
• The Final Rule is consistent with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and other protections for religiously affiliated contractors. While there is no formal process for invoking the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) as a basis for an exemption from E.O. 11246, the preamble to the Final Rule states that insofar as the application of any requirement under this part would violate RFRA, such application shall not be required. OFCCP also notes that E.O. 11246 specifically allows religiously affiliated contractors (religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, or societies) to favor individuals of a particular religion when making employment decisions. In addition, OFCCP follows Supreme Court precedent recognizing that the First Amendment to the Constitution requires a “ministerial exception” from employment discrimination laws, which prohibits the government from interfering with the ability of a religious organization to make employment decisions about its “ministers.”

The Final Rule becomes effective on August 15, 2016.  A copy of the Final Rule can be obtained at https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2016-13806.pdf.

Take Away:  All employers who are federal contractors (or subcontractors to a federal contractor) should review their EEO and Affirmative Action documents and work with their legal counsel to take the necessary steps to ensure they comply with the OFCCP’s Final Rule on Sex Discrimination by the August 15, 2016 effective date.

Employers in Pennsylvania may or may not be enjoying high times as that state’s Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”) went into effect on May 17, 2016.  This new law allows patients to use marijuana to treat autism, cancer, HIV/AIDS, and post-traumatic stress disorder, among other ailments.  Governor Tom Wolf signed the MMA into law on April 17, 2016, just three days before one of the most important dates on the calendar for marijuana enthusiasts.

The MMA does not allow all Pennsylvania citizens who feel under the weather to ingest marijuana however they like.  On the contrary, the MMA allows medical marijuana to be dispensed only to individuals who both have been issued an identification card from the Pennsylvania Department of Health and obtained a certification from a medical provider.  Nonetheless, Pennsylvania employers (like those in other states that have enacted similar laws) now will face some hazy dilemmas in terms of their drug-free workplace policies.

That is because the MMA contains some potent anti-discrimination provisions but also creates some cloudy ambiguities.  For instance, the new law makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire, threaten, or discharge a prospective or current employee “solely on the basis of such employee’s status as an individual who is certified to use medical marijuana.”  On the other hand, the MMA does not specify whether employers may rely upon a positive drug test to impose an adverse employment action.

Meanwhile, the MMA does not require employers to refrain from imposing discipline “when the employee’s conduct falls below the standard of care normally accepted for that position.” The MMA also allows employers to discipline an employee who is “under the influence” of medical marijuana at work, yet it does not clarify whether a positive drug test could be used as evidence of impairment on the job.

This new law gives some latitude to employers with safety-sensitive work environments.  In particular, employers may prohibit employees from performing a number of tasks while under the influence of marijuana.  Such tasks include operating or controlling certain chemicals or high-voltage electricity, performing duties in dangerous places, or performing tasks that may put the life of the employee or the lives of others in jeopardy.  The law also states that employees in certain safety-sensitive positions may not have more than ten nanograms of active tetrahydrocannabis per milliliter of blood in serum.

Still, this list of exceptions could be interpreted as barring employers from restricting employees covered by the MMA in other common-sense ways.  Another budding problem stems from the lack of clarity as to how employers can ascertain whether an employee is impaired by the influence of marijuana while on the job.  Some observations may be helpful, but few appear to offer anything conclusive.  For instance, an employee who reeks of marijuana smoke might be subject to discipline.  That is because smoking marijuana in Pennsylvania will remain illegal; the MMA allows marijuana to be ingested only through alternative delivery systems such as pills or ointments.

Other observations might be helpful, such as the tell-tale red or glassy eyes or some level of confusion or distraction on the part of the employee.  But such circumstances may not conclusively identify the presence or cause of impairment.  And while blood-alcohol tests may be helpful in confirming how inebriated a worker is at the time of the test, drug tests for marijuana are not so precise in measuring the individual’s level of impairment at the time of the test.

For example, urine testing may reveal that the employee used marijuana at some point in the weeks prior to the test, but such tests typically cannot pinpoint whether such use occurred on a specific day.  Similarly, saliva testing may be able to detect more recent use – albeit without providing a absolute confirmation as to whether the employee was under the “influence of marijuana” on the job.

Beyond the ambiguities created by the MMA, its very enforceability may be subject to challenge – since it appears to be in direct conflict with federal laws that illegalize the use of marijuana.  Until the tension between federal law and Pennsylvania law is resolved by the courts, employers in the Keystone State should take some steps to keep their worksites from going up in smoke.

The first step would be to review and, if necessary, revise applicable handbooks and employment policies to make sure that they are compliant with both federal and Pennsylvania law.  At the same time, employers should consider reviewing their job descriptions for safety-sensitive positions.  Likewise, it would be advisable for employers to determine how positive marijuana tests will be handled.  In that regard, when an employee tests positive for marijuana, it might be wise to have appropriate managers designated and trained to communicate with the employee to ascertain whether he or she has the necessary documentation to be covered by the MMA.  Of course, it also would be prudent to consult with legal counsel to ensure that workplace policies and contemplated disciplinary actions do not run afoul of this new law.

On May 9, 2016 the EEOC issued yet another “guide” – this time to outline its position on when and how leave must be granted for reasons related to an employee’s disability under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  The publication, entitled “Employer-Provided Leave and the Americans with Disabilities Act,” contains information on the EEOC’s position in connection with six subject areas relating to leaves as a form of reasonable accommodation under the ADA, and contains various examples to illustrate those positions.   For a summary of the EEOC’s position on each of the six subject areas, please click here.

To sit or not to sit, that is the question.  And now the California Supreme Court has given us an answer.  Well, sort of.  They have told us how to find the answer.  Even that’s a stretch.  Pull up a seat and I will explain.

To help it resolve two class actions involving California Wage Order requirements that employers provide employees with suitable seats, the Ninth Circuit recently certified some questions for the California Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court responded in Kilby v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.  As stated verbatim in the Supreme Court’s responsive opinion, these were the questions posed by the Ninth Circuit:

1. Does the phrase “nature of the work” refer to individual tasks performed throughout the workday, or to the entire range of an employee’s duties performed during a given day or shift?

2. When determining whether the nature of the work “reasonably permits” use of a seat, what factors should courts consider? Specifically, are an employer’s business judgment, the physical layout of the workplace, and the characteristics of a specific employee relevant factors?

3. If an employer has not provided any seat, must a plaintiff prove a suitable seat is available in order to show the employer has violated the seating provision?”

If you just want the short answers, the opinion was kind enough to give us those right up front as well.  Again, verbatim:

1. The “nature of the work” refers to an employee’s tasks performed at a given location for which a right to a suitable seat is claimed, rather than a “holistic” consideration of the entire range of an employee’s duties anywhere on the jobsite during a complete shift. If the tasks being performed at a given location reasonably permit sitting, and provision of a seat would not interfere with performance of any other tasks that may require standing, a seat is called for.

2. Whether the nature of the work reasonably permits sitting is a question to be determined objectively based on the totality of the circumstances. An employer’s business judgment and the physical layout of the workplace are relevant but not dispositive factors. The inquiry focuses on the nature of the work, not an individual employee’s characteristics.

3. The nature of the work aside, if an employer argues there is no suitable seat available, the burden is on the employer to prove unavailability.

So, there you go.  If you just wanted the answers, you can stop reading now.  But if you want a little elaboration and more background on how the Court arrived at those answers, and my thoughts on what employers should take away from the opinion, remain seated and continue ahead.

The Cases

The two class actions before the Ninth Circuit involved identical provisions of two separate Wage Orders.  InKilby v. CVS Pharmacy Inc., a former CVS customer service representative filed a class action alleging that CVS violated Wage Order No. 7-2001 (mercantile industry) by failing to provide employees seats during shifts.  In large part, the employees’ duties consisted of operating cash registers, straightening and stocking shelves, cleaning the register, gathering shopping baskets, and removing trash.

Similarly, in Henderson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, a group of bank tellers sued Chase alleging it violated Wage Order No. 4-2001(professional/technical/mechanical occupations) by also failing to provide seats to its tellers.  The tellers’ duties consisted of a mix between those around their teller stations such as handling deposits and withdrawals, and those away from their stations such as escorting customers, servicing ATM machines and working the drive-up window.

Both cases turned on identical phrases in the two Wage Orders stating that “[a]ll working employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.”  In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit after procedural losses in the respective district courts.  The Ninth Circuit punted (for now), instead asking the California Supreme Court to answer the above questions to aid in the Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  The Supreme Court did just that, as set forth above.   Here’s how they arrived at their answers.

The “Nature of the Work”

The defendants in the two cases argued that, when determining whether “the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats,” courts should examine “an employee’s job as a whole, i.e., a ‘holistic’ consideration of all of an employee’s tasks and duties throughout a shift.”  The plaintiffs, in turn, argued that the inquiry should involve a “task-by-task evaluation of whether a single task may feasibly be performed seated.”

After analyzing a long and tortured history of California wage law, which I will spare you here, the court rejected both arguments as inconsistent with the IWC’s intent in placing that language in the Wage Orders.  The court held that the defendants’ “all or nothing approach” ignored factors such as the duration, location, and frequency of tasks, and would unfairly deny a seat to an employee who spends a substantial portion of his workday performing tasks that can be done while seated merely because other aspects of the job required standing.  On the other hand, the plaintiff’s approach would have the opposite effect.  Employer’s would have to provide employees a seat if any single task could be performed while seated, even if the employee only briefly performs the task for negligible periods during each shift.

The court instead split the baby.  It held that “courts must examine subsets of an employee’s total tasks and duties by location,” and then determine whether it’s feasible to perform those tasks while seated.  If so, an employee is entitled to a seat at that location.  But the employee is not entitled to a seat during other parts of a shift while at locations where seating is not feasible.

“Reasonably Permits”

The California Supreme Court next set out to answer the Ninth Circuit’s questions whether the analysis involves consideration of the employer’s business judgment, the workplace layout, and/or the employee’s physical characteristics.

Chase and CVS argued that the court should consider, and even give deference to, the employer’s business judgment as to whether work should be performed standing or sitting.  The plaintiffs argued that the employer’s opinion should be irrelevant, with the focus instead being on the objective nature of the work.  The court again found middle ground. It held that providing a certain level of customer service is an objective job function that employers should be able to assess in determining whether use of a seat is permitted in a certain location.  The court did clarify, however, that “business judgment” does not encompass an employer’s “mere preference.”  So, while business judgment may be considered, so too may objective evidence that sheds light on the reasonableness of that judgment.

Like business judgment, the court held that the physical layout of the work location can be considered as a relevant factor in assessing whether the nature of the work reasonably permits use of a seat.  Again, though, the court cautioned that an employer cannot “unreasonably design a workspace to further a preference for standing.”  In other words, no cheating.

Finally, the court found that consideration of employee’s physical characteristics, rather than the nature of the work, was inconsistent with the IWC’s intent.  That is, if the job permits seating for one, it permits seating for all.

Burden to Show Seating is Available

Finally, the court cleared up any ambiguity about who bears the burden of proof in a suitable seating inquiry.  The defendants argued that, even if the nature of the work permitted suitable seating, the plaintiff must still show that a suitable seat was available but not provided.  The court rejected that argument, holding that an employer who seeks to be excused from the suitable seating requirement bears the burden of showing compliance is infeasible because no suitable seat exists.

Takeaway

If you’re still with me, here is the moral of the story: be careful.  The case leaves a lot of room for factual interpretation.  We are still waiting to see how the Ninth Circuit will treat these two specific cases in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion, let alone how various courts will interpret suitable seating cases under this analysis down the road.

But for now, the court found enough middle ground in its opinion for both plaintiff’s lawyers and employers to claim victories.  Employers can take comfort knowing that their business judgment and the layout of the workplace are relevant factors in assessing whether a given task permits suitable seating.  The court’s focus on all of the circumstances surrounding work performed at a given location, rather than a task-by-task approach, is also good news for employers.

On the flip side, employers now clearly bear the burden of showing that no suitable seat exists.  Employers must also examine all of the separate locations in which an employee performs tasks during a shift, and determine independently whether the nature of the work performed at each location reasonably permits the use of a seat.  If all of that leaves your head spinning, you may want to find a place to sit down.  That is, if doing so is reasonably permissible.

When companies sue their former employees for theft they often claim that the former employee’s new employer has conspired with the former employee to misappropriate trade secrets, or that that new employer has aided and abetted the former employee’s breach of duty he/she owed to his/her former employer.

Like Woodward and Bernstein, liability “follows the money.”  Current employers are often added to trade secret and breach of duty lawsuits because they have deeper pockets than former employees.  Conspiracy and aiding and abetting claims are more vague and less precise than are other business claims.  Often plaintiffs need only allege that the new employer benefitted from wrongful acts.  Employers should not believe that there is nothing they can do to reduce the chances of a successful conspiracy or aiding and abetting claim against them.  By adopting best practice policies and procedures, an employer can do a lot to reduce the likelihood that it will be found liable on these theories.  These policies and practices should be adopted well in advance of the hiring of a competitor’s employees.  Although there are many policies and practices that an employer can adopt, two of the most common (and most powerful) are: (1) a policy in the employment handbook that prohibits the use or importation of third party or prior employer information.  Such policies often read:

As a condition of employment, employees of the company agree and represent that during the course of their employment with the company, they will not use or disclose any confidential or proprietary information of any third party, including any prior employer, unless such third party has consented to the use or disclosure of that information in writing.

Moreover, as a condition of employment, employees of the company are required to comply with the terms of any agreements where any prior employer pertaining to confidential information, non-solicitation or non-competition to the extent that such agreements are enforceable under applicable law.

Second, employers can, in their offer letters, expressly condition employment upon the non-importation or use of any information from the former employer.  Such language often provides that:

This offer of employment is conditioned upon your agreement that you will not bring any proprietary, confidential or any other business information from any place or former employment to the company.  The company will provide everything you need to perform your work.

While nothing can guarantee that your company will not be named as a conspirator of abettor in a trade secret or breach of duty case, adoption of policies like this will help.

Many – maybe even most – contracts issued by major payroll processing services contain traps for the unwary. Many employers I speak with turn over all payroll processing responsibilities, including issuance of accurate checks and wage statements and record storage, to their payroll processing service.

This may be a big mistake.

When faced with an individual or a class-action wage and hour claim, many employers turn to their payroll processing service to produce records that evidence the Company’s compliance with California law. Yet many of these payroll processing services expressly disclaim any responsibility to maintain records or to ensure wage statements comply with the law.  Indeed, some of these contracts actually require employers to indemnify the payroll services company against any claims that wage statements or wages were not in paid compliance with applicable law.

Maybe it’s just me, but I think that this is outrageous. Most employers I talk to believe their payroll processing company is their partner in ensuring that the business complies with California law. Read your payroll processing contract carefully. You may not have a partner in your payroll processing company. In fact, your company may be completely on its own. Employers have statutory duties to ensure that they both pay their employees properly and keep records of those payments.  Additionally, the law requires that employers issue detailed wage statements explaining how the wages were calculated and paid.  Failure to comply with these wage statement, payment and record keeping requirements can result in breathtakingly large liability.

To my mind these common contract provisions in payroll processing contracts require employers to do two things:

1. Shop aggressively for a payroll service that will indemnify your business against the payroll service’s errors and that will agree to keep and maintain all records required under California law without additional charge.
2. Audit the performance of your payroll service company (to ensure compliance) and regularly download all records the employer is obligated to maintain.

PAGA and class action liability for failure to comply with these laws can be breathtaking. If you have any doubt about your Company’s obligations please contact your employment law advisor immediately.