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9th Circuit Agrees Litigant is Vexatious

The San Francisco Daily Journal
April 8, 2008
By John Roemer, Daily Journal Staff Writer

Shareholder Lizbeth “Beth” West is quoted in this article about the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmation of the Los Angeles District Court judge’s decision to declare Jarek Molski a vexatious litigant. Mr. Molski, a Woodland Hills paraplegic who uses a wheelchair, has filed over 400 lawsuits over disability access against California businesses.

LizBeth West criticized these types of lawsuits by individuals such as Mr. Molski, as they are motivated by attorney fees and statutory damages for hyper technical violations of the ADA law. She stated, “Plaintiffs can go in almost in a private regulatory role and subject businesses to great economic hardship.”

Superman and a Super Copyright Battle

On March 26, 2008, the District Court for the Central District of California issued an order closing one chapter to a long running battle between the heirs of one of the original creators of the iconic comic book superhero, Superman, and DC Comics. The court’s order addressed the heirs’ attempt to exercise their rights under the termination provision contained in the Copyright Act of 1976; a formalistic and complex statutory scheme which allows authors and their heirs to terminate a prior grant of copyright in a creation.

At issue in the case was a 1938 grant (and other purported grants) by Jerome Siegel and his creative partner Joseph Shuster, of the copyright in the first edition of Superman published by DC Comics. The court’s order is a detailed 72 page ruling which devotes great consideration to the story behind the creation of Superman. As the court notes, “any discussion about the termination of the initial grant to the copyright in a work begins with the story of the creation of the work itself.”

In 1932 Jerome Siegel and Joseph Shuster were teenagers at Glenville High School in Cleveland, Ohio. Siegel was an aspiring writer and Shuster an aspiring artist. The two men met while working on their high school newspaper and discovered a shared passion for science fiction and comics.

In January, 1933, Siegel and Shuster first introduced the Superman character in a short story, The Reign of the Superman. The story told of a mad scientist’s experiment with a “deprived man from the bread lines,” and the creation of a villain with superhuman powers. A short time later, inspired to introduce a literary character which would bring hope amidst the general despair felt by most as a result of the Depression, Siegel revised the Superman character from a villain to a hero.

Siegel and Shuster made numerous attempts to get their current version of Superman published. The comic book publisher Detective Dan was the first potential publisher. However, Detective Dan later rescinded its offer. Undaunted rejections, Siegel and Shuster continued to work on Superman. They enhanced his powers and modified the format from comic book to newspaper comic strip.

By 1934, Siegel and Shuster had transformed the Superman character to its present day incarnation. Dressed in its now well known cape and outfit, complete with the “S” crest on its chest, Superman possessed superhuman strength, had the ability to jump an eight of a mile and leap a twenty story building; the character could run faster than an express train and was impervious to gunfire. Siegel and Shuster had also developed the concept of Superman’s secret identity and humanized this character by giving it an “ordinary person” alter ego in the form of Clark Kent.

The two shopped Superman for a number of years to numerous publishers but were unsuccessful. During that time, Siegel and Shuster wrote other comic strips that were sold to Nickelson Publishing Company. When Nickelson closed up in 1937, Detective Comics acquired some of the comic properties that Siegel and Shuster had written. On December 4, 1937, Siegel and Shuster entered into an agreement with Detective Comics and agreed to continue to furnish these comics for the next two years. The agreement also gave Detective Comics a sixty day option to publish any new material created by Siegel and Shuster.

Soon thereafter, Detective Comics decided to issue a new comic book magazine entitled Action Comic and became interested in Siegel and Shuster’s Superman material. With Detective Comics intending to publish Superman in an expanded thirteen page format, Siegel and Shuster began work on revising and expanding the existing Superman newspaper material into a format suitable for a comic book. In February, 1938 Siegel and Shuster resubmitted their Superman material to Detective Comics. On March 1, 1938, prior to the printing of the first issue of Action Comics, Detective Comics sent Siegel a check for $130.00 (representing the per page rate for the thirteen page Superman comic book) and a written agreement for Siegel and Shuster’s signature. The agreement assigned to Detective Comics “[all] the goodwill attached…and exclusive right[s]” to Superman “to have and hold forever.” Siegel and Shuster signed and returned the written assignment to Detective Comics.

Siegel and Shuster’s grant of worldwide ownership rights in Superman was later confirmed in a September 22, 1938 employment agreement in which Siegel and Shuster acknowledged that Detective Comics was “the exclusive owner of Superman.” This agreement also provided for Siegel and Shuster to continue to supply the artwork and storyline for Superman at a per page rate for the next five years.

Superman was published by Detective Comics on April 19, 1938 in Volume One of Action Comics. The comic was highly successful. However, while Superman continued to grow in popularity, a rift developed between the two creators, and Detective Comics. The parties engaged in legal bouts and disputes beginning in 1947, when Siegel and Shuster brought an action against Detective Comics seeking, among other things, to rescind their previous agreements with Detective Comics based lack of mutuality and consideration. The parties litigated again in 1969 as a result of the expiration of the initial copyright term for Superman. Siegel and Shuster brought suit seeking a declaration that they, not Detective Comics, were the owners of the renewal rights to the Superman copyrights. The results were not fruitful, and in 1970 the Federal District Court in New York ruled that the March 1, 1938 grant to Detective Comics (which was reconfirmed in a 1948 stipulation) had transferred and assigned to Detective Comics not only the initial copyright term, but the renewal term in the Superman copyrights as well.

In 1976, Congress made substantial changes to the Copyright Act, and these changes would have a great and profound affect on Siegel and Shuster and their grant of rights to Detective Comics. The 1976 Act expanded the duration of the renewal term for works like Volume One of Action Comics that were already in their renewal term at the time of the Act’s passage. Additionally, the Act gave artists and their heirs the ability to terminate any prior grant of rights to their creation where the grants were executed before January 1, 1978. The purpose was to protect authors, given their lack of bargaining power. Specifically, Section 304(c) of the Act provided that any copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal term on January 1, 1978, other than a copyright in a work for hire, the exclusive or non-exclusive transfer or license executed before January 1, 1978 is subject to termination notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. It was this right of termination that spurred ten years of negotiation and litigation between the heirs of Jerome Siegel and Detective Comics, its parent company Time Warner, and their affiliated entities.

While the 1976 Act created a new right allowing authors and their heirs to terminate a prior grant of copyright, the Act also set forth specific steps concerning the timing and contents of the termination notice that must be served in order to effectuate termination. The termination of a grant may be effective “at any time during a period of five years beginning of the end of 56 years from the date the copyright was originally secured” and the notice of termination must by served “not less than two or more than ten years” before its effective date. These statutory requirements, along with regulations promulgated by the Register of Copyright made the termination process difficult, complex and extremely technical. However, through assistance of able counsel, the Siegel heirs were able to serve seven separate notices of termination on April 3, 1997, purporting to terminate several of Siegel’s grants in the Superman copyright. The parties negotiated until February, 2002 but were unable to come to terms. Litigation commenced in 2004.

Detective Comics attacked the enforceability of the termination notices and claimed that certain portions of the Superman comic in Volume one of Action Comics were in the nature of a work for hire and not subject to termination. Detective Comics raised other technical challenges to the claims made by Siegel’s heirs. Although highly technical and intricate, the court essentially ruled in favor of Siegel’s heirs and returned to them the copyright in the Superman material that was published in Volume one of Action Comics. Left undecided was how to apportion the profits from the exploitation of new derivative works on a going forward basis. (A termination of rights does not affect the post termination utilization and exploitation of derivative work prepared before termination.) The Court noted that section 304(c)(6)(E) would appear to exclude the Siegel heirs from sharing in profits derived from the foreign exploitation of the Superman material. Additionally, the Court noted that profits derived form the use of the Superman trademarks need not be shared with the Siegel heirs. Also left open is the issue of an accounting for profits resulting from the exploitations of the works by Detective Comics’ corporate siblings, Warner Brothers Entertainment and its corporate parent Time Warner Inc. The genesis of this claim stems from certain inter-corporate transactions concerning the Superman copyright. In noting that summary judgment was inappropriate (and surely ensuring another ten years of litigation), the court noted that “whether the license fees paid represents the fair market value…or whether the license for the works was a sweetheart deal…” are questions of fact that are not answered on summary judgments.

LEGAL Alert – Updating Employment Policies

Download: Legal Alert – Updating Employment Policies (1025969).pdf

Updating Employment Policies

Below is a Notice from the U.S. Department of Labor regarding the new Military Family Leave entitlement added to the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). For those employers covered by the FMLA, this new entitlement will require that FMLA policies in employee handbooks and policy manuals be updated to appropriately reflect the new law.

However, this is not the only new law that recently went into effect which requires employers to review and update their employee handbooks and policy manuals. A number of other laws, such as California’s new Military Spouse Leave; changes in state minimum wage and minimum salary requirements for exempt employees; the upcoming restrictions on cell phone usage while driving; health insurance and mandatory sick leave requirements for employees in San Francisco; and compliance with certain statutory training requirements, also impact the employer’s policy and handbook language.

We recommend that employers have their employee handbooks or policy manuals audited for compliance with employment laws no less than every two years. If you have not updated your employee handbook or policy manual to reflect the recent changes and updates in federal and state law, now is the time to do so. We would be happy to assist you in this audit and update. Please feel free to contact us if you are interested in these services.

Upcoming Seminars:

We also want to let you know that the following seminars are on the horizon and separate invitations will be mailed out shortly.

May 15, 2008: “Untangling the Complex Web of Leaves and Absences: FMLA/CFRA, PDL, ADA/FEHA, and Workers’ Compensation.”

June 19, 2008: “Wage and Hour Laws: Understanding Some Important Intricacies Like: “Exempt” v. “Non-Exempt” Status; Proper Calculation of the “Regular Rate of Pay” and “Overtime Premiums;” and the True Meaning of “Hours Worked.”

We hope you can join us.

NOTICE

Military Family Leave

On January 28, President Bush signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (NDAA), Public Law 110-181. Section 585(a) of the NDAA amended the FMLA to provide eligible employees working for covered employers two important new leave rights related to military service:

(1) New Qualifying Reason for Leave. Eligible employees are entitled to up to 12 weeks of leave because of “any qualifying exigency” arising out of the fact that the spouse, son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on active duty, or has been notified of an impending call to active duty status, in support of a contingency operation. By the terms of the statute, this provision requires the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations defining “any qualifying exigency.” In the interim, employers are encouraged to provide this type of leave to qualifying employees.

(2) New Leave Entitlement. An eligible employee who is the spouse, son, daughter, parent, or next of kin of a covered servicemember who is recovering from a serious illness or injury sustained in the line of duty on active duty is entitled to up to 26 weeks of leave in a single 12-month period to care for the servicemember. This provision became effective immediately upon enactment. This military caregiver leave is available during “a single 12-month period” during which an eligible employee is entitled to a combined total of 26 weeks of all types of FMLA leave.

Additional information on the amendments and a version of Title I of the FMLA with the new statutory language incorporated are available on the FMLA amendments Web site at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/fmla/NDAA_fmla.htm.

Weintraub Firm Represents Private Fund in Preferred Stock Investment

Download: Central Valley Fund Source Logistics Press Release.pdf

SACRAMENTO, Calif., March 31, 2008 –Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, a Sacramento-based business law and business litigation firm, represented the Central Valley Fund, a private investment fund with offices in Davis and Fresno, California, with a preferred stock investment of approximately $2.75 million in Source Holding Delaware, LLC. The investment was used to assist management in expanding the company’s shipping and storage logistics operations.

Source Holding Delaware, LLC based in Los Angeles provides logistics solutions for the storage and freight handling needs for Mexican and Latin American consumer products manufacturers exporting product throughout the United States. The company also utilizes a network of warehouses to assist in logisitcs. The Central Valley Fund was established by the principals of Gael Partners, LLC to finance later stage growth through mezzanine and prefered equity investments. It focuses on making investments in California’s Central Valley and throughout the state.

Shareholder Chris Chediak and associate Jeff Pietsch of the firm’s corporate and securities group assisted the Central Valley Fund with the investment. “We are pleased to work with our client Central Valley Fund to expand their investments and reach into the Los Angeles market,” said Chris Chediak.

Weintraub Genshlea Chediak is Sacramento’s leading business and litigation law firm with one of the largest corporate practices in the region. Major practice areas include litigation, real estate, corporate, securities, banking, intellectual property, licensing and distribution, nonprofit law, entertainment, labor and employment, fiduciary abuse, tax, trusts and estates.

Trademark Infringement: Factors Considered in Consumer Confusion

Trademark infringement occurs when a third party uses a mark in a way that infringes upon a trademark owner’s exclusive right and use of a trademark. Often, the third party will use a similar mark in a way that confuses consumers as to the source of the goods and services. For example, a fast food restaurant named “Wendi’s” would likely cause confusion with “Wendy’s.” Trademark infringement can occur only when it is likely that consumers will be confused as to the source of the goods. The purpose of this article is to examine the test and factors that courts use to determine if such infringement exists.

Many courts have developed a balancing test to determine if a mark infringes on another. This balancing test has largely grown from the seminal case Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2nd Cir. 1961). In that case, the court identified several variables to consider when assessing if a mark is infringing on another mark. This balancing test seeks to determine if consumers would likely be confused as to the source of the marks. If the test favors that confusion would likely result, then the court will likely rule that infringement exists. On the other hand, if confusion is unlikely or minimal, the court will likely rule against infringement.

The following are factors used by courts to assess the possibility of trademark infringement by looking at the likelihood of consumer confusion. Not one of these factors is dispositive to the issue of consumer confusion, and each factor must be examined in the context of the ultimate likelihood of confusion.

The first factor the court will look at is the strength of the marks in question. The strength of the marks is determined by distinctiveness of the mark. The more unique and distinct the mark, the more likely the mark will be protected against junior users. On the hand, the more descriptive and generic the mark, the less protection courts will provide to these marks. For example, the mark KODAK will receive more protection than a similar product that uses the mark FAST PHOTO.

Another factor examined is the similarity between the marks. Similarity of marks is tested based on sight, sound and meaning. The marks will be considered in their entirety to determine any similarities. A mark that looks different from another but gives off a similar commercial impression might be considered similar and thus weigh in favor of confusion. For example, a trademark that consisted of the word MONEY might be confused with the mark $$$ because the marks have similar commercial impressions.

The courts will also look at the proximity of the goods in the marketplace. This test relates to the channels of trade used by the goods. The more related the goods the greater the likelihood that they would exist together in the marketplace. Similar marks that are also are related would likely cause confusion as to the source of those goods. Highly related goods are more likely to cause confusion compared to unrelated goods.

The above three factors weigh heavily in determining likelihood of confusion. A mark will not be found confusingly similar with another mark if the two are not found similar in one of these areas, and the complaining mark is considered a weak mark.

After reviewing these, the courts will examine the likelihood that the prior owner will “bridge the gap” in the marketplace. This factor addresses the possibility that a mark will expand into other product lines. The more likely expansion will occur, the more likely consumer confusion will exist.

Next the courts examine evidence of actual confusion. When a case is brought to trial, the evidence is usually in the form of consumer surveys done by the parties. Survey evidence of this nature is often critical in determining likelihood of confusion in infringement cases.

The courts will also look to the sophistication of the buyers of the goods or services to determine likelihood of confusion. Courts have found that sophisticated buyers, such as those who have expertise in a specific area, are less likely to be confused by similarities in marks. In addition, courts have held that consumers of goods and services that are expensive exercise a higher degree of care in making these expensive purchasers. For example, a consumer would exercise a higher degree of care when purchasing a car compared to when that consumer purchases a piece of candy.

The last factor courts examine in a trademark infringement case is the intent of the defendant. If the defendant copies an existing trademark in bad faith to capitalize on that trademark’s goodwill, the courts will lean in favor of finding infringement. The likelihood of confusion, however, is the main consideration in determining infringement regardless of intent. If an individual copies a mark that does not lead to consumer confusion, the courts will likely not find infringement.

The above are not a rigid set of factors used by the courts. Most jurisdictions use some form of the above factors to determine if a likelihood of confusion exists. Regardless of the different variations, courts ultimately are seeking to discover if marks, as they are used in commerce, cause consumer confusion and lead to trademark infringement.

The Ninth Circuit Just Doesn’t Like Karaoke

The Ninth Circuit just doesn’t like karaoke. At least, that’s what plaintiffs, manufacturers of karaoke machines, in two recent opinions involving copyright law would likely say. In both decisions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ dismissal of the complaints without leave to amend. Both of these decisions discussed the various copyrights that are implicated in a karaoke device, including the copyright of the performance of the song itself, the song lyrics, and the synchronization of the two. Both decisions also involved the licenses required by karaoke device manufacturers.

In the first, Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 512 F3d 522 (9th Cir. 2008), the court addressed a matter of first impression in the Circuit: How does the Copyright Act apply to karaoke devices? Plaintiff Leadsinger is a karaoke device manufacturer. The device it manufactures is “an all-in-one microphone player” that connects directly to a television and has recorded songs imbedded in a microchip in the microphone. While playing, the Leadsinger device, like most karaoke devices, plays music and projects the song lyrics visually on the screen synchronized with the music.

Copyright law grants the copyright owner the exclusive rights reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work in “phonorecords.” However, as the Leadsinger court noted these exclusive rights are subject to a compulsory license under section 115, which “subjects phonorecords to a compulsory licensing scheme that authorizes any person who complies with its provisions to obtain a license to make and distribute phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work.” If, as Leadsinger argued, its karaoke device was a “phonorecord,” then the compulsory license under section 115 would allow the use of the songs and lyrics.

The gravamen of the dispute involved license fees that BMG demanded of Leadsinger. As the court explained, “in addition to the mechanical fee required under to secure a compulsory license, BMG has demanded that Leadsinger and other karaoke companies pay a ‘lyric reprint’ fee and a ‘synchronization fee.’ Leadsinger has refused to pay these additional fees and filed for declaratory judgment to resolve whether it has the right to visually display song lyrics in real time with song recordings….” In essence, Leadsinger believes that the compulsory mechanical license under 17 U.S.C. § 115 should cover everything, and it should not be required to pay a separate fee to show the lyrics or to synchronize the lyrics with the music.

The Copyright Act defines “phonorecords” as “material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Audiovisual works” are defined as “works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any….” Id.

The Ninth Circuit found that the use of the lyrics, in projecting them on the screen synchronized with the music, met every element of an “audiovisual work,” and therefore was not a phonorecord. The court found that the “images of successive portions of song lyrics are ‘intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machine [sic] … together with accompanying sounds.’” As an audiovisual work, it was excluded from the compulsory licensing scheme in § 115.

The end result was that Leadsinger could not rely just on the compulsory license fees it paid to BMG to make and distribute copies of phonorecords, it also had to pay BMG fees for synchronization licenses and reprint licenses to display the song lyrics.

In the second case, Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp. et al., — F3d —, 2008 WL 509245 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit continued its apparent disdain for karaoke. In that case, Plaintiff Sybersound Records, another karaoke device manufacturer, sued several of its competitors over the same licenses that were at issue in Leadsinger. In Sybersound, however, the complaint was that the other manufacturer defendants were not paying the license fees, therefore they were able to undercut Sybersound’s prices and compete unfairly. Sybersound claimed it was injured because it did pay all required license fees, and therefore its costs were higher than his competitors.

Sybersound’s problem, however, is that they didn’t own the copyrights on which they claimed the license fees were due. Because it didn’t own the copyrights, Sybersound did not have standing to complain about the actual infringement due to failure to pay the license fees. Apparently recognizing this problem, Sybersound sued instead for violations of California’s unfair competition law, RICO violations, and intentional interference. But all of these claims rested on one alleged wrong – the infringement of the copyrights Sybersound lacked standing to address. The court held that because Sybersound lacked standing to sue for copyright infringement, it also lacked standing to sue for related claims that required the copyright claims to be decided. The court also held that the unfair competition claim was preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.

Thus, for the second time in two months, the Ninth Circuit pulled the plug on karaoke plaintiffs. However, in so doing, it left us with a few reminders of what should probably be obvious points. First, karaoke devices, and the recordings that are played on them, contain more than one copyright. Each of these rights is separate and requires a separate license. Second, a plaintiff can only complain of the infringement of rights it owns. And third, a plaintiff cannot easily plead around this standing requirement by recasting its complaint in terms of other related claims. Or perhaps it’s really as simple as the Ninth Circuit just doesn’t like karaoke.

Federal Circuit Applies Supreme Court’s New Test for Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction

The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed a district court’s dismissal of a declaratory judgment action, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007). See Micron Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc., 2008 WL 540182 (Feb. 29, 2008)

Micron was one of the four largest manufacturers of dynamic random access memory (DRAM) chips. Micron, together with Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd, Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., and Infineon Technologies of North America, controlled seventy-five percent of the worldwide market for these chips.

MOSAID held patents on the circuit technology that was used in the manufacture of DRAM chips. In 2001 and 2002, MOSAID sent a series of four letters to Micron inviting Micron to license MOSAID’s patents.

After sending letters to all four of the manufacturers who declined to enter into licenses with MOSAID, MOSAID began patent infringement litigation against each of the manufacturers. MOSAID first sued Samsung. Infineon then sued MOSAID for declaratory judgment of noninfringement. MOSAID and Samsung settled. MOSAID then sued Hynix, who later settled. MOSAID then settled with Infineon. In each settlement, MOSAID granted the manufacturer a license under its patents. MOSAID made statements in public and in its 2005 annual report that it intended to “aggressively” pursue all other DRAM manufacturers to force them to license MOSAID’s technology, and that it would be “unrelenting” in its litigation strategy. The industry believed that Micron was the next target of MOSAID.

In July 2005, Micron filed a declaratory judgment in the Northern District of California seeking a declaration of noninfringement of 14 patents owned by MOSAID. The following day, MOSAID sued Micron and two other defendants, in the Eastern District of Texas, for infringing seven patents. MOSAID later added one more defendant and three more patents to the Texas action.

MOSAID then moved to dismiss the California action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted MOSAID’s motion on the grounds that Micron had no reasonable apprehension of being sued by MOSAID. The district court found that there was no evidence of threats from MOSAID to Micron for the last four years, no threats from MOSAID to Micron’s customers, and no public statements by MOSAID that it intented to sue Micron.

Micron appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed.

The court first held that the district court in California did have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The district court had applied the wrong test – the “reasonable apprehension” test is not the proper test, according to the Supreme Court in MedImmune. The correct test, which the appellate court repeatedly stated “is more lenient,” is “whether the facts alleged under all the circumstances show that there is a substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Micron, quoting MedImmune, 127 S.Ct. at 771.

In applying this test, a district court must look at the evidence of all of the circumstances. In this case, the evidence included the series of letters from MOSAID to Micron, the previous suits from MOSAID against the other three manufacturers, and MOSAID’s public statements of its intent to aggressively pursue litigation against the remaining manufacturers.

The appellate court explained that this case was just the type of case for which the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended. The court explained the purpose of the Act as follows, quoting from a previous decision in Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2005):

“[A] patent owner…attempts extra-judicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty and insecurity…Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors were no longer restricted to in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.”

The court next addressed the district court’s discretion not to hear a case even if it has subject matter jurisdiction. The court explained that, based on MOSAID’s filing of its patent infringement suit against Micron in Texas one day after Micron filed its declaratory judgment action in California, “the parties in this dispute are really just contesting the location and right to choose the form for their inevitable suit.” Because of the “more lenient” test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction, the court noted that there is an increased likelihood of “a forum-seeking race to the courthouse between accused infringers and patent holders.” As a result, district courts must perform an analysis under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), considering the factors of convenience. In essence, if there is subject matter jurisdiction in two different forums, the real issue is “the convenience and suitability of competing forums.”

The court stated that under §1404(a), in general, the forum of the first-filed action controls, but that the interests of justice and convenience factors could alter that rule. In particular, courts should consider the convenience of witnesses, the lack of jurisdiction over necessary or desirable parties, and the existence and possible consolidation of related cases.

In this case, the court found that MOSAID is a Canadian company, but that it had operations in the Northern District of California. Both MOSAID and Micron did business in both California and Texas; there were no related cases in Texas; and there was no evidence regarding the convenience or availability of witnesses. Therefore, the first-filed forum, the Northern District of California, was proper.

Weintraub Firm Represents Private Fund in $3.35 Million Investment

Download: Central Valley Fund Ultra Gro LLC Press Release.pdf

SACRAMENTO, Calif., March 12, 2008 –Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, a Sacramento-based business law and business litigation firm, represented the Central Valley Fund, a private investment fund with offices in Davis and Fresno, California, with a mezzanine investment of approximately $3.35 million in Ultra Gro, LLC. The investment was used to fund a buyout of the family-owned company by a management team intent on maintaining and growing the business.

Ultra Gro, LLC based in Madera, California, formulates, blends, and distributes liquid agricultural fertilizers customized for a diverse group of crop growers, primarily in the Central San Joaquin Valley. The Central Valley Fund was established by the principals of Gael Partners, LLC to finance later stage growth through mezzanine and prefered investments. It focuses on making investments in California’s Central Valley and throughout the state (www.centralvalleyfund.com).

Shareholders Chris Chediak and Mike De Angelis of the firm’s corporate and securities group assisted the Central Valley Fund with the investment. “We are pleased to assist the Central Valley Fund with their investment and mission of continued growth in California’s Central Valley,” said Chris Chediak.

Weintraub Genshlea Chediak is Sacramento’s leading business and litigation law firm with one of the largest corporate practices in the region. Major practice areas include litigation, real estate, corporate, securities, banking, intellectual property, licensing and distribution, nonprofit law, entertainment, labor and employment, fiduciary abuse, tax, trusts and estates.

Weintraub Firm Represents Public Company in $14 Million International Acquisition

Download: NutraCea Acquisition Press Release.pdf

SACRAMENTO, Calif., March 5, 2008 –Weintraub Genshlea Chediak, a Sacramento-based business law and business litigation firm, represented NutraCea, a world leader in stabilized rice bran or SRB, technology and nutrient research, based in Phoenix, Arizona, in the acquisition of Irgovel, the largest South American rice bran oil processing facility, for approximately $14 million.

The 70,000 ton annual capacity facility provides NutraCea with the opportunity to expand its marketable products to rice bran oil, in addition to its current portfolio of patented and proprietary stabilized rice bran, into the South American marketplace. They expect to invest additional $4 to $6 million in 2008 to refurbish Irgovel’s facility, thus preparing the company to generate approximately $30 million in annual sales from rice bran oil. NutraCea also plans to install its proprietary technology during 2008 to improve the dynamics of the traditional rice bran oil extraction business for the production of higher value-added derivative products. These new derivative products could result in meaningful additional revenue from 2009.

Shareholder Chris Chediak and associate Jeff Pietsch of the firm’s corporate and securities group, and Meritas affiliated law firm Felsberg e Associados in Sao Paulo, Brazil, assisted NutraCea with the acquisition. Weintraub Genshlea Chediak is a member of Meritas (www.meritas.org), a global alliance of business law firms that delivers localized legal service of the highest quality worldwide. “We are very pleased that we could provide a positive outcome for our client after many months of negotiations between the two parties as well as with the Brazilian government,” said Chris Chediak.

Weintraub Genshlea Chediak is Sacramento’s leading business and litigation law firm with one of the largest corporate practices in the region. Major practice areas include litigation, real estate, corporate, securities, banking, intellectual property, licensing and distribution, nonprofit law, entertainment, labor and employment, fiduciary abuse, tax, trusts and estates. For more information, please visit weintraub.com.