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California Employers – Revised Wage Orders Posted

By Jessica Schoendienst

The California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) updated all but Wage Order 14 and 17 recently.  The DIR regulates wages and hours for employees.  The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) enforces the provisions of the wage orders, including the posting requirements.  The Wage Orders are numbered 1 through 17.

The most recent updates were made to reflect the increases in California’s minimum wage.  (To read more on the minimum wage increase, visit my prior L&E Blog here.)  The update shows the minimum wage for 2017 and 2018 as follows:

Effective Date          26 or More Employees         25 or Fewer Employees

January 1, 2017                        $10.50                                               $10.00

January 1, 2018                        $11.00                                               $10.50

Employers are required to post a copy of the applicable Wage Order in an area frequented by employees, such as a breakroom or your employee entrance.  The Wage Orders must be printed on 8.5″ x 11″ paper.  If you are unable to post the Wage Order because of the work location or other conditions, you should inform employees that they may request a copy of the Wage Order from you.  While the Wage Order does not specify what penalties can be imposed for failure to comply with the posting requirements, it is likely Private Attorney General Act (PAGA) penalties could be recovered by employees and/or the DLSE for noncompliance.  PAGA’s default penalty provision under Labor Code section 2699(f) permits the recovery of a penalty of $100 per employee for initial violations, and subsequent penalties in the amount of $200 per employee per pay period. The updated version of the Wage Orders contains a revision date of “12/2016.”  Employers can find this date on the cover page for each Wage Order.

Given that there are 17 different Wage Orders it may be unclear as to which Wage Order each employer must post.  The DLSE has published a pamphlet to help guide employers in determining which Wage Order must be posted.  This pamphlet can be found here.

Electronic versions of the Wage Orders for posting can be obtained from the DIR Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order webpage here.  Printed versions of the Wage Orders can be obtained by contacting a local DLSE district office.  A listing of these offices can be found here.

If you have questions about these revisions or which Wage Order applies to you, the attorneys in Weintraub Tobin’s Employment Law Group can assist you.  Contact any one of us if we can be of assistance.

IF YOU SUE FACEBOOK, WHAT’S THE LIKELIHOOD YOU’LL BE ALLOWED TO DEPOSE MARK ZUCKERBERG?

Companies are no strangers to litigation. In California, it is a cost of doing business. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for litigants to try to gain leverage in a dispute with a corporate party by attempting to depose its high-level executives to harass and embarrass them, and force the company into a quick and aberrant settlement. The strategy employed by a litigant may go like this: (1) put pressure on a company by noticing the deposition of an officer or director, (2) make clear the intent to delve not only into the high-level executive’s alleged wrongdoing, but also other points of potential embarrassment, and (3) the company will capitulate and pay a significant settlement to avoid the pain of the deposition. Some refer to this (and similar tactics) as judicial extortion. What, then, can a company and its counsel do to prevent an abusive deposition of a high-level executive?

California federal and state courts apply the “apex” doctrine to protect high-level executives, also referred to as apex executives, from harassing depositions.  In considering whether to allow the deposition of a high-level executive, courts focus on two primary factors: (1) whether the high level executive has unique first-hand, non-repetitive knowledge of facts at issue in the case, and (2) whether the party seeking the deposition has exhausted other less intrusive discovery methods. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 263 (N.D.Cal. 2012); Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1289 (1992).

Courts understand that where an opportunity exists to game the system and harass a party it will likely be exploited, and, thus, are carful to protect against it. This was observed in one of the first cases to apply the “apex” doctrine. In 1985, a class of plaintiffs sued for personal injuries from an alleged defective design in the fuel system of the 1975 Dodge van. Plaintiffs’ counsel noticed the deposition of Lee Iacocca, then Chairman of the Board of Chrysler Corporation, claiming that statements Iacoccoa made in his recently published biography demonstrated that he had knowledge relevant to Chrysler’s alleged liability and the plaintiffs should be allowed to depose him to explore such knowledge. The court granted Iacoccoa’s motion for protective order preventing his deposition, noting: “the fact remains [Iacoccoa] is a singularly unique and important individual who can be easily subjected to unwarranted harassment and abuse. He has a right to be protected, and the courts have a duty to recognize his vulnerability.” Mulvey v. Chrsyler Corp., 106 F.R.D. 364, 366 (D.R.I. 1985).

Some chairman and officers are obvious “apex” executives – such as Iacoccoa or, say, the late Steve Jobs. See Affinity Labs of Texas v. Apple, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53649 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (court denied plaintiff’s attempt to depose Steve Jobs). However, most high level executives are not celebrities. They are not regularly quoted and their companies are not featured in the media. Yet, these less recognizable high-level executives responsible for running smaller to mid-size business are just as important to their companies as their high-profile counterparts, and equally vulnerable to harassment. Unfortunately, there is no clear definition of who qualifies for protection as an “apex” executive. Some factors that have been considered are job duties and the potential for business disruption, where the executive falls within the company’s executive hierarchy (e.g., how many people report to the executive), and the likelihood of harassment.

The most important factor considered by courts in applying the “apex” doctrine is whether the high-level executive has personal knowledge of relevant facts. Equally important is whether the information can be obtained through other less burdensome means, such as from a lower level executive or employee. When a CEO or other high-level executive lacks such personal knowledge, courts are inclined to deny their depositions.

However, the “apex” doctrine exists in tension with the otherwise broad allowance for discovery in litigation. Apple Inc., supra., 282 F.R.D. at 263. Although a deposition notice directed at a high-level executive with no personal knowledge of the facts involved should result in the issuance of a protective order denying that executive’s deposition – courts are likely to allow some manner of discovery. Now, in the case involving Apple, the court simply denied the deposition of Steve Jobs outright. But, in the matter involving Chrysler, although the court denied the deposition of Iacoccoa it allowed plaintiffs to propound written interrogatories to him. This is a less intrusive means of discovery of a high-level executive courts have allowed. See, e.g., Retail Brand Alliance, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 622810, at *6 (SD NY 2008). Likewise, rather than  completely deny the deposition of a high-level executive, a court may limit the length or scope of the deposition to avoid harassment or undue burden. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 282 F.R.D. 259, 265-67 (ND CA 2012) (allowing depositions of high-level officers, but limiting them to 2-3 hours each); Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 306 F.R.D. 120, 124 (SD NY 2015) (limiting apex depositions to 4 hours).

From the outset of litigation or potential litigation, a company’s counsel must be mindful that higher-level executives are vulnerable to a deposition – particularly as a form of harassment and to gain leverage. Counsel should investigate alternative means for providing an opposing party with potentially relevant information that a high-level executive may possess, and develop a record early on establishing the limits of the high-level executive’s involvement, if any, and that such executive has no unique, personal knowledge of the relevant facts. It is important to be prepared to utilize the “apex” doctrine in order to protect against potential abuse or harassment of high-level executives.

Lawsuits are the Inevitable Cost of YouTube Success

Whenever there is a report of a YouTube creator being sued for copyright infringement, the response from the creator and the community seems to be one of shock and surprise.  The truth is, successful YouTube content creators should not be surprised when they get sued for copyright infringement.  Any person or company that creates content professionally, whether that’s a television network, a motion picture studio or a YouTuber, is a likely target for a copyright lawsuit.  When I began representing Anthony Padilla and Ian Hecox of Smosh over 10 years ago, only a few people were making digital video content, even fewer understood what YouTube was, and the amount and types of revenue opportunities was nowhere near what it is today.  But today, there are so very many successful YouTube content creators with millions and millions of subscribers and the amount of money flowing through the digital first content genera is significant.   Like it or not, popular YouTube creators are just as much a target for infringement claims as a television network or movie studio.  If a creator is surprised or caught off guard when they receive a claim of infringement, it means they were not adequately advised and prepared for this eventuality.

The truth is that, for the most part, anyone can sue anyone.  As one of my first year law school professors explained, one of the basic elements of the American system of jurisprudence is the concept of the “American Rule” in which each party pays their own attorneys’ fees as opposed to the “English Rule” whereby the loser pays the winner’s attorneys’ fees.  While the American rule does enable the bringing of questionable claims, the founders of our judicial system believed that this risk was outweighed by making the courts available to all without the fear of financial ruin.

Another truth about the American civil judicial system is that lawyers are expensive.  While there are vastly different rates that certain lawyers may charge, good lawyers are expensive.  And since most lawyers charge by the hour, this makes lawsuits a costly endeavor.

So with the reality that content creators are a likely target for lawsuits, that it’s relatively easy to bring a lawsuit and that lawyers (and thus lawsuits) are expensive, what is a content creator to do?  Doing nothing to prepare for the eventual lawsuit is not it.  Content creators should take the risk of lawsuits into account when doing business and take steps to hedge against that potentiality.   Like all other media businesses, creators should consider making the following part of their general business practices.  The following isn’t exclusive, but it’s a good place to start.

The first step any content creator should take is to “clear” the rights to any other person appearing on camera and any third-party music, pictures, videos or other content.  This sounds more complicated that it is.  Clearing rights is accomplished by using a written agreement to secure whatever rights are necessary that will allow you to feature that person, music or clip in your video.  If you have people other than yourself appearing in your video, they should sign what’s known as an appearance release.  Similarly, if you use third-party music or other content, there are specific documents that are appropriate for those situations as well.

Granted there are certain times when a content creator can’t obtain permission to include third‑party content in a video.  In those situations, a creator may still be able to use the content if the use satisfies the judicial test established for fair use.  I strongly suggest that all creators have a working knowledge of fair use.  (A good place to start is the fair use presentation Rian Bosak and I give each year at VidCon.)  However, unless a creator is absolutely certain that what he/she is doing qualifies as fair use, it may be best to consult an expert.  When I was the attorney for YouTube Nation, fair use review took up a fair amount of my time.  Fair use is a complicated legal theory that is constantly in flux; even our federal courts sometimes can’t agree on what is and what is not fair use.

Any content creator that includes third-party music, third-party pictures or videos or third-party brands in their video or that reviews products or services should consider the benefits of a media liability insurance policy.  This is a type of Errors and Omissions (E&O) insurance policy and generally covers against copyright and trademark infringement claims, privacy claims, defamation claims and others.  The coverage provided by such a policy not only includes the damage award resulting from a covered claim, but also includes the cost to defend against such a claim.  And while it is true that a media liability policy may be expensive, the cost to pay lawyers to defend against a claim is way more expensive.

In addition, YouTubers should consider adopting some of the methods television networks and film studios use in their production of content.  I am not necessarily saying that creators would need to employ a full-blown production team, but implementing some of their practices could lessen the risks inherent with the production and distribution of content.  Making use of some standard production forms and having a relationship with a lawyer who is extremely familiar with copyright, fair use and production issues will go a long way towards preventing claims.

The high odds of being on the receiving end of a cease and desist letter or a complaint (which are much worse than a strike or a takedown) is the cost of success as a creator.  The smart bet is to prepare in advance so you are not caught off guard and doesn’t put your financial wellbeing in jeopardy.

*Scott Hervey represents top content creators, studios and production companies in a wide variety of matters including financing, acquisitions, production, clearance and general business matters. Scott’s clients include STX, DreamWorks/YouTube Nation, Pharrell Williams’ I am Other channel, Smosh, Sawyer Hartman and Nerdwriter. Scott previously served as the acting business affairs director for the publicly traded digital content company, Digital Music Group, Inc. (now The Orchard). Scott was featured in Variety’s Legal Impact Report and is a Super Lawyer®. Scott is a professor of entertainment law at King Hall law school, U.C, Davis and he serves on the board of directors of the Hollywood Radio and Television Society (HRTS).

Managing Your Business Under Mandatory Evacuation

Imagine this: Your business lies within a zone that is subject to a mandatory evacuation order from emergency response and law enforcement officials.  Imagine that the evacuation order arises from a fire or imminent flooding.  What do you do?  Shut your business and get out of course.  Most evacuation orders are short lived and the hazardous conditions are realized or not within a short period of time.  But what happens when the evacuation order persists for a number of days or even weeks?  Your plant operations or business remains shut down.  You may have compelling business interests that demand attention during an extended evacuation order.  You may need to respond to security alarms and alerts, or ensure that the premises are adequately secured.  There may be a fear of product spoliation or destruction, and you may face a serious temptation to send a minimal or skeleton crew into the area covered by the evacuation order in order to ensure that those business concerns are addressed.

Lawyers are trained to look at scenarios like this in reverse.  The employer sends a skeleton crew in to secure the premises or ensure that essential processes are completed or that products do not spoil. Something bad then happens.  The wildfire burns down the surrounding area or the flood arrives and employees are injured.  Now what?

To read the full article, visit the HRUSA blog at http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/managing-your-business-under-mandatory-evacuation/

What Do California Wine Grapes and California Marijuana Have in Common?

When a winery wants to tell consumers the geographic source of its wine, it includes on the label the wine’s “appellation of origin.”  An appellation of origin tells the consumer where the wine grapes were grown.  Appellations are either the name of a county or state, or a federally-recognized growing region called American Viticultural Areas (AVAs).  California has 138 AVAs.  The value of an AVA designation is significant; it increases the amount a winemaker can charge for the wine.  Consumers will pay much more for a Napa Valley Cabernet than a California Cabernet.

The drafters of The Adult Use of Marijuana Act (the “Act”) borrowed this concept from the wine industry playbook.  The Act added California Business and Professions Code section 26063 which states:

(a) The Bureau [of Marijuana Control] shall establish standards for recognition of a particular appellation of origin applicable to marijuana grown or cultivated in a certain geographical area in California.

(b) Marijuana shall not be marketed, labeled, or sold as grown in a California county when the marijuana was not grown in that county.

(c) The name of a California county shall not be used in the labeling, marketing, or packaging of marijuana products unless the marijuana contained in the product was grown in that county.

On April 5, 2017 Governor Jerry Brown issued a number of proposed changes to the Act including proposing that the California Department of Food and Agriculture take responsibility for establishing marijuana appellations of origin by January 2020.

It is reasonable to presume that the Department of Food and Agriculture will enact regulations that mimic the Federal wine labeling regulations established by the Alcohol Tobacco and Tax Trade Bureau and the regulatory scheme currently in place for California’s wine industry.  If this were to be the case, it would be safe to assume that California law will require that marijuana or any marijuana product listing an appellation of origin must be 100% from California, and that 85% must be from the county in California or other appellation listed.  It is also safe to assume that the Department of Food and Agriculture will begin working with growers and growing groups to establish the growing regions similar to AVAs.

Certain growers have already recognized the value of establishing unique appellations.  For example, the Mendocino Appellations Project is seeking to establish ten appellations within Mendocino County:  Spyrock-Bell Springs, Covelo-Dos Rios, Long Valley-Branscomb-Leggett, Willits, Comptche, Ukiah Valley, North Mendocino Coast, South Mendocino Coast-Greenwood Ridge, Anderson Valley-South Mendocino, and Potter Valley.  Justin Calvino from the Mendocino Appellations Project believes that Mendocino could become the Napa of cannabis.  What area will be the Sonoma of cannabis?

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Federal Court Prohibits Sexual Orientation Discrimination

Introduction

For the first time, a federal appellate court has determined that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Under Title VII, an employer may not take an adverse employment action against an employee on the basis of a protected characteristic, such as race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. On April 4, 2017, the full panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana that sexual orientation is a protected class that may be used as a basis to bring a discrimination or retaliation suit under Title VII.

Read the case discussion on the HRUSA blog here: http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/federal-court-prohibits-sexual-orientation-discrimination/.

Employers May Be Liable For Violence Away From Work

Intentional torts committed by employees are difficult for employers to both anticipate and protect against. When an employee commits a criminal act against another employee or a third party, the law generally considers whether the employer knew or should have known that the employee posed a danger in deciding whether a duty to protect against the harm was owed. However, an employee’s dangerous propensity is often difficult to predict.  Employees rarely make overt criminal threats or give unambiguous indications that they intend to cause harm. Further, employers are judged in retrospect, and with the benefit of hindsight, in deciding whether seemingly innocuous comments or acts should have been taken as warning signs that the employee posed a danger.

CASE DISCUSSION

On March 24, 2017, in Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., the Seventh Circuit extended the duty of Illinois employers to protect against criminal acts by an employee occurring away from the workplace, when a supervisor uses his or her “supervisory authority” to compel an employee to attend a private event under the threat of termination or job reduction.  The case arose out of a supervisor’s rape and murder of a subordinate employee during a trip to attend a family wedding in a different state, when the supervisor had previously threatened to either fire or reduce the employee’s hours if she did not attend.

To read the rest of the article, visit the HRUSA Law Blog at: http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/employers-may-be-liable-for-violence-away-from-work/.

Are the Tides Turning for Motions to Amend Claims in IPR Proceedings?

The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) has rarely allowed patent owners to replace or modify claims during inter partes review (“IPR”), covered business method review, or post-grant review.  In fact, in April 2016 the PTAB’s Motion to Amend Study reported that only 6 of 118, or about 5%, of such motions to amend claims had been granted.  We have not seen a substantial change since that report, but will that statistic be changing in light of recent events?  In particular, the PTAB just granted Shire’s motion to amend, and the Federal Circuit is considering en banc whether to shift the burden of proving patentability away from the patent owner, which could make it easier to amend claims.

In Amerigen Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Shire LLC, the PTAB instituted review of claims 18-21, 23 and 25 of Shire’s patent for the attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder medication known as Adderall XR.  In lieu of responding to the invalidity arguments, Shire filed a motion to amend that consisted of a request to cancel all of the claims under review and substitute a single, “new” claim in their place.  The PTAB granted Shire’s motion.

Does the Shire decision open the door for other patent owners hoping to amend claims during IPRs?  To answer that question, we need to look more closely at the facts in Shire.  Specifically, Shire requested cancellation of instituted claims 18-21 and 23, as well as non-instituted claims 22 and 24.  Shire also requested substitution of new claim 26 for instituted claim 25, which is a multiple dependent claim that recites:

  1. The pharmaceutical composition of any one of claims 2, 13 or 18 to 20 wherein the pharmaceutically active amphetamine salt in (a) and (b) comprises mixed amphetamine salts.

Proposed new claim 26 recites:

  1. The pharmaceutical composition of any one of claims 2 or 13 wherein the pharmaceutically active amphetamine salt in (a) and (b) comprises mixed amphetamine salts.

The PTAB’s ultimate decision relied on the fact that for these purposes a multiple dependent claim is treated in the same manner as if it were written as separate dependent claims.  In the case of claim 25, it is treated as if it had been written as five separate dependent claims with a separate claim depending from each of claims 2, 13, 18, 19, and 20.  Similarly, claim 26 is treated as two separate dependent claims with one depending from claim 2 and one from claim 13.   Effectively, claim 26 deletes three “claims” from claim 25, those that depended from claims 18-20, which were all claims under review by the PTAB.  Given that claims 2 and 13 were not under review, new claim 26 would not involve any claim under review.  Thus, Shire’s motion to replace claim 25 with claim 26 and cancel the other claims would leave no instituted claim under review by the PTAB.

Petitioner Amerigen opposed Shire’s motion to amend arguing that according to Idle Free Sys. v. Berstrom, Inc., a patent owner seeking to amend a claim has the burden “to show a patentable distinction over the prior art of record and also prior art known to the patent owner.”  The PTAB, however, explained that in Shire’s request “[e]ffectively, no claim is being amended, and claims are only being cancelled, because claims 18-24 are being removed, and proposed claim 26 removes three multiple dependent claims (claim 25 as it depends from claims 18-20)” and “[n]o other changes to the claims are being made.”  Therefore, the PTAB “agree[d] with Patent owner that ‘[t]here is no requirement for Shire to prove, after the Institution Decision, that original non-amended claims are patentable over all potential prior art, especially non-instituted claims.’”

While motions to substitute amended claims are rarely granted, motions to cancel claims are routinely granted.  Therefore, once the PTAB decided that Shire’s motion was merely canceling claims, the outcome was very predictable.  In other words, nothing really changed as a result of the Shire decision.

But, in In re Aqua, will the Federal Circuit turn the tide for amending claims?  Currently, a patent owner is allowed to file one motion to amend to (A) “cancel any challenged patent claim” and (B) “propose a reasonable number of substitute claims” that do not “enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter.”  The patent owner has the burden of showing that the amended claims are patentable over the known prior art.  Then the petitioner may oppose the motion to amend and raise new arguments of unpatentability, cite new prior art against the proposed new claims, and file new expert declarations.  But in In re Aqua the Federal Circuit is currently considering en banc whether it is proper for the PTAB to put the burden on the patent owner to prove that the proposed substitute claims are patentable or whether the burden to show unpatentability should be shifted to the petitioner.

Under the current requirements, a patent owner must distinguish the proposed substitute claims over the material art in the prosecution history, the material art in the current proceeding, any material art in any other proceeding before the USPTO involving the patent, and any material art not of record but known to the patent owner.  In Shinn Fu v. The Tire Hanger, the PTAB found that, in instances where art is duplicative, a patent owner is not required to address each piece of art individually.  Instead, as long as the patent owner groups prior art references according to claim features and examines a representative reference from each group, the patent owner can satisfy its burden for purposes of a motion to amend.

As evidenced by the difficulty of succeeding on a motion to amend, the patent owner has a heavy burden.  Further, placing this burden on the patent owner differs from the traditional approach used during initial prosecution of a patent.  During prosecution, a patentee merely needs to respond to unpatentability positions offered by the examiner rather than affirmatively distinguishing the proposed claims from all known prior art.  If the Federal Circuit adopts a prosecution-like approach in In re Aqua, then the patent owner would likely still need to show the proposed new claims respond to a ground of patentability involved in the PTAB trial, do not broaden claim scope, and have written description support and do not introduce new matter.  The patent owner will also need to provide claim constructions for any new claim terms and show that the number of proposed substitute claims is reasonable. The petitioner, however, would then bear the burden of showing unpatentability.  In response, the patent owner would be given the opportunity to rebut the petitioner’s unpatentability arguments.

Shifting the burden to petitioners to show unpatentability could have a number of consequences.  For example, it may be easier to amend claims because it likely will be easier for a patent owner to rebut a petitioner’s specific unpatentability arguments for the substitute claims than to affirmatively show patentability.  Thus patent owners may be more likely to file motions to amend.  Further, if patent owners are more likely to succeed in amending claims, some petitioners may opt against an IPR petition and instead challenge validity in district court where amendment is not possible.

Even if amendments become easier to obtain, the patent owner will still need to consider the impact of amending claims on litigation strategy, particularly in ongoing litigation.  Amended claims give rise to intervening rights, which may relieve infringers of cancelled claims from liability during the period before the amended claims issue.  Further, amendments and arguments made to the PTAB may impact infringement and validity arguments in the district court proceeding.  Therefore, a successful claim amendment may dramatically impact infringement, validity, and damages arguments in co-pending district court litigation.

The Federal Circuit heard oral argument in In re Aqua on Friday, December 9, 2016.  Therefore, we will know soon whether there will be a shift that may favor patent owner amendments or whether amendments are destined to remain a rarity, at least for now.

Requiring Employees to Prove Eligibility to Work in the U.S. Can Lead to Liability

As the national controversy continues to swirl around immigration issues, a federal appellate court this week faulted an employer for demanding that an employee provide information to prove “‘legal right to work in the United States … as required by the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986.’”  The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”) ruled in Santillan v. USA Waste of California, Inc., Case No. No. 15-55238, that Gilberto Santillan — a 53-year-old, Spanish-speaking garbage truck driver — did not have to “provide proof of employment eligibility.”

The appellate court said that was so because Santillan, who had worked for the employer for 32 years, had been fired and then reinstated shortly before his employer required him to provide such proof.  It may come as a surprise to employers to learn that an employee who is fired and then reinstated may not have to prove his or her eligibility to work in the U.S. upon reinstatement, but that is the case under federal law.

Pennsylvania Employers Can Pay Wages With Payroll Cards

By Jessica Schoendienst

Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law requires employers to pay all wages, other than fringe benefits and wage supplements, due employees on regularly scheduled paydays designated in advance by the employer in cash, bank check, or direct deposit. As of May 4, 2017, Pennsylvania employers will have another option to pay employee wages each pay period.

On November 4, 2016, Governor Tom Wolf signed Senate Bill 1265 which amends the banking code to allow employers to use a payroll debit card on which an employer can load an employee’s wages each pay period.  The payroll debit cards work like an ATM card but without the employee needing to have a bank account to access the funds.  The sponsor of the bill introduced this option to provide an option to employees to avoid the costs of check cashing and money orders for those with little or no access to traditional banking.

The amendment allows for employers to use the payroll debit cards with certain restrictions that are intended to ensure that employees have access to the full amount of their wages, with unlimited, no-cost access to their accounts.  Read what these restrictions include at: http://blog.hrusa.com/blog/pennsylvania-employers-can-pay-wages-with-payroll-cards/