^ WP_User {#14007
  +data: {#14008
    +"ID": "6"
    +"user_login": "Msiceloff"
    +"user_pass": "$P$BVg0DDH.AOcuasVwoTguJCoGHjNlJt1"
    +"user_nicename": "msiceloff"
    +"user_email": "msiceloff@weintraub.com"
    +"user_url": ""
    +"user_registered": "2022-06-21 15:33:28"
    +"user_activation_key": ""
    +"user_status": "0"
    +"display_name": "Mary Siceloff"
  }
  +ID: 6
  +caps: array:1 [
    "administrator" => true
  ]
  +cap_key: "wp_capabilities"
  +roles: array:1 [
    0 => "administrator"
  ]
  +allcaps: array:69 [
    "switch_themes" => true
    "edit_themes" => true
    "activate_plugins" => true
    "edit_plugins" => true
    "edit_users" => true
    "edit_files" => true
    "manage_options" => true
    "moderate_comments" => true
    "manage_categories" => true
    "manage_links" => true
    "upload_files" => true
    "import" => true
    "unfiltered_html" => true
    "edit_posts" => true
    "edit_others_posts" => true
    "edit_published_posts" => true
    "publish_posts" => true
    "edit_pages" => true
    "read" => true
    "level_10" => true
    "level_9" => true
    "level_8" => true
    "level_7" => true
    "level_6" => true
    "level_5" => true
    "level_4" => true
    "level_3" => true
    "level_2" => true
    "level_1" => true
    "level_0" => true
    "edit_others_pages" => true
    "edit_published_pages" => true
    "publish_pages" => true
    "delete_pages" => true
    "delete_others_pages" => true
    "delete_published_pages" => true
    "delete_posts" => true
    "delete_others_posts" => true
    "delete_published_posts" => true
    "delete_private_posts" => true
    "edit_private_posts" => true
    "read_private_posts" => true
    "delete_private_pages" => true
    "edit_private_pages" => true
    "read_private_pages" => true
    "delete_users" => true
    "create_users" => true
    "unfiltered_upload" => true
    "edit_dashboard" => true
    "update_plugins" => true
    "delete_plugins" => true
    "install_plugins" => true
    "update_themes" => true
    "install_themes" => true
    "update_core" => true
    "list_users" => true
    "remove_users" => true
    "promote_users" => true
    "edit_theme_options" => true
    "delete_themes" => true
    "export" => true
    "wf2fa_activate_2fa_self" => true
    "wf2fa_activate_2fa_others" => true
    "wf2fa_manage_settings" => true
    "copy_posts" => true
    "wpseo_manage_options" => true
    "manage_postman_smtp" => true
    "manage_postman_logs" => true
    "administrator" => true
  ]
  +filter: null
  -site_id: 1
}
Mary Siceloff, Author at Weintraub Tobin - Page 46 of 179

Welcome to the Weintraub Tobin Resources Page

Browse below for news, legal insights, information on presentations and events, and other resources from the Weintraub Tobin legal team.


California Employers Likely Immune To Employee COVID-19 Lawsuits, But More Susceptible To COVID-19 Workers-Compensation Claims

Recent news reports, like this one from the Los Angeles Times, indicate that Congress is hotly debating a proposed law to immunize employers from lawsuits alleging that their workers contracted COVID-19 illness on the job.  While business owners in California may suffer headaches or congestion from other types of lawsuits related to COVID-19 in the workplace, exposure to employee lawsuits of this kind is probably not a feverish worry.

That is because, with very few exceptions, California employees who suffer a work-related injury or illness cannot sue their employer in civil court.  Instead, such employees must pursue relief through a workers-compensation claim.

Even though there probably won’t be a rash of employee lawsuits related to COVID-19, California employers should anticipate an increase in workers-compensation claims related to that coronavirus.  Such claims typically would assert that an employee was exposed to the contagion on the job and became ill, unable to work, and in need of medical attention and treatment.

Indeed, California Gov. Gavin Newsom this week mandated a presumption that an employee’s COVID-19-related illness is work-related under certain circumstances.  In Executive Order N-62-20, signed on May 6, 2020, Gov. Newsom directed that “[a]ny COVID-19-related illness of an employee shall be presumed to arise out of … the employment for purposes of awarding workers’ compensation benefits if [specified] requirements are satisfied.”

Under that executive order, the presumption only arises if the employee tested positive for, or was diagnosed by a qualified physician as having, COVID-19 within 14 days after performing work directed by the employer at the employee’s place of employment.  The presumption does not arise if the employee worked from home during that timeframe, or if he or she was otherwise not on the job on or after March 19, 2020.

Just because such a presumption arises, that does not mean the source of the employee’s infection is beyond dispute.  On the contrary the executive order confirms that the presumption “is disputable and may be controverted by other evidence.”  Moreover, if “an employee has paid sick leave benefits specifically available in response to COVID-19, those benefits [must] be used and exhausted before any [workers-compensation] temporary disability benefits … are due and payable.”

Of course, employees who file such claims may also allege that their illness was caused by the employer’s serious and willful misconduct.  If a worker were to succeed on such a claim, it could result in the “amount of compensation otherwise recoverable [being] increased [by] one-half” under section 4553 of the California Labor Code.

To prevail on such a claim, the infected employee would have to prove that the employer maliciously (not just negligently) engaged in such misconduct.  Simply opening up for business after the government said it was ok to do so, by itself, almost surely wouldn’t amount to serious and willful misconduct – but opening sooner than that might.  Employers also may face greater risk of liability under such a claim if they maliciously (not just carelessly) fail to provide necessary protective gear or enforce social-distancing or sanitary guidelines.

Therefore, absent some unanticipated development, any presumed action that Congress may take in passing a federal law to shield employers from such lawsuits probably won’t have much of an impact in the Golden State.  Still, employers here should be mindful of the new presumption that an employee’s COVID-19 infection may be an industrial illness covered by workers-compensation laws.  To inoculate against potential claims that a COVID-19 infection was caused by serious and willful misconduct, California employers should consult with competent legal counsel to prepare for reopening their business in the coming weeks and months.

SCOTUS Considers Whether Adding a Top-Level Domain Makes a Generic Term a Protectable Trademark

On Monday, May 4, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States heard oral argument in United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com, B.V.  For the first time in the history of the Court, the argument was live streamed via multiple outlets, including CNN, enabling us trademark junkies to listen to the argument in real time. Although it was surely an unfamiliar circumstance for the Court and its litigants, the hearing was mostly without issue. Returning to the case at issue, in USPTO v. Booking.com, the Court addressed whether a business can create a registrable trademark by adding a generic top-level domain name like “.com” to an otherwise unprotectable generic term. Specifically, the Supreme Court addressed whether BOOKING.COM is entitled to trademark registration.

The dispute arose in 2012 when Booking.com sought to register BOOKING.COM as a service mark for its online reservation services. The USPTO’s examining attorney determined that “booking” is generic for hotel reservation services, relying upon dictionary definitions of “booking” and “.com” and the use of “booking” by various other third parties who offer similar services. The examining attorney ultimately refused registration arguing that combining a generic term like “booking” with “.com” simply communicates to consumers that the business offers its services online.

Booking.com sought review of the refusal in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (“District Court”). The District Court agreed with the USPTO that “booking” is generic for the services provided, but unlike the USPTO, the District Court found that combining “booking” with “.com” results in a term that is descriptive, not generic. Because descriptive, unlike generic, marks are entitled to protection if the user can establish the existence of secondary meaning, the District Court considered evidence to determine if consumers recognize BOOKING.COM as a source of services rather than a type of services. After considering survey evidence and evidence of extensive advertising expenditures proffered by Booking.com, the District Court held that that BOOKING.COM is entitled to trademark protection. The decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The USPTO petitioned and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In short, the USPTO has two arguments. First, it argues that the matter is controlled by Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, a pre-Lanham Act case from 1888. The USPTO argues that under Goodyear, Booking.com could not add a “corporate identifier” such as “Company” to a generic term to create a protectable trademark, and as such, it cannot simply add “.com” to a generic term to do so. According to the USPTO, the addition of “.com” to a generic term is nothing more than an identifier indicating that the company’s services are provided online. Second, the USPTO argues that the Fourth Circuit’s decision would permit businesses to monopolize language by registering generic terms as domain names, and then using those trademark rights to preclude competitors from referring to their products by the generic term.

On the other hand, Booking.com argues that Goodyear was superseded by the Lanham Act in 1946. Booking.com argues that, as amended in 1984, the Lanham Act requires courts and the USPTO to determine the primary significance of the mark to the relevant public when analyzing whether a trademark has become generic. Booking.com contends the same test should apply when analyzing whether a term is generic or descriptive, and that consumer surveys are the best way to assess primary significance. Accordingly, because Booking.com’s survey evidence indicates that the public recognizes BOOKING.COM as a trademark rather than a category of service, the mark should be deemed descriptive rather than generic. Therefore, Booking.com reasoned that, because Booking.com established secondary meaning in BOOKING.COM, the mark is entitled to registration, the Court should affirm the Fourth Circuit’s decision.

As usual, the Court had difficult questions for both sides during oral argument, with Justice Thomas even breaking his year-long silence to make inquiries to both parties. In my opinion, the Court had more difficult and troubling questions for the USPTO, but it would be inaccurate to say that the Court wasn’t concerned with the potential monopolistic advantages that could come with its affirmation of the Fourth Circuit’s decision. If I had to guess, I think the Court will affirm the decision, but I will write about the Court’s opinion when it is issued.

Webinar: Staffing Your Restaurant for Reopening

Attorneys Lukas Clary and Shauna Correia are presenting a webinar hosted by the California Restaurant Association to help restaurant owners prepare for reopening.

As restaurants look forward to how their businesses will operate with limited service or hours, they will need to evaluate staffing needs and determine essential employees, as well as understand rights and risk factors for reassigning employees’ duties, reducing employee hours or wages, bringing back furloughed employees, or laying off or continuing to furlough employees.

Date/Time:
Friday, May 8
9:30 AM – 10:30 AM PST

This webinar is a no-cost event and is available for both CRA members and nonmembers to attend.

Registration:
For more information or to register, please click here.

Emergency Paid Sick Leave Now Available for Employees of Large Employers in California’s Food Supply Sector

  • When: May 8, 2020
  • Where: Webinar

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the federal government recently passed emergency legislation making up to two weeks of paid sick leave benefits available to employees who are forced to miss work for reasons relating to COVID-19. We previously blogged about the paid sick leave made available under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”) here and here. The FFCRA’s paid sick leave, however, is not available to employees of large employers, defined as those with at least 500 employees. California has now stepped up to fill that gap for employees in the food supply sector who work for these larger employers.

On April 16, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom signed Executive Order N-51-20, which provides two weeks of paid sick leave to food supply sector employees who are unable to work due to any of the following:

  • A quarantine or isolation order in place by the federal, state, or local government related to COVID-19;
  • Being advised by a healthcare provider to self-quarantine due to COVID-19 concerns;
  • Being prohibited by a hiring entity from working due to COVID-19 concerns.

The order applies to “Food Sector Workers,” which includes farmworkers, agricultural workers, workers who can, freeze, preserve, or harvest food, grocery store and restaurant workers, and delivery drivers. The leave is available to any of the above workers who perform work for a “hiring entity,” which is defined as any entity that has 500 or more employees in the United States.

The Order provides up to 80 hours of paid sick leave for any workers who an employer considers to be full time or those who worked or were scheduled to worker at least 40 hours per week, on average, in the two weeks preceding the date the worker began using the sick leave. In turn, part-time employees are entitled to take up to the average number of hours they are normally scheduled to work over two weeks. If a part-time worker has a variable schedule, they are entitled to take up to 14 times the amount of daily hours they averaged over the preceding 6 months.

The leave is available to all qualifying workers immediately upon either oral or written request. Sick leave hours must be paid at the higher of the workers’ regular rate of pay, the state minimum wage, or the local minimum wage where the worker performs work, but in no event will a worker be entitled to more than $511 per day or an aggregate cap of $5,110.

The intent of the Order is to fill the gap left under the FFCRA that provides similar paid sick leave only to employees of employers with fewer than 500 workers, rather than to provide additional leave to employees who already qualify.  The amount of paid sick leave available, and the floors and caps on the amount of pay are identical to those set forth in the FFCRA’s paid sick leave. In addition, employers are not required to provide additional leave under the Order to those employees who are already entitled to equivalent paid sick leave under the FFCRA or as a discretionary benefit from the employer.

There is, however, one key distinction between the FFCRA leave and the paid sick leave available under Executive Order N-51-20. Whereas employers are entitled to a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for all sick leave paid under the FFCRA, no such tax credit language was included in the State Order. Unless further legislation is passed covering this discrepancy, large employers paying sick leave under this Order will not be reimbursed for it from the State.

In addition to making the sick leave available, employers must post notice to employees of their leave rights under the Order. The Labor Commissioner’s office has created a notice for this purpose, a copy of which can be found here.  Finally, in addition to the paid sick leave discussed above, the Order requires that all food sector workers be permitted to wash their hands every 30 minutes and additionally as needed. Should any employer fail to comply with the order, employees may file complaints with the Labor Commissioner.

California employers should continue to monitor our blog for future updates concerning employment developments as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. We also advise employers to seek legal advice to determine whether Executive Order N-51-20 applies to their business, and if so, what steps to take to ensure compliance.

Finally – SBA Guidance on an Employer’s PPP Loan Forgiveness When Employees Refuse to Return to Work  

On May 3, 2020, the SBA updated its FAQs regarding the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) under the CARES Act.  Among other things, the updated FAQs finally addressed this issue:  What happens to an employer’s ability to have its PPP loan forgiven if employees refuse to return from layoff and thus an employer cannot meet the required full-time employee ratio in connection with the required 75% expenditure of loan proceeds on “payroll costs” during the 8-week Coverage Period?

The SBA’s FAQ No. 40 provides expressly:

40. Question: Will a borrower’s PPP loan forgiveness amount (pursuant to section 1106 of the CARES Act and SBA’s implementing rules and guidance) be reduced if the borrower laid off an employee, offered to rehire the same employee, but the employee declined the offer?

Answer: No. As an exercise of the Administrator’s and the Secretary’s authority under Section 1106(d)(6) of the CARES Act to prescribe regulations granting de minimis exemptions from the Act’s limits on loan forgiveness, SBA and Treasury intend to issue an interim final rule excluding laid-off employees whom the borrower offered to rehire (for the same salary/wages and same number of hours) from the CARES Act’s loan forgiveness reduction calculation. The interim final rule will specify that, to qualify for this exception, the borrower must have made a good faith, written offer of rehire, and the employee’s rejection of that offer must be documented by the borrower. Employees and employers should be aware that employees who reject offers of re-employment may forfeit eligibility for continued unemployment compensation.

While the SBA has not yet finalized their rules, this is good news for those employers who were lucky enough to obtain their PPP loan during the first round of government funding but who have experienced a number of employees who refuse to return to work.  Employers in this situation are cautioned, however, to be sure that the written offer of rehire (or recall to a furloughed employee) is clearly documented, that they can prove the employee received the written offer, and that they have documentation of the employee’s decline of the offer.  This documentation will be needed when applying for loan forgiveness at a future date.

A full copy of the SBA’s May 3, 2020 version of its FAQs regarding the PPP can be obtained at:  https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Paycheck-Protection-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions.pdf

The Labor and Employment attorneys at Weintraub Tobin continue to wish you and yours good health during this very unsettling time.  If we can assist you in any of your employment law needs, feel free to reach out to one of us.

IRS Issues Clarification on Deductibility of Expenses Paid with Forgiven PPP Loans

The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) was established by the recently enacted CARES Act. PPP allows approved lenders to make loans to small businesses operating the United States. The federal government guarantees the repayment of PPP loans while providing borrowers with favorable repayment terms. The loans may be forgiven if the proceeds are expended primarily on employee payroll costs and if certain other employment-related standards are satisfied (we will discuss these requirements in further detail in a future alert following receipt of additional guidance from the Treasury Department). A smaller portion of the loan proceeds may be used to pay interest on mortgage obligations, rent, utilities, and interest on certain other pre-existing debt obligations. Any loan amounts that are not forgiven can be repaid over two years plus one percent interest.

Income tax law normally requires borrowers to recognize income when they are relieved of an obligation to repay a loan. However, the terms of the CARES Act expressly provides that borrowers are not required to recognize income with respect to any PPP loans forgiven.

Unfortunately, the CARES Act was silent as to the deductibility of payments made with the loan proceeds. In Notice 2020-32, the Internal Revenue Service concluded that expenses paid with loan proceeds are not deductible to the extent the loan is forgiven. The IRS based this conclusion on section 265 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides that no deduction is allowable for any expense paid with tax-exempt income. Because the loan is tax-exempt, pursuant to section 265, the use of the funds does not produce a tax deduction.

Notice 2020-32 may not be the final word on this topic. Both Representative Richard Neal (the Democratic chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee) and Senator Chuck Grassley (the Republican chairman of the Senate Finance Committee) have indicated that they would like to pass additional legislation permitting tax deductions for these expenditures. We will update this alert if and when additional relevant legislation is enacted.

Guess What? The Laws HAVE Changed – Avoiding a Conduit Trust Catastrophe after the SECURE Act

Like most estate planners, we always remind clients that tax and estate planning laws are subject to change and frequently do. As busy practitioners, it is impossible for us to reach out to every client when a change might affect him or her, so we remind all clients to come back to see us if they have questions or are concerned about how recent developments affect their plans (and in any event, at least every three to five years).

Trademark Infringers Beware – Willfulness Not Required for Disgorgement

For some time there has been a split among the Federal circuits as to whether evidence of willfulness is required in order to award disgorgement of profits for trademark infringement under Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.  The split stems from how each Federal circuit interprets Section 1117(a) of the Lanham Act which was amended in 1999.  The section reads as follows:

When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits . . .

A number of Federal Circuits, including the Second and the Ninth, have interpreted the above to require a showing of willfulness for disgorgement in Section 1125(a) cases.  Six Federal Circuits do not.  On April 23, 2020 the United States Supreme Court made clear where it stands.